



2019

**Global Report
on Food Crises**

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This third annual *Global Report on Food Crises* (GRFC 2019) marks another major collaborative effort between numerous agencies in the international humanitarian and development community to share their data, analysis, knowledge and expertise regarding people facing food crises. Producing this report is a complex and iterative process, which is coordinated by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) but would not have been possible without the dedication and contributions of numerous agencies and individuals.

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FOREWORD

This year's *Global Report on Food Crises* highlights the plight of millions of people who must fight every day against acute hunger and malnutrition.

The report also points the way towards solutions that can rebuild lives and livelihoods in communities around the world.

Climate-induced disasters, economic crises and, above all, armed conflict, continued to drive hunger rates and food insecurity in 2018.

Last May, the United Nations Security Council condemned the use of starvation as a weapon of war.

Determined action is needed to uphold this pledge.

In this spirit, I welcome your efforts to focus on food and agriculture in times of crisis.

Let us all commit to building societies without hunger – and a world at peace.

António Guterres,

Secretary-General of the United Nations



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations



SICA
Sistema de la Integración
Centroamericana

unicef
for every child



World Food
Programme

"I can describe the horrors of what it was like to live under siege... but to describe how it feels to be hungry? On day one it is bad, and on day two you start to think, 'what can I do about this?' Beyond that I will not say."

Syrian refugee

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KEY FINDINGS



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY GLOBAL ESTIMATES IN 2018

More than 113 million people across 53 countries experienced acute hunger requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihoods assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in 2018.

The worst food crises in 2018, in order of severity, were: Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, South Sudan and north Nigeria. These eight countries accounted for two thirds of the total number of people facing acute food insecurity - amounting to nearly 72 million people.

Countries in Africa remained disproportionately affected by food insecurity

The figure of 113 million people represents a slight improvement over the number for 2017 presented in last year's report, in which an estimated 124 million people in 51 countries faced acute hunger.

Despite the slight decrease, over the past three years, the report has consistently shown that, year on year, more than 100 million people (2016, 2017 and 2018) have faced periods of acute hunger.

The modest decrease between 2017 and 2018 is largely attributed to changes in climate shocks. A number of highly exposed countries did not experience the intensity of climate-related shocks and stressors that they had experienced in 2017 when they variously faced severe drought, flooding, erratic rains and temperature rises brought on by the El Niño of 2015-16. These include countries in southern and eastern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific region.

An additional 143 million people in a subset of 42 countries were found to be living in *Stressed* conditions on the cusp of acute hunger (IPC/CH Phase 2). They risked slipping into *Crisis* or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) if faced with a shock or stressor.

High levels of acute and chronic malnutrition in children living in emergency conditions remained of grave concern. The immediate drivers of undernutrition include poor dietary intake and disease. Mothers and caregivers often face challenges in providing children with the key micronutrients they need at critical growth periods in food crises. This is reflected in the dismally low number of children consuming a minimum acceptable diet in most of the countries profiled in this report.

Primary drivers

Conflict and insecurity, climate shocks and economic turbulence - the main drivers of food insecurity - continued to erode livelihoods and destroy lives.

Conflict and insecurity remained the key driver in 2018. Some 74 million people - two thirds of those facing acute hunger - were located in 21 countries and territories affected by conflict or insecurity. Around 33 million of these people were in 10 countries in Africa; over 27 million were in seven countries and territories in West Asia/Middle East; 13 million were in three countries in South/South-east Asia and 1.1 million in Eastern Europe.

Climate and natural disasters pushed another 29 million people into situations of acute food insecurity in 2018. As in previous years, most of these individuals were in Africa, where nearly 23 million people in 20 countries were acutely food insecure primarily due to climate shocks.

Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity for 10.2 million people, mainly in Burundi, the Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Food insecurity: short-term outlook for 2019

Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, South Sudan and north Nigeria are expected to remain among the world's most severe food crises in 2019. Large segments of populations in most of these countries risk falling into *Emergency* (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.

Climate shocks and conflict will continue driving food insecurity and are expected once again to severely affect several regions. Dry weather in parts of southern Africa and drought in Central America's Dry Corridor have dampened prospects for agricultural output. El Niño conditions are likely to have an impact on agricultural production and food prices in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The needs of refugees and migrants in host countries are expected to remain significant in Bangladesh and the Syria regional crisis. The number of displaced people, refugees and migrants are expected to increase if the political and economic crisis persists in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

TWO GLOBAL HUNGER REPORTS

This report complements the evidence reported by *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018 (ex SOFI)*, which identifies 821 million undernourished people. While the SOFI estimate provides the scale of chronic food insecurity worldwide, the *Global Report on Food Crises* focuses specifically on the most severe manifestations of acute food insecurity in the world's most pressing food crises.

The way forward


Ending conflicts, empowering women, nourishing and educating children, improving rural infrastructure and reinforcing social safety-nets are essential for a resilient, stable and hunger-free world.

Information and technology can capture changes in food security - especially in fragile countries and contexts - on a near real-time basis. Though this report demonstrates that overall, quality of data has improved, there are countries for which there are data gaps. Collecting and analysing data on vulnerable populations is vital to ensure a situation analysis that identifies not only outcomes, but hunger's key drivers, for a targeted and integrated response for multiple partners working in development and humanitarian spheres.

In the last 10 years, humanitarian assistance and spending needs have grown by around 127 percent - approximately 40 percent of which went to cover needs in the food and agriculture subsectors. The surge in humanitarian needs - as well as the potential for agricultural development and rural resilience-building to provide a buffer against crises - highlights the need for a new way of responding to the food security challenges of this new era.

Investments in conflict prevention and sustaining peace will save lives and livelihoods, reduce structural vulnerabilities and address the root causes of hunger. The findings of this report clearly demonstrate the need for simultaneous action across the humanitarian-development nexus to deliver a hunger-free world in the 21st century.

1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODS



WHY THIS REPORT?

For several years the number of people who cannot meet their daily food needs without humanitarian assistance has been rising, primarily driven by two factors: persistent instability in conflict-ridden regions and adverse climate events.¹

These growing needs have been reflected in the increasing level of international humanitarian assistance, which reached US\$27.3 billion in 2017, up from US\$18.4 billion in 2013.² While critical to saving lives and alleviating human suffering, humanitarian assistance does not address the root causes of food crises.

In response, those coordinating emergency humanitarian assistance are working more seriously with those in development support and conflict prevention to find ways to reverse the current trend in escalating numbers of food-insecure people in need of urgent action.

This “new way of working,” aims to address the humanitarian-development (HD) nexus, which emerged from the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, as well as the Agenda for Humanity’s call³ to “move from delivering aid to ending need,” which provided a framework for thinking about innovative approaches to address food crises more sustainably in line with Sustainable Development Goal 2.1.⁴

These collaborative efforts to prevent and address food crises are reflected in the UN Security Council’s adoption of resolution 2417 in May 2018. It allows the Council to consider its full range of tools – including sanctions – to ensure that parties to conflict do not violate international humanitarian law (IHL) by, for example, starving civilians as a weapon of war, unlawfully denying humanitarian access to civilian populations in need and depriving people of their means to produce food.

This HD nexus is also reflected in the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC), which seeks to combat food crises from humanitarian and development perspectives and tackle the root causes of these crises (see box). This *Global Report on Food Crises* (GRFC) contributes to humanitarian development

efforts by providing the global and national food security community and GNAFC members with timely, independent and consensus-based information on the severity, magnitude and drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition in food crisis contexts. This information supports humanitarian and development actors to plan and fund evidence-based responses, while using the data to seek high-level political action for durable solutions to food crises.

GLOBAL NETWORK AGAINST FOOD CRISES

The Global Network Against Food Crises was launched at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit by the European Union, FAO and WFP with the objective of tackling the root causes of food crises through shared analysis and knowledge and strengthened coordination in evidence-based responses across the humanitarian development nexus.

The Global Network acknowledges the centrality of food and agri-food systems in preventing food crises and mitigating their impact, boosting recovery and reconstruction. It also acknowledges the need to understand links and coordinate policies and actions in relation to other complex dynamics and drivers of vulnerability, such as conflict and insecurity, climate change and demography.

It is a global platform that aims to shape food security and nutrition decision-making by establishing and consolidating partnerships at national, regional and global levels; sharing data and analyses; defining innovative approaches; monitoring progress towards better food security, pursuing evidence-based advocacy and coordination for supporting food and nutrition security in contexts at risk of food crises within a longer perspective of eradicating hunger and malnutrition by 2030.

These objectives are achieved via three work streams (i) analysis and information, (ii) strategic programming and (iii) high-level policy uptake, advocacy and coordination. The work stream on analysis is delivered by the Technical Working Group under the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), which produces the annual GRFC, the main information product of the GNAFC.

