Plans to build the Kalabagh dam, have been the source of tensions between regional states in Pakistan for more than thirty years. However, water tensions between upstream Punjab and downstream Sindh stretch back much further, at least to the time of British colonial rule (Akhter, 2015). Politicians in Sindh have described the dam as a “water theft” by the Punjab region (Niazi, 2018; Dawn, 2018) and construction of water infrastructure in Punjab is a source of recurring protests in Sindh (e.g. see Rizvi, 2006; Dawn, 2018).

Many disputes over dams on the Indus stem from a power asymmetry between upstream and downstream riparians, where the tendency is for upstream riparians to take more water than their share in times of shortage (IUCN, 2010). Arguments around Kalabagh are no exception, however there is also opposition to its construction from the upper riparian province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Although the dam will be built in the Punjab region, much of the water catchment is situated in KP province as the border between the two states is directly north of Kalabagh. This means KP risks losing a large area of agricultural land. In absence of detailed benefit sharing plans between regional states, politicians fear that proper compensation will not be paid (Mustafa,et al 2017; Alam, 2019).

 Following mass protests and strong opposition from the state of Sindh, the project was suspended in 2008. However, planning re-opened in 2012 and the project currently awaits assessment from the Federal water ministry (Dawn, 2019). Concerns over the potential negative impacts of the dam have led to renewed protests from Sindh.

The proponents’ arguments
Punjabi officials and the National government often present the dam as a way to benefit the national economy as a whole - even though it was first proposed as a measure to address water and energy supply gaps in Punjab. The Kalabagh hydro-electric dam has been defended as a necessary means of supplying water for agriculture in the context of Pakistan's shrinking reserves, and existential threats to Pakistan as a nation (Rizvi, 2006, Tribune news desk, 2018). Benefits are often presented at the national scale and refer to national level data.

In 2005, Pakistan’s water supply was 29% short of what was required and, with current water supply infrastructures, this is estimated to reach 33% by 2025 (Feyyaz, 2011).

The Kalabagh dam is also seen by proponents as a climate-friendly method to provide Pakistan with renewable energy. The Pakistani government argues that the extension of hydropower as central to its intended nationally determined contribution to climate change mitigation (INDC) as set out in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016).  In 2011, the supply-demand gap in electricity was calculated to have ranged between 1500 and 2500MW per day (Feyyaz, 2011).

It is also presented as a way of controlling floodwaters for disaster risk reduction and as a way of adapting to climate change, which has also become a priority given predictions of increasingly unpredictable and destructive monsoon seasons (Feyyaz, 2011). Monsoonal rains often swell the banks of the Indus River, causing devastating flooding. This occurred in 2010 when floods caused at least 2000 fatalities and wiped out 1.1 million hectares of crops (Farmer, 2010). Moreover, climate related water stress has been used as an argument in favour of construction. Water availability during the winter cropping season has been dwindling across Pakistan (Feyyaz, 2011), suggesting a need for additional water storage capacities.

Disputes surrounding the dam
Opponents to the plans are generally suspicious of ideas of national unity and development citing regional disparities in both the economic development of Pakistan and the negative effects of large water projects. Sindhi politicians have been particularly outspoken in the past over the construction of large dams (e.g. Tarbela dam). Further conflicts date back to the development of irrigation canals by colonial authorities in the late 1900s and post-independence water allocations between India and Pakistan as agreed in the Indus Waters Treaty (Ahkter, 2015; Mustafa,et al 2017; see also Interstate Conflict in the Indus River basin). Dams have arguably intensified tensions between regional blocks and worsened regional fragmentation (Ahkter, 2015). Sindh claims the Kalabagh Dam the dam would further strip them of their rights to water and decimate downstream water access and quality for farmers and urban centres.

These political tensions are reflected in ideological differences between dominant political leaders in the various provinces. Some have noted a tendency in Sindhi and Balochistani politicians towards discourses of regional identity, equity and ecology; situating them in opposition to the “national” “developmentalist” agenda in Punjab, which favours large scale infrastructure and the modernisation of the country as a national unit (Mustafa,et al 2017).

Construction is also opposed due to its likely impact on communities on the planned construction site. It is predicted that 10,200 acres of land will need to be inundated, displacing an estimated 120,000 people. Politicians in KP are sceptical of Kalabagh. Even Punjabi citizens of the Mianwali district near the planned dam argue that the benefits of the dam will be unevenly distributed (Dawn, 2010).

Some argue that increasing water demands used as justification for dams is drawn primarily from powerful landowners resisting limitations on their water use. While negative impacts are felt foremost by poorer downstream communities in cities like Karachi who already lack access to sufficient drinking water (Pasha, 2018). Some large landowners downstream may also be affected. While they may be compensated, landless people are often less likely to receive compensation for the loss of their livelihoods (Mustafa,et al 2017). The disparities in the distribution of risks and benefits of the dams are thus well reflected in the disputes over its construction.

Taking climate change into consideration
Climate change is predicted to have multiple effects on water in Pakistan which is already considered one of the world’s most water-stressed countries (Kugelman, 2016). The Himalayan Glaciers which feed the Indus basin, are predicted to diminish more in the coming years. This may increase water flow in the short run while depleting ground water recharge in the long run, thus reducing de-facto energy production (Jayaram, 2016). Meanwhile heavy rains during the monsoon are predicted to become more irregular bringing challenges for addressing potential flood risks (Stolbova, et al., 2016). This could potentially affect the dams ability to block surges, and is also likely to aggravate tensions around issues of water distribution and timing flow management and reduce water availability along the Indus basin (Diamond, 2014).

The dam has been presented more recently as a strategy to adapt to climate change while increasing economic growth and meeting energy demand. However, potential benefits of the dam could be undermined by the effects of climate change on the Indus basin and could multiply the effects of climate change on some regions adding to the likelihood of conflict.