- 1 FSIN. *Global Report on Food Crises 2018; State of food Security and Nutrition in the World* (formerly SOFI)
- 2 Development Initiative 2018. *Global humanitarian assistance report 2018*
- 3 The Agenda for Humanity is a five-point plan that outlines the changes that are needed to alleviate suffering, reduce risk and lessen vulnerability on a global scale. In the Agenda, humanity—people’s safety, dignity and the right to thrive—is placed at the heart of global decision-making. More information at: <https://agendaforhumanity.org/agendaforhumanity>
- 4 SDG2.1: By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

For the 2019 edition of the GRFC, 15 agencies in the international humanitarian and development community have joined forces to share their data, analyses, knowledge and expertise regarding food insecurity and malnutrition in countries facing crisis.⁵

The report is structured as follows:

Chapter 1 introduces the rationale of the report, its geographical coverage and describes the methodology.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of 2018 food crises. A table of 53 countries and territories with food crises gives the peak 2018 numbers of food-insecure people in need of urgent action as well as the numbers of those in need of longer-term support, such as disaster risk reduction, livelihood protection and resilience-building interventions, to prevent them from becoming affected by most severe forms of acute food insecurity. It identifies the key drivers and factors contributing to food crises throughout the year, making comparisons with past editions. It also provides an overview of the nutritional status of the population in crises.

Chapter 3 presents country-by-country analysis of food insecurity and malnutrition for 27 selected crises. Each brief contains a narrative on the magnitude, severity and main drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition, preceded by a one-page graphical summary.

Chapter 4 provides an analysis of expected trends in 2019. It identifies which countries are likely to experience improving food security and those where the situation is likely to remain static or deteriorate. It explores the reasons behind the particular food insecurity forecasts, and it estimates the number of people in need of urgent action.

GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE

Selection of countries for the GRFC 2019

The main table in chapter 2 of the GRFC 2019 provides acute food insecurity data for 53 countries. The following criteria were used to select these countries.

Firstly, the GRFC includes the 40 countries that required external assistance for food in 2018 as assessed by FAO Global Information and Early Warning System

(GIEWS). These are countries facing food crises and in need of external food assistance because they have an exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production and supplies or widespread lack of access to food or severe localized food insecurity. Eight countries not in the 2018 GIEWS list are included because they experienced at least one food crisis in the past three years or at least three food crises in the past 10 years. This ensures countries with persistent or protracted crises are captured. Thirty-four countries did not meet these criteria but were affected by natural disasters and/or hosted large numbers of refugees and/or were experiencing conflict and/or political instability and were therefore added. Among these 34 countries, 16 countries were omitted because the shock did not have a major impact on food security or the Government could handle the response without external assistance. A further 13 were excluded because of lack of data, leaving 53 countries to be analysed. See Figure 1. In this report, the shocks identified as primary drivers of acute food insecurity are categorized as follows:

Conflict/insecurity: countries facing conflict, insecurity, localized violence or political crisis;

Climate shocks and natural disasters: climate-related and natural disasters such as drought/dry spells, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes;

Economic shocks: refers macro or micro-economic shocks such as hyperinflation, economic down turn or significant decrease in purchasing power.

Shortlisting countries for further analysis


The list of 53 countries or territories facing food crises was distilled down to the 27 with the most severe food and nutrition crises for further analysis in chapter 3, using criteria based on Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé (CH). They are areas with at least 20 percent of the population or at least 1 million people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or with any area in *Emergency* (IPC/CH Phase 4). In the absence of IPC or CH analyses, other sources were used. (See section below for description of IPC/CH classifications and other acute food insecurity data sources).

Three countries (the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, The Democratic Republic of the Congo) were included because they were on the IASC Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Response ('Level 3/L3' Response) emergencies list.⁶ An L3 response is activated when

5 GRFC partners in 2019 edition: CILSS, European Union, global Food Security Cluster, global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, IPC Global support unit, FAO, FEWS NET, SADC, SICA, OCHA, UNICEF, USAID, WFP

6 These countries were not only IASC L3 emergencies but they also fulfilled the first set of criteria.

Figure 1 GRFC 2019 process for selecting countries



STEP 2 DETERMINE SHORTLISTS OF COUNTRIES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS IN GRFC 2019



Chapter 2 Overview of food crises in 2018

Estimates of acutely food-insecure population were produced for 53 countries.

N.B. Estimates were not produced for 13 of the long listed countries because of insufficient data.

Table 3: Highest conflict and share of food-insecure population in 2018

Country	Population (millions)	Share of food-insecure population (%)	Number of people in acute food insecurity (millions)
Yemen	25.1	85.0	21.3
Sudan	41.5	75.0	31.1
South Sudan	11.0	73.0	8.0
Democratic Republic of Congo	75.9	65.0	49.3
Central African Republic	4.8	63.0	3.0
Chad	14.5	62.0	9.0
Guinea-Bissau	1.6	61.0	1.0
Sierra Leone	5.0	59.0	3.0
South Africa	55.5	58.0	32.1
Kenya	41.0	57.0	23.4
Uganda	34.5	56.0	19.3
Malawi	19.0	55.0	10.5
Myanmar	53.8	54.0	29.0
India	1366.0	53.0	725.8
Indonesia	253.0	52.0	131.6
Philippines	103.0	51.0	52.5
Thailand	65.0	50.0	32.5
China	1400.0	49.0	686.0
USA	325.0	48.0	156.0
France	67.0	47.0	31.4
Germany	82.0	46.0	37.7
UK	63.0	45.0	28.4
Japan	126.0	44.0	55.2
Canada	36.0	43.0	15.5
USA (incl. Alaska and Hawaii)	325.0	42.0	136.5
USA (contiguous)	309.0	41.0	126.7
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	40.0	126.4
USA (excl. Alaska)	315.0	39.0	122.8
USA (excl. Hawaii)	324.0	38.0	123.1
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	37.0	126.9
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	36.0	125.7
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	35.0	111.6
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	34.0	107.4
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	33.0	104.3
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	32.0	101.2
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	31.0	98.1
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	30.0	95.0
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	29.0	91.9
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	28.0	88.8
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	27.0	85.7
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	26.0	82.6
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	25.0	79.5
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	24.0	76.4
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	23.0	73.3
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	22.0	70.2
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	21.0	67.1
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	20.0	64.0
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	19.0	60.9
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	18.0	57.8
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	17.0	54.7
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	16.0	51.6
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	15.0	48.5
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	14.0	45.4
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	13.0	42.3
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	12.0	39.2
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	11.0	36.1
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	10.0	33.0
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	9.0	29.9
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	8.0	26.8
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	7.0	23.7
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	6.0	20.6
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	5.0	17.5
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	4.0	14.4
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	3.0	11.3
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	2.0	8.2
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	1.0	5.1
USA (excl. Alaska and Hawaii)	316.0	0.0	2.0




Chapter 3 Analysis of food crises in 2018

The following criteria were used to select 27 crises for in-depth analysis:*

- at least 20% of the population analysed in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above
- at least 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above
- any area in IPC/CH Phase 4 or above
- included in the IASC Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Response – Level 3


* selection criteria not mutually-exclusive.



Chapter 4 Forecast of food crises in 2019

Some level of information is provided for all 66 countries, plus 2 additional countries flagged by Early Warning.

- actual estimates are provided for 35 countries.



a humanitarian situation suddenly and significantly changes and when, following an analysis of five criteria – scale, complexity, urgency, capacity and reputational risk—it is clear that the capacity to lead, coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance and protection on the ground does not match the scale, complexity and urgency of the crisis. Declaration of an L3 response activates a UN system-wide mobilisation of leadership, staffing and funding to enable the accelerated and scaled-up delivery of assistance and protection to people in need.

ANALYSIS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Food insecurity refers to the lack of secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development and an active and healthy life. For people to be food secure, food must *consistently* be *available* and *accessible* in sufficient quantities and diversity and households must be able to *utilise* (store, cook, prepare and share) the food in a way that has a positive nutritional impact.

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. These acute states are highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition.⁷

Sources for the 2018 peak number of food-insecure people

When more than one food insecurity figure exists for 2018, the GRFC presents the highest number – or peak – of food-insecure people who needed urgent action during 2018. This allows for a direct comparison with peak figures from previous years.

In countries where the government and food security stakeholders have adopted the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) or the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) as the protocol for classifying the severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity, the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above is used to assess the number of food-insecure people in need of urgent assistance. Populations in *Crisis* (IPC/CH Phase 3), *Emergency* (IPC/CH Phase 4) and *Catastrophe/Famine* (IPC/CH Phase 5)

are deemed to be those in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. Populations in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) require a different set of actions – ideally disaster risk reduction and livelihoods protection interventions – and are also reported in Chapter 2. See Annexes 1 and 2 for more explanation of IPC/CH and phase descriptions.

For countries and territories that lack either an IPC/CH, estimates of the number of people in need of food assistance were primarily derived from IPC-compatible⁸ analyses carried out by FEWS NET or Vulnerability Assessment Committees (VAC),⁹ Food Security Cluster (FSC) reports or Humanitarian Needs Overviews¹⁰ (HNO) or WFP Food Security Assessments using CARI methodology.¹¹

Sources for the 2019 forecasts of acute food insecurity

The sources for the outlook and projected trends for 2019 (presented in chapter 4) vary. They are based on IPC and CH projections, FEWS NET's projected emergency food assistance needs and other reliable sources (VAC, HNOs, etc). FEWS NET's food assistance outlook briefs provide information on the projected severity and magnitude (using ranges) of acute food insecurity and indicate each country's food-insecure population in need of urgent action (IPC Phase 3 or above). FEWS NET projections are based on a scenario development approach, where a set of assumptions regarding the evolution of food security drivers and their impacts on food security outcomes are developed in a most-likely scenario.

CH projections were generated in October–November 2018 and forecast the number of people in CH Phase 3 or above for the West African and Sahel lean season in June–August 2019.

7 IPC, 2017

8 IPC compatible products are generated using key IPC protocols but are not built on multi-partner technical consensus.

9 The VAC assessment process and methodology is coordinated and backstopped by the SADC Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Vulnerability Assessment Committee. Its methodology draws from a livelihood-based vulnerability assessment framework.

10 HNO: Humanitarian Needs Overviews aim to support the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in developing a shared understanding of the impact and evolution of a crisis and to inform response planning. The HNO includes an assessment of the food security situation, the impact of the crisis, the breakdown of the people in need and the required funds.

11 The CARI is used to classify individual households according to their level of food insecurity. All five indicators included within the CARI approach can be incorporated within IPC analysis; the IPC Technical Manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC Analytical Framework.

Table 1 IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description

Phase	Technical description	Priority response objective
1 Minimal	More than four in five households in the area are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five households in the area have the following or worse: minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in detrimental coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five households in the area have the following or worse: food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and reduce acute malnutrition.
4 Emergency	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five households in the area have the following or worse: large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality OR extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short term.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Famine	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five households in the area has an extreme lack of food and other basic needs where starvation, death, and destitution are evident.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

TWO GLOBAL REPORTS ON HUNGER: THE GRFC AND THE SOFI

The GRFC focuses on acute food insecurity, mainly based on IPC/CH estimates for food-insecure populations facing *Crisis* conditions or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), at the worst (peak) moment in the year, rather than an average condition for the year. These conditions can be highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short timeframe, as a result of sudden changes or shocks. According to the GRFC 2018, around 124 million people in 51 countries faced *Crisis* conditions or worse in 2017. Where available, the report highlights the populations in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) for whom disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods is needed.

There is a major conceptual difference between data used for the GRFC and estimates in the State of Food and Nutrition Security in the World (SOFI), which provides estimates of the Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) and of the Prevalence of Food Insecurity (FI) based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES). There are two indicators based on the FIES: the prevalence of food insecurity at moderate and severe levels combined, FI_{mod+sev}, and at severe levels only, FI_{sev} (see annex 4). Both measures, PoU and FI_{sev}, identify food insecurity faced by households and individuals on average during a year. As such, they could be said to measure chronic food insufficiency and relate to the

nutritional indicator of “chronic undernutrition”. The SOFI 2018 estimated the absolute number of undernourished people at 821 million, and severely food-insecure people at 770 million in 2017.

While chronic food insecurity is a long-term or persistent inability to meet food consumption requirements (generally lasting for at least six months of the year) acute or transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises, indicating a capacity to recover. Acute and chronic food insecurity are not mutually exclusively. Indeed, repeated shocks can provoke ratchets of severe food insecurity, eventually forcing households into destitution and chronic poverty, and potentially leading to starvation. While acute food insecurity may require shorter-term interventions that address immediate causes, interventions tackling root causes may also be important to prevent repeated transitory acute food insecurity, which may lead to chronic food insecurity.

The GRFC reports acute food insecurity only for countries experiencing food crises; the SOFI provides the number of food-insecure and undernourished people out of the total population of the world.

ANALYSIS OF MALNUTRITION

Malnutrition includes undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity. Undernutrition refers to the outcome of insufficient intake, and/or poor absorption and/or poor biological use of nutrients consumed. It includes being too short for one’s age (stunted), dangerously thin for one’s height (wasted), underweight for one’s age and deficient in vitamins and minerals (micronutrient deficiencies).



Acute malnutrition

Acute malnutrition occurs when an individual is suffering from inadequate nutrient intake. It is characterized by extreme weight loss, and, in its severe form, can lead to death. The immediate cause of this severe nutritional restriction may be inadequate food intake or a recent bout of illness that hinders appropriate intake and absorption of nutrients. Household food insecurity combined with other factors such as inappropriate childcare practices, limited access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities, may lead to restricted dietary intake and frequent illness. Broader basic contributing factors include social, economic, political and environmental contexts, such as adequate health services.¹²

Acute malnutrition in children can be measured by a low weight-for-height compared to a reference population, which is called wasting, a low mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC), and/or the presence of bilateral oedema. Moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) using the weight for height (WFZ) indicator is identified by WFZ measurements below -2 z scores and above -3 z scores of the reference population, and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) by WFZ below -3 z scores. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) reflects the total presence of both MAM and SAM in a population.

Table 2 WHO severity index for prevalence of wasting in children aged 6-59 months

Previous prevalence ranges	Label	New prevalence ranges	Label
-	-	< 2.5%	Very low
<5 %	Acceptable	2.5 - < 5%	Low
5 - 9%	Poor	5 - < 10%	Medium
10 - 14%	Serious	10 - < 15%	High
≥ 15%	Critical	≥ 15%	Very high

Acute malnutrition rates depict the nutrition situation in the general population at a specific time: they can show marked seasonal patterns and can change quickly over time. In 2018, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF reviewed the prevalence ranges to re-classify population levels of wasting and stunting, and the terminology used to interpret them.¹³ See tables 2 and 3.



Chronic malnutrition

Malnutrition measured by stunting is characterized by slowed child growth, resulting in failure of a child to reach his/her expected height/length. Stunted children under five years old are identified by a height for age z score (HAZ) below -2 of the reference population. Severe stunting is defined as HAZ below -3. A stunted child is at higher risk of illness and more likely to develop poor physical and cognitive skills throughout childhood and into adolescence, affecting labour productivity, income-earning potential and social skills later in life, with consequences beyond the individual level, potentially undermining the economic development of communities and nations.

12 UNICEF conceptual framework is available here: <https://www.unicef.org/nutrition/training/2.5/4.html>

13 De Onis et al. Prevalence thresholds for wasting, overweight and stunting in children under 5 years. Public Health Nutrition, pages 1-5

Table 3 WHO severity index for prevalence of chronic malnutrition (stunting in children aged 0-59 months)

Previous prevalence ranges	Label	New prevalence ranges	Label
-	-	< 2.5%	Very low
<20%	Acceptable	2.5 - 10%	Low
20 - <30%	Poor	10 - < 20%	Medium
30 - < 40%	Serious	20 - <30%	High
>40%	Critical	≥ 30%	Very high

Micronutrient deficiencies – caused by a lack of intake, absorption or use of one or more vitamins or minerals such as vitamin A, iron and zinc¹⁴ – are often referred to as ‘hidden hunger’ because they develop gradually over time, and a large percentage of the population may be deficient without showing any clinical symptoms or signs of deficiency.¹⁵






Sources of malnutrition data

The GRFC reviews and analyses available country data on anthropometry, dietary intake, infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices, health and WASH indicators from nutrition surveys – conducted at national and also sub-national level. These include representative SMART (Standardized Monitoring and Assessment for Relief and Transitions) surveys, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple Indicators Cluster Surveys (MICS), National Vulnerability Assessments and Analysis, and Infant and Young Child Feeding – Knowledge Attitude and Practices Assessments (IYCF KAP).

Estimates of the number of children affected by acute malnutrition are in-country calculations officially approved by the nutrition clusters/sectors and shared in key planning documents such as HNO and HRP.

In 2018, seven countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia and South Sudan) conducted an IPC acute malnutrition analysis to understand the severity and main factors affecting the nutritional status of a population in areas with a high rate of acute malnutrition. In countries that conducted two IPC analysis processes in a year, the most recent analysis was included.

Table 4 IPC acute malnutrition technical descriptions and response objectives

Phase	Technical description	Priority response objective
1 Acceptable	Less than 5% of children are acutely malnourished.	Maintain the low prevalence of acute malnutrition. 
2 Alert	5-9.9% children are acutely malnourished.	Strengthen existing response capacity and resilience. Address contributing factors to acute malnutrition. Monitor conditions. 
3 Serious	10-14.9% children are acutely malnourished.	Scaling up of treatment and prevention of affected populations. 
4 Critical	15-29.9% children are acutely malnourished. The mortality and morbidity levels are elevated or increasing. Individual food consumption is likely to be compromised.	Significant scale up and intensification of treatment and protection activities to reach potential population affected. 
5 Extremely Critical	30% of children are acutely malnourished widespread morbidity and/or very large individual food consumption gaps are likely evident.	Addressing widespread acute malnutrition and disease epidemics by all means. 

14 Global Nutrition report 2018

15 https://www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_iodine.html

OTHER NUTRITION INDICATORS USED IN GRFC


Minimum acceptable diet

A composite indicator that combines **minimum meal frequency** (proportion of breastfed and non-breastfed children aged 6–23 months, who receive solid, semi-solid, or soft foods at least the minimum number of recommended times a day) and **minimum dietary diversity** (proportion of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from more than four food groups out of seven a day) to assess the percentage consuming a diet that meets the minimum acceptable level of quality and quantity for growth and development.¹


Exclusive breastfeeding

WHO recommends that infants are fed exclusively with breast milk up to six months of age. This indicator refers to the percentage of infants (up to six months old) who are exclusively breastfed.


Access to safe drinking water

This indicator assesses the percentage of households that have safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic hygiene. This includes public water points being sufficiently close to households to enable use of the minimum water requirement.²

- 1 Source WHO: Indicators for assessing infant and young child feeding practices
- 2 SPHERE standards handbook

LIMITATIONS

Consensus


All partners are in agreement with the general magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries included in this report, except Afghanistan, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, for which FEWS NET analyses of available evidence suggest the population requiring emergency food assistance in 2018 was lower than Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) estimates, because of different interpretation of data related to factors contributing to food insecurity.

Data gaps

Some countries and territories are not included in the report because of the lack of recently validated data. In 2018, data gaps on acute food insecurity were observed for: Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Syrian refugees in Egypt, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Western Sahara. This underlines the need for the Global Network against Food Crises to campaign for investments in food security monitoring systems at country and regional level.

Nutrition data availability varied from country to country and by geographic areas within countries. Most countries had conducted a national survey in the previous three to five years (except for Iraq, Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia and South Sudan), but the aggregated values reported at national level sometimes differ greatly from values reported in the food crisis-affected areas of the country. In 2018, only seven countries conducted IPC acute malnutrition analyses, but a roll-out plan continues

Data gaps can mean data that are:



to expand the use of this framework to more countries. The biggest data availability challenges remain in inaccessible areas of countries where conflict and insecurity are particularly severe. It is particularly difficult to obtain reliable nutrition data for displaced populations in affected regions.

Comparability challenges

For some countries, the coverage of food security analyses within and between years varies in terms of population (e.g. rural only vs. rural and urban) and/or areas analysed (e.g. part of the country vs. whole country). This affects the comparability of the number of food-insecure people between time periods. In a few countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Djibouti), no IPC acute food insecurity analysis was conducted in 2018. Depending on whether other comparable sources of information could be found, this hampers comparability with previous years and highlights the importance for countries that face food crises to conduct an IPC analysis at least on a yearly basis.


A few countries included in this report (i.e. Afghanistan, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen) tested or rolled out the new IPC Version 3.0 protocols in 2018. This implies some changes in methodology, in particular regarding the non-inclusion of the mitigating effects of humanitarian food assistance on food insecurity in projected analyses. However, this did not affect the comparability of numbers of food-insecure people with previous years and between countries for various reasons: in some countries (e.g. Haiti), the level of humanitarian food assistance was not significant enough to make a meaningful difference in the overall number of food-insecure people. In others, the peak number of food-insecure people reported in this report takes into account the mitigating effects of humanitarian food assistance, similar to countries using IPC Version 2.0 protocols.

The number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect and save lives and livelihoods. This is because current population tables identify those found in different severity phases, all things considered and including the mitigating effects of any assistance received. As such, some households may be in IPC Phase 1 or 2 but only because of receipt of assistance, and as a result may be in need of continued action. In areas where assistance is significant, decision-makers should be informed that estimations incorporate effects of any assistance delivered and they do not reflect total number of people in need of action.

Lack of predictive analysis

For the 2019 forecasts, estimates of the future food-insecure populations for some countries are presented as ranges, rather than point estimates, to reflect the higher level of uncertainty. Additionally, many countries cannot be included because there are no projections for 2019 food security outcomes, thus only drivers are indicated.

2. ANALYSIS OF FOOD CRISES IN 2018



Since the *Global Report on Food Crises* launched in 2017, more than 100 million people each year (2016, 2017 and 2018) have been in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. The *GRFC 2019* shows that in 2018, out of 803 million people analysed, 113 million people in 53 countries or territories – 14 percent of the population analysed – were in *Crisis* or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

This humanitarian situation has been driven primarily by three factors: conflict/insecurity, climate shocks and economic shocks – or a mutually reinforcing combination of two or all of these drivers – which result in food crises.

Strikingly, three conflict-affected countries (Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan) each had more than 10 million people in *Crisis* conditions or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), totalling almost 40 million people and accounting for 35 percent of the aggregate number in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above in 2018. Another five countries (Ethiopia, north Nigeria, South Sudan, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic) each had 5-10 million people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Together these eight countries/regions had nearly 72 million people in need of urgent food and livelihood support and accounted for 64 percent of the aggregate number.

In addition, very large numbers – nearly 143 million people in a subset of 42 countries or territories for which this analysis was carried out – were classified in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) and may slip into IPC/CH Phase 3 or above if confronted with an additional shock or stressor.

The analysis shows that more than half (74 million people) of those facing *Crisis* (IPC/CH Phase 3) conditions or worse were in 21 countries or territories affected by conflict/insecurity: 33 million of these people were in 10 countries in Africa, over 27 million in seven countries or territories in West Asia/Middle East, 13 million in three countries in South/Southeast Asia and 1.1 million in Eastern Europe.

Climate-related shocks were the main drivers of food insecurity in nearly half (26) of the 53 countries analysed, accounting for 29 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. As in previous years, in 2018 most of these people were in Africa, with nearly 23 million in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above in 20 countries affected by climate shocks. In Central America and the Caribbean, five countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua) collectively had 3.8 million acutely food insecure mainly as a result of climate shocks. Out of these 26 countries with climate as the primary driver, 22 had 35 million in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) and on the cusp of slipping into *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3).

In 2018, economic shocks were considered the primary

driver of the acute food insecurity of 10.2 million people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in three countries (Burundi, the Sudan and Zimbabwe) and for three selected migrant populations (Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). An additional 14.3 million people were classified in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) in four of these countries.

Yemen remained the world's gravest food insecurity crisis in 2018. By the end of the year the crisis reached a critical point that drew attention to the urgent need for an implemented cessation of hostilities to avert famine. For the first time the Yemen IPC Technical Working Group classified people (65 000) in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5), indicating extreme food gaps and/or the inability of some population groups to meet basic food needs without full employment of coping strategies. Without humanitarian food assistance the number facing *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) would have been about 238 000.

While the humanitarian landscape in 2017 was marked by the declaration of famine in areas of South Sudan and the risk of famine (in a worst-case scenario) in northeastern Nigeria and Somalia, there was no declaration of famine in 2018 and no population groups were classified in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) in 2018 in northeastern Nigeria or Somalia. However, besides the above-mentioned numbers in Yemen, around 47 000 in South Sudan still faced *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) in the latter half of 2018.

High levels of acute and chronic malnutrition persist in countries affected by food crises, threatening, in particular, the health and lives of young children and women. Acute malnutrition significantly worsened between 2017 and 2018 in areas of Afghanistan, South Sudan, northeastern Nigeria, Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic (Eastern Ghouta, Ar Raqqa and Idlib) and across the six countries of the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Senegal).

Ending conflicts, empowering women, nourishing and educating children, improving rural infrastructure and reinforcing social safety-nets are essential for a resilient, stable and hunger-free world.

Information and technology can capture changes in food security – especially in fragile countries and contexts – on a near real-time basis. Though this report demonstrates that overall quality of data has improved, there are countries for which there are data gaps. Collecting and analysing data on vulnerable populations is vital to ensure a situation analysis that identifies not only outcomes, but hunger's key drivers for a targeted and integrated response for multiple partners working in development and humanitarian spheres.

In the last 10 years, humanitarian assistance and spending needs have grown by around 127 percent – approximately 40 percent of that went to cover needs in the food and agriculture subsectors. The surge in humanitarian needs – as well as the potential for agricultural development and rural resilience-building to provide a buffer against crises – highlights the need for a new way of responding to the food security challenges of this new era.

The findings of this report clearly underscore the need for simultaneous action across the humanitarian-development nexus, along with investments in conflict prevention and sustaining peace, when appropriate, to save lives and livelihoods, reduce structural vulnerabilities and address the root causes of hunger.

The regional perspective

Over half of the global total of acutely food-insecure people estimated by the *GRFC 2019* were in Africa, where there were over 65 million people in need of urgent action. East Africa had the highest number of acutely food-insecure people (28.6 million) followed by southern Africa (23.3 million) and West Africa and the Sahel (11.2 million).


With 27.4 million food-insecure people in need of urgent action, the seven Middle-Eastern countries or territories accounted for 24 percent of the global total estimated by the *GRFC 2019*.

With 14.7 million food-insecure people in need of urgent action, four countries in South and South-East Asia (Myanmar, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan) accounted for 13 percent of the *GRFC 2019* total.

The remaining five percent were in Ukraine (1.1 million) and Latin America and the Caribbean with 4.2 million food-insecure people in need of urgent action across eight countries (Haiti with 2.3 million), Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 'Dry Corridor' with 1.6 million), and South America (0.4 million among Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru).

While Latin America and the Caribbean was home to just a fraction of the global number of acutely food-insecure people in need of urgent action (four percent of the *GRFC 2019* total) it had high numbers (5.6 million) in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) across seven countries (*Stressed* figures were not available for Nicaragua). These populations require support to reduce disaster risks and protect their livelihoods, and to prevent them from slipping into more severe levels of acute food insecurity when climate and economic shocks occur.

Figure 2 More than half of the 113 million acutely food-insecure people were in 33 African countries



Year on year comparisons

In 2016 there were 108 million people across 48 countries facing *Crisis* food insecurity or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). In 2017 there were 124 million people in 51 countries or territories.

Availability of data played an important role in the difference in numbers. When an analysis was conducted comparing the 42 countries analysed each year, it showed the same pattern as the overall comparison, i.e. an increase between 2016 and 2017, followed by a decrease between 2017 and 2018.

The 14 million increase between 2016 and 2017 (like for like) was largely attributed to intensified conflict or insecurity in countries such as Yemen, north Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Myanmar. Persistent drought also played a major role, causing consecutive poor harvests in countries already facing high levels of food insecurity in eastern and southern Africa.

The 6 million decrease between 2017 and 2018 can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, some 26 countries did see a less severe peak in the numbers of acutely food insecure people in 2018 by comparison with 2017. These include countries in southern and eastern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific region, which did not experience the intensity of shocks and stressors that they were still experiencing in 2017 as a result of severe drought, flooding, rains, and temperature rises due to the El Niño of 2015-16. However, in 2018 some were still experiencing the lingering effects of past climate shocks or saw improvements in crop yields offset by severe economic challenges and high food prices, resulting in a worsening food security situation as the year progressed (Zimbabwe).



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The most significant decreases between 2017 and 2018 were in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. For Bangladesh and Cameroon, the geographical coverage differs between the two years. For Nigeria the improvement could be attributed to provision of humanitarian food assistance and better harvest.

Notably, 17 countries faced either the same or higher numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, with the biggest increases in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan and Zambia.

Figure 3 Peak numbers of people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above)




Table 5 Highest number and share of food-insecure population in 2018

Country	Total population analysed		Population in <i>Crisis</i> or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)		Population in <i>Stressed</i> (IPC/CH Phase 2)	
	Number (millions)	Percentage of population analysed out of total population of reference	Number (millions)	% of total population analysed	Number (millions)	% of total population analysed
Afghanistan ¹	22.6	65%	10.6	47%	6.8	30%
Bangladesh (Cox's Bazaar refugee and host populations)	1.5		1.3	87%	N/A	N/A
Burkina Faso ¹	20.1	97%	1.0	5%	2.7	13%
Burundi ³	11.0	98%	1.7	16%	N/A	N/A
Cabo Verde ¹	0.5	99%	0.02	4%	0.1	20%
Cameroon (7 regions)	15.8	64%	0.5	3%	2.9	18%
Central African Republic ¹	4.4	95%	1.9	43%	1.8	41%
Chad ¹	13.9	90%	1.0	7%	2.9	21%
Colombia (Venezuelan migrants)	1.1	100%	0.3	30%	0.3	30%
Cote d'Ivoire	19.8	80%	0.04	0%	3.0	15%
Democratic Republic of the Congo ¹	56.2	66%	13.1	23%	27.4	49%
Djibouti (rural areas)	0.2	16%	0.15	55%	0.1	40%
Ecuador (Venezuelan migrants)	0.1	20%	0.02	23%	0.1	60%
El Salvador (Dry Corridor)	1.4	22%	0.2	16%	0.4	28%
eSwatini ¹	1.1	79%	0.2	23%	0.3	28%
Ethiopia	96.5	100%	8.1	8%	N/A	N/A
Gambia ¹	1.8	83%	0.1	6%	0.4	21%
Guatemala (Dry Corridor)	5.9	34%	0.8	14%	1.4	23%
Guinea	10.0	100%	0.1	1%	0.9	9%
Guinea-Bissau	1.2	65%	0.01	1%	0.1	11%
Haiti ¹	7.0	63%	2.3	32%	2.4	35%
Honduras (Dry Corridor)	2.8	30%	0.5	19%	0.8	28%
Iraq	37.0	100%	2.5	7%	N/A	N/A
Jordan (Syrian refugees)	0.7	100%	0.1	14%	0.4	66%
Kenya	46.3	100%	2.6	6%	N/A	N/A
Lebanon (Syrian refugees)	1.5	100%	0.5	34%	0.9	57%
Lesotho ¹	1.5	64%	0.3	19%	0.5	33%
Liberia	4.2	87%	0.04	1%	0.6	15%
Libya	6.6	100%	0.3	5%	N/A	N/A
Madagascar (southern and southeastern) ¹	3.0	12%	1.5	51%	0.7	22%
Malawi ¹	15.3	79%	3.3	22%	5.0	33%
Mali ¹	18.9	97%	0.9	5%	3.4	18%
Mauritania ¹	4.0	88%	0.5	14%	1.0	24%
Mozambique ¹	28.8	94%	1.8	6%	7.8	27%
Myanmar (selected areas)	7.4	14%	0.8	11%	N/A	N/A
Nicaragua	6.0	100%	0.02	0%	N/A	N/A
Niger ¹	20.9	94%	0.8	4%	5.0	24%
Nigeria (16 states and Federal Capital Territory) ¹	98.6	50%	5.3	5%	22.7	23%
Pakistan (Sindh drought-affected areas)	2.3	1%	2.0	87%	0.2	11%
Palestine (occupied territories of)	5.0	100%	1.7	34%	0.8	17%
Peru (Venezuelan migrants)	0.3	55%	0.04	14%	0.2	82%
Senegal ¹	12.5	77%	0.8	6%	3.2	26%
Sierra Leone	6.6	86%	0.1	2%	1.5	23%
Somalia ¹	12.3	89%	2.7	22%	2.7	22%
South Sudan ²	10.4	93%	6.1	59%	3.2	31%
Sudan ¹	43.9	100%	6.2	14%	13.7	31%
Syrian Arab Republic	20.0	100%	6.5	33%	2.5	13%
Turkey (Syrian refugees)	2.2	60%	0.2	11%	1.3	61%
Uganda	40.0	100%	1.1	3%	N/A	N/A
Ukraine (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and IDP)	6.2	15%	1.1	18%	N/A	N/A
Yemen ²	29.9	100%	15.9	53%	8.9	30%
Zambia ¹	6.9	39%	1.2	17%	2.0	28%
Zimbabwe	9.3	67%	1.9	20%	N/A	N/A

¹ The estimates for this country contains population classified in *Emergency* (IPC/CH Phase 4)

² The estimates for this country contains population classified in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) and in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5)

³ For Burundi, the estimate of population in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) is not reported as it is merged with the estimates of population in *Minimal* (IPC Phase 1)

All partners are in agreement with the general magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries included in this report, except Afghanistan, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, for which FEWS NET analyses of available evidence suggest the population requiring emergency food assistance in 2018 was lower than Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) estimates, because of different interpretation of data related to factors contributing to food insecurity

The world's eight worst food crises in 2018

Yemen remained the world's gravest food insecurity crisis in 2018. By the end of the year the crisis reached a critical point that drew attention to the urgent need for an implemented cessation of hostilities to avert famine. More than half (53 percent) of the total population was in urgent need of food and livelihood assistance (IPC Phases 3 or above) from December 2018 to January 2019, even when taking into account the mitigating effects of food assistance.




After Yemen, the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** had the highest number (13 million) of acutely food insecure people in urgent need of assistance in the second half of 2018. This represents the biggest year on year deterioration following armed conflict in Ituri and South Kivu, fighting in the eastern and southern areas, and the humanitarian crisis in the Kasai region. Localized floods compounded the impact of persistent insecurity, disrupting agricultural activities, markets and humanitarian assistance while an ongoing outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) further disrupted livelihoods.

Countries whose economic bases have been destroyed by years of conflict cannot cope with the consequences of (recurrent) natural disasters. In **Afghanistan** severe drought in 2018 constrained food production and stripped farmers and livestock keepers of their assets and livelihoods, creating the country's worst food insecurity emergency since the 2011 drought. The number of rural Afghans facing *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) was projected to reach 10.6 million (47 percent of the rural population) in the winter months (November 2018–February 2019) if urgent food assistance was not provided.


In **Ethiopia**, despite major improvements in southern pastoral areas in late 2017 and early 2018, the country still faced a major food security emergency in 2018 with 8 million people in need of food assistance. This was driven by several inter-related factors: the aftermath of three preceding years of poor rainfall, intercommunal conflict driving mass displacement, currency devaluation, high food prices, localized floods and dry spells.

In 2018 **the Syrian Arab Republic** suffered its worst drought in 30 years followed by heavy, out-of-season rains, which, coupled with the effects of conflict, caused wheat production to hit a three-decade low. An estimated 6.5 million Syrians are food insecure in need of urgent action.


Since late 2017, the **Sudan** was facing major macro-economic challenges, illustrated by a spiralling parallel foreign exchange rate, dwindling foreign currency



ETHIOPIA



THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC



reserves and increasing inflation rates, resulting in reduced imports of fuel and agricultural inputs. Rising poverty levels reduced access to food and basic services, resulting in 6.2 million being acutely food insecure during the 2018 lean season.

Five years of persistent conflict, widespread and recurrent displacement, record low 2017 cereal production, very high food prices, loss of livelihoods and limited access to markets drove rising hunger in **South Sudan**. At the peak of the 2018 lean season, 59 percent of the analysed population or 6 million people needed urgent food and livelihood assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) compared with 55 percent during the same period the previous year.

In the 16 states of **north Nigeria** and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) the number of people in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) decreased by 40 percent between June-August 2017 and 2018 to 5.3 million. At the peak of the lean season 3 million were acutely food insecure in the three north-eastern states affected by the Boko Haram insurgency where protracted conflict and mass displacement disrupted agriculture, trade, markets and livelihoods, and pushed up food prices.

MAIN DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY IN 2018

While the *GRFC* gives a clear idea of the number of acutely food-insecure people by each of the three primary drivers it must be emphasized that these drivers often co-exist or reinforce each other.



Conflict and insecurity

Last year's *GRFC* found there were 74 million people in 18 conflict-affected areas experiencing acute food insecurity in 2017. Conflict remained the number one driver of acute food insecurity in 2018. This year's report shows that in 2018 again 74 million people - this time in 21 conflict-afflicted countries and territories - were in *Crisis* or worse. As conflicts become more protracted the resilience and coping capacities of the people caught up in them is eroded.

Intensified conflict and insecurity in Afghanistan as well as in Yemen, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, either worsened or kept acute food insecurity at similar levels to the previous year, demonstrating the persistent and destructive link between conflict and hunger. High levels of acute food insecurity persisted in other key conflict-








Figure 4 Conflict was the key driver of food insecurity for the majority of the 113 million acutely food-insecure people in areas analysed in 2018




Map 1 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (ranges) in 2018



Source: FSIN GRFC March 2019

Map 2 Share of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (ranges) in 2018



Source: FSIN GRFC March 2019

affected countries/territories including the Syrian Arab Republic, Lake Chad Basin and Somalia. The observed trends make clear that besides many efforts to stabilize these situations and promote peace, more needs to be done to provide support to populations and ensure the international community is equipped to operate in these environments.

In conflict civilians are frequently pushed into acute food insecurity when they are displaced and deprived of their income sources. Food systems and markets are disrupted, pushing up food prices and sometimes leading to scarcities of water and fuel, or of food itself. Landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices often destroy agricultural land, mills, storage facilities, machinery etc. Conflict prevents businesses from operating and weakens the national economy, reducing employment opportunities and increasing poverty levels. It undermines and sometimes destroys health and public distribution systems leaving people reliant on humanitarian support - yet insecurity and unserviceable roads can prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching them. Armed conflict has particular impact on women and children, including as refugees and IDPs, and on people with vulnerabilities including those with disabilities and the elderly.

Against this backdrop, in 2018 the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 2417, which provides a framework to address conflict-induced hunger by allowing the Council to consider its full range of tools – including sanctions – to ensure that all parties to conflict uphold International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Violations of IHL include starving civilians as a weapon of war, unlawfully denying humanitarian access to civilian populations in need and depriving people of their means to produce food.

However, new conflicts are emerging and finding sustainable political resolutions to ongoing crises is becoming increasingly difficult.

In many conflict-affected countries there are areas that humanitarian agencies cannot reach with aid. Or they face lengthy delays, with restrictions on personnel or the type or quantity of aid supplies, or insufficient security

Figure 5 Around half of those facing *Crisis* (IPC/CH Phase 3) conditions or worse were in 10 countries or territories affected by conflict/insecurity, mainly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia




Figure 6 African countries accounted for the overwhelming majority of acutely food-insecure people in countries affected by climate shocks





Figure 7 Economic shocks were considered the primary driver of the acute food insecurity of 10.2 million people in *Crisis* or worse mostly in three countries



DISAGGREGATED GENDER ANALYSIS IS VITAL IN EMERGENCIES

Armed conflict affects men and women, girls and boys differently. Emergencies can exacerbate the existing power inequalities between women and men leading to increased discrimination and exploitation. Men and women have different needs, different coping mechanisms and different opportunities to benefit from support in crises. What's more, women and girls are an important resource in designing and delivering humanitarian assistance.

Promoting gender equality in humanitarian action facilitates the right to information and participation for all; increases access to assistance and decreases vulnerability levels; affords protection, dignity and safety from GBV; and provides the opportunity to change norms, shifting towards equality, empowerment and transformative change. A gender equality perspective is also about assistance being designed and delivered based on the "do no harm" approach, in a way that does not trigger armed conflict, exacerbate tensions between population groups or expose people to violence and other forms of abuse such as GBV. Programmes that lack a gender perspective risk

being off-target, not reaching the most excluded, providing support in an inadequate manner or even inadvertently causing harm.

The responsibility of humanitarians to make sure that assistance and protection meet the needs, capacities and priorities of women, girls, men and boys in an equitable and empowering way and that their rights are protected and promoted touches all phases of the humanitarian programme cycle.

In the needs assessment and analysis phase data must be disaggregated by gender and interventions should reflect gender-specific needs. Gender analysis should understand the experiences of all women and men and within different contexts and the specific barriers and bottlenecks that they face. Critically, gender analysis must also understand how humanitarian engagement can create conditions for women and girls to empower themselves, to exercise leadership and promote health and well-being and be fully involved in efforts to prevent and resolve the growing number of armed conflicts.

guarantees.¹ As a result, securing access becomes time-consuming, costly and aid delivery for civilians in need is inadequate or inconsistent during certain periods.² Deliberate targeting of aid workers persisted in 2018. According to the Aid Worker Security Database there were 310 deliberate acts of violence affecting mainly national aid workers, such as killings, kidnappings, and attacks that resulted in serious injury in 2018, 313 in 2017 and 294 in 2016. The most dangerous countries in 2018 were South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

UNSC Resolution 2417 also identifies the linkage between protection of medical facilities and the

prevention of famine and food insecurity. In Yemen, conflict, attacks on medical facilities and the lack of salary payments to medical staff have led to the closure of more than half of the country's medical facilities,³ leaving most of the country's 500 000 children who are suffering from severe acute malnutrition⁴ unable to receive life-saving nutritional support and other treatment. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed conflict is inhibiting the response to the second largest Ebola outbreak in history in North Kivu.⁵ Attacks on health workers and food security and nutrition actors' inability to obtain security guarantees from non-state armed groups means it is much more difficult to provide the food and nutrition response necessary to contain the outbreak.

1 UN Security Council meeting 12 March, 2018
2 Ibid

3 Medecins Sans Frontieres country brief
4 WHO April 2018
5 WFP News Release. WFP launches emergency food aid to Ebola victims in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, August 2018



Climate-related shocks

Climate-related disasters, such as drought, floods and tropical storms are among the main drivers of food insecurity, both in the aftermath of a disaster and in the long run. Weather extremes, such as droughts and floods, have more than doubled since the early 1990s.⁶ Observed data and many studies also indicate that a warming climate has a negative effect on crop production and generally reduces yields of staple cereals such as wheat, rice, and maize in many areas.⁷ Smallholder farmers who are dependent on rainfed agriculture and living in the earth's more fragile environments are particularly vulnerable.

Last year's *GRFC* found there were 39 million acutely food-insecure people in 13 countries affected by climate-related shocks in 2017. In 2018, 29 million people were acutely food insecure in 26 countries affected by climate-related shocks with 23 million of them in 20 African countries, according to the *GRFC 2019*.

This marks an improvement largely because overall good production outturns in the last two years have had a stabilizing impact on food security in several countries of southern Africa compared with 2017, which was marked by the prolonged impact of the 2015-2016 El Niño-induced drought. In Malawi, the number of people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) decreased from almost 7 million in late 2016 and 5.1 million in early 2017 to 3.3 million in late 2018.

However, weather shocks, notably droughts in 2018, intensified food insecurity in other regions. In Afghanistan, drought in 2018 taking place amid a protracted conflict escalated the food crisis, making this Afghanistan's worst food insecurity emergency since the 2011 drought.⁸ The lack of water had such dramatic effect because the local coping capacities of institutions and households were largely depleted by decades of conflict and the ability to deliver aid was highly constrained by the intensification of violence. In the Syrian Arab Republic the worst drought in 30 years was followed by heavy, out-of-season rains, which, coupled with the effects of conflict, made wheat production plummet to its lowest level since 1989.

In South America, dry weather conditions lowered cereal harvests compared to last year's record high. In Central America and the Caribbean, the drought was not as drastic as in 2015, but it was severe enough to have a negative impact on agricultural output in several areas.⁹ In the Central America Dry Corridor (CADC), a territory shared by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua as well as the Dry ARCH of Panama, from November 2018 to March 2019 1.6 million were classified in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above). Half of them (0.8 million) were in Guatemala and the remaining 0.8 million in El Salvador and Honduras.

In contrast to conflict situations where persistent levels of acute food insecurity are observed (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), climate-related food insecurity can be of a more temporary nature. The generally low resilience of farmers renders them highly susceptible to climatic shocks, heightening the likelihood of households slipping into worse conditions (i.e. IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in the event of weather shocks.

Around 35 million people in climate-affected countries were classified in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) and likely to shift into a worse phase if they faced a shock or stressor. Frequent climate shocks erode the already-poor coping capacities of households making them increasingly less equipped for the next shock. This is particularly pertinent given the less favourable weather conditions during the 2018/19 cropping season that have increased the probability of a drop in agricultural production in 2019 and the fact that climate shocks are set to become more frequent and intense.

People in conflict settings are also affected by climate extremes that constitute aggravating factors and contribute to fuelling conflict. For instance, the number of new displacements in Ethiopia increased sharply in the first half of 2018 to 1.4 million mainly associated with the outbreak of new intercommunal conflict along the border between Oromia and SNNPR regions in April and June. It is thought that disputes over borders and the allocation of pasture and water resources are likely to have contributed to the sudden escalation of violence.¹⁰

Climate shocks are a main driver of displacement. On average 22 million people are displaced annually because of climate-related disasters.¹¹ It is already

6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2018
7 IPCC. Food Security and Food Production Systems
8 FEWS NET. Afghanistan, Key message update, September 2018

9 GIEWS Update, Central America drought causes, crop losses in Dry Corridor in Central America, August 2018
10 Internal Displacement mid-year figures September 2018
11 SOFI 2018

recognised that warming beyond 1.5°C (the world has already warmed by 1°C above pre-industrial levels) could lead to a higher risk of food shortages in many regions already on the brink of hunger crisis, including the Sahel.¹² A 2°C warmer world would add an estimated 189 million more people to the 821 million who are already suffering from chronic food shortages.¹³



Economic shocks

Although food prices declined globally in 2018 – the FAO Food Price Index for the whole year was 3.5 percent below 2017's level and 27 percent lower than its record high of 2011¹⁴ – rising unemployment, lack of sustainable livelihoods or regular reliable work, currency depreciation, poor functioning markets and high food prices are regular outcomes in countries experiencing protracted conflict, often making economic shocks a secondary or tertiary driver of food insecurity. In 2018, economic shocks were considered the primary driver of the acute food insecurity of 10.2 million people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in three countries (Burundi, the Sudan and Zimbabwe) and Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

Yemen saw significant increases in food prices driven by conflict and a severe economic liquidity crisis. During September 2018 alone, on the parallel market the local currency lost a fifth of its value relative to the USD, and almost half its value on a yearly basis.¹⁵

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) has experienced severe economic and political turmoil that triggered massive increases in the price of food and other basic commodities. This hyperinflation has drastically cut people's purchasing power, curbing access to food. Many of the Venezuelans seeking refuge in neighbouring countries have exhausted their means to buy food (see box).

In Turkey, which hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees, signs of a significant slowdown in economic growth and an increasingly fragile external financial situation led to a sharp depreciation of the Turkish lira against the USD, i.e. 52 percent lower in September 2018 compared to 2015.¹⁶ This contributed to year-on-year food inflation of 29 percent in October 2018, with both Syrian refugees and the vulnerable host population seeing their purchasing power to buy food and other essentials severely weakened.

In West Africa (Burkina Faso, Mali and north-east Nigeria) and East Africa (South Sudan and the Sudan), elevated prices were observed for most of the year instigated by production shortfalls, currency depreciation, insecurity and policies such as large-scale restocking of national inventories or subsidy cuts. A loss in the value of the currency as well as limited availability of fuel contributed significantly to the continuous increase in cereal prices in the Sudan, with prices reaching record or near-record levels in December. Currency devaluation drove prices up in South Sudan, Nigeria and Zambia.

In southern Africa, while prices were mostly stable in the first half of 2018, sharply reduced supplies in Madagascar spurred rice prices to record highs in early 2018, and towards the end of the year food prices climbed abruptly in several other southern African countries. Following substantial rises in the last quarter of 2018, Zimbabwe's annual inflation rate surged to 42 percent in December. Given the generally large share of income allocated to food expenditure by poorer households, these elevated prices hit the poorest particularly hard.

Maize prices climbed steeply in several Central American countries, on the back of rising production costs and concerns over the impact of severe dry weather on the main season crops, reaching near record highs. In Nicaragua social unrest disrupted marketing activities that further amplified price increases in 2018. In Asia, prices of rice in the Philippines reached record highs in September 2018 as a result of low public inventories and increased fuel costs. Prices fell in the latter months of the year with the start of the main harvest and imports.

12 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018

13 WFP 2018 <https://www.wfp.org/content/2017-2-and-4-degrees-infographic>


14 FAO Food Prices Index, January 2019

15 Exchange rate data for Yemen extracted from http://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/prices?iso3=YEM

16 WFP: Turkish economic slowdown: implications on WFP's work. Internal document. 30 November 2018

The Sahel pastoralist region experienced severe

Map 3 Sahel and West Africa, acute food insecurity, CH Acute Food Insecurity Situation, June-August 2018



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2018

In 2018, the Sahel region was confronted with an exceptional crisis characterized by the most severe humanitarian needs in years, and required an urgent intensification of the response. Between June and August, about 5 million people were in urgent need of food, nutrition and livelihood assistance in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Senegal, according to the *Cadre Harmonisé*¹ – a 20 percent increase compared to a year earlier,² in a context of extreme vulnerability and increasing hardship.³ Severe rainfall deficits, localized production shortfalls, high food prices, reduced incomes resulting from declining livestock sales, in tandem with conflict, insecurity and market disruption drove this severely deteriorating food insecurity situation since the end of 2017.⁴

In the first half of 2018, many zones across the region had alarming levels of global acute malnutrition, exceeding the emergency thresholds.

Across the six countries, up to 1.6 million children were reported to be at risk of suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM), an increase of more than 50 percent since 2017, and 3.4 million from moderate acute malnutrition (MAM).⁵ Mauritania, Mali and the Niger reported the highest rates of acute malnutrition driven by inadequate caring practices and high burden of disease,⁶ aggravated by acute water shortages, increased use of coping strategies such as cutting down on meals, and not receiving health treatment.


Overgrazing and severe pasture degradation led to limited or no fodder production in 2018. The lack of fodder and water led pastoralist households, who make up 30 per cent of the Sahel's population,⁷ to bring forward their migration by two months, causing high herd concentrations in certain areas and localized conflicts between farmers and herders.⁸ An animal foot and mouth disease

1 Cadre Harmonisé Analyse régionale de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aigüe, March 2018
 2 Cadre Harmonisé Analyse régionale de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aigüe, March 2017
 3 OCHA Crise alimentaire et nutritionnelle aigüe au Sahel, June 2018
 4 FAO Crop Prospects and Food Situation no. 2, June 2018

5 CILSS. Nutrition situation. Presentation at the PREGEC meeting, Abidjan 19-21 Novembre 2018
 6 Ibid
 7 OCHA. Sahel 2018: Overview of humanitarian needs and requirements
 8 FAO, UNICEF & WFP Sahel - Early action and scale-up of emergency response, March 2018

rainfall deficits and conflict/insecurity

Map 4 Situation of acute malnutrition for lean season 2018



Source: CILSS, March 2018

broke out in the region and remained an issue throughout the year.

Poor pastoralist communities were market-reliant for a longer period than usual: from June, market supplies were below-average and demand for food was seasonally above average, which resulted in higher staple prices until the end of the lean season, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.⁹ The lack of livestock feed and reduced exports to Nigeria depressed livestock prices and resulted in detrimental terms of trade for pastoralist households.¹⁰

Meanwhile, armed attacks in regions of Burkina Faso and the Niger bordering Mali devastated communities and forced thousands of people to flee their homes. Conflict disrupted basic services and livelihoods, and hindered access and delivery of assistance. As of June, the six countries hosted around 293 000 IDPs and 718 000 refugees.¹¹ Relations between farmers and pastoral livestock herders, once cooperative and symbiotic, became confrontational with increasingly frequent, intense violent clashes.

The outlook for vulnerable pastoralists and agropastoralists across the region is bleak, necessitating a scale-up of emergency livelihoods assistance. Overgrazing, pasture degradation and lack of fodder production, the emergence of transboundary epidemics and increasing risk of conflict over natural resources all threaten to undermine livelihoods in the coming years.¹² The drivers of fragility and conflict include lack of basic services, high unemployment and limited opportunities, particularly for the large and growing population of young people. The crisis highlights the need to bring together political, security and development dimensions and expand joint activities across this vast area of Africa. Activities and policies that foster social cohesion and sustain peace, transform economies, improve living standards and give young people hope must come from local, national and regional stakeholders, assisted by external partners as needed.

9 WFP West and central Africa Bulletin, June 2018

10 FEWS NET West Africa Key Message Update, June 2018

11 OCHA Crise alimentaire et nutritionnelle aigüe au Sahel, June 2018

12 FAO, UNICEF & WFP Sahel - Early action and scale-up of emergency response, March 2018



POPULATION DISPLACEMENT TRENDS

As of June 2018, there were over 70 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, representing an increase of more than 5 million since the beginning of the year mainly as a result of conflict and insecurity.¹⁷ Most are displaced within their own countries.¹⁸ More than eight in 10 are in developing countries.¹⁹

Globally there were around 20.2 million refugees by June 2018, with most of them located in Europe (32 percent, including 18 percent in Turkey alone), Africa (30 percent), Asia and the Pacific (21 percent), and the Middle-East and North Africa (14 percent). The major source countries were the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Burundi. The 10 main recipient countries host 62 percent of the worldwide refugee population registered by UNHCR, of which eight are covered in this report as they had large numbers of food-insecure people in need of urgent assistance. In addition, there were 3.2 million pending asylum requests in mid 2018.²⁰

In the first half of 2018, there were reportedly 555 800 newly displaced refugees at the global level. Most were fleeing violence and insecurity in the Syrian Arab Republic, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, the Sudan and Eritrea. The largest number of arrivals were reported in Turkey, Uganda, the Sudan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Jordan, Chad and the Niger. In addition, one million people had requested asylum in another countries, with most of them fleeing Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, El Salvador, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Honduras.²¹

As of mid-2018, there were nearly 40 million people internally displaced by conflict, insecurity and violence at the global level, according to UNHCR. The largest population of violence or insecurity-related IDPs were hosted in the Syrian Arab Republic, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, the Sudan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, South Sudan, Ukraine and Ethiopia. This corresponds to an increase of more than half a million IDPs during the first six months of 2018, with the largest increases in the Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia,

Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.

In many countries displaced people are more vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition since they have lost their livelihoods and are often living in over-crowded conditions with poor sanitation and water access, and without the support of their extended families/communities. For instance, in Afghanistan, millions have abandoned their rural homes and moved to cities in 2018 – most fleeing the drought-hit rural areas of Badghis, Ghor and Herat for provincial capitals. High levels of food insecurity and acute malnutrition were noted among IDP populations.

In some countries host communities are just as vulnerable as IDPs – or more so. In Uganda, which hosts more than 1.2 million refugees, mostly from South Sudan, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, the sustained influx of refugees has put substantial pressure on the environment and on the resources of host communities. Both refugees and host communities lack income-generating opportunities, and access to water, cultivable land, and markets.

In Cox's Bazar the influx of refugees has aggravated the already-fragile situation of one of the poorest and most vulnerable districts in Bangladesh and the host populations face higher levels of food insecurity than the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. Many have lost access to farm lands, fishing grounds and forest resources and have been deprived of their livelihoods. Many of them have been compelled to work as wage labourers, but the availability of cheaper refugee labour has made jobs scarce and pushed down daily wage rates. They also face diminished access to basic services, and an increase in staple food prices because of higher demand.

The situation in Colombia, which is both a transit and destination country for Venezuelans crossing the border, is of particular concern. According to the 2019 HNO, 5.1 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.²² In addition to the migrants from Venezuela and Colombian returnees, Colombia still has 487 000 vulnerable people displaced by decades of armed conflict within the country.

17 UNHCR mid-year trends 2018

18 UNHCR

19 Ibid

20 All from UNHCR Mid-year trends, 2018

21 Ibid

22 OCHA. Colombia. HNO 2019



ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF THOSE ON THE CUSP OF CRISIS


The *GRFC 2019* shows that major food crises are often characterized not only by persistent levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), but also by large and persistent segments of populations on the edge of acute food insecurity - in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2). This report highlights that for the 42 countries where data is available, 143 million people were in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2) food insecurity conditions while 91.4 million people were in *Crisis* or worse in these same 42 countries. The large number on the cusp of *Crisis* conditions has changed very little over time.

Households in this phase have minimal adequate food consumption and cannot afford to access certain essential needs without engaging in coping strategies that undermine their food insecurity or ability to recover, such as compromising their food intake or selling their productive assets. Therefore, they may slip into IPC/CH Phase 3 or above if an additional shock or stressor occurs. Although the main focus of this report is on populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, it is also important to consider and act upon those in *Stressed* (IPC/CH Phase 2).

For instance, in Somalia despite the sustained humanitarian assistance, which prevented deepening food insecurity in 2017, the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above remained significant. In addition, large segments of the population - around 3 million people - have remained constantly in IPC/CH Phase 2 since 2016. Or in Afghanistan, where significant population levels were classified in IPC/CH Phase 2, fluctuating between 6 and almost 10 million people between 2014 and 2018.

While humanitarian assistance is required to save lives and livelihoods in a timely manner (particularly in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), long-term and resilience-based interventions are important to reduce structural vulnerabilities and address root causes of hunger for those in *Stressed* food security conditions, allowing not only to reduce the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, but also to prevent other households from falling into *Crisis* or worse. All actors investing in resilience programming need to have the capacity to be able to absorb additional numbers as populations move back and forth between IPC/CH Phases 2 and 3 (*Stressed* and *Crisis*).

Figure 8 143 million people likely to slip into IPC/CH Phase 3 or above if confronted with a shock or stressor



This shows the need for simultaneous investments across the humanitarian-development nexus, along with investments in conflict prevention and sustaining peace to reduce the number of people in need of assistance. Collaborative efforts and converging programmes between humanitarian and development actors would bring real progress in reducing the number of people in need, if combined with adapted financing tools to be more predictive, flexible and multi-years, allowing funding of early actions and preventive measures.

Economic shock and population displacement



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Venezuela is undergoing a political and economic crisis. Most of the food supply is imported, but the collapse in the value of the local Bolivar currency is resulting in difficulties in importing food. In 2016–2017, food imports fell by 67 percent.¹ Hyperinflation has severely reduced the purchasing power of households, limiting access to food, as well as medicine and other basic goods.

According to the “Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida de la Población Venezolana (ENCOVI)”, in 2017, 87 percent of households surveyed were considered to be poor, up from 48 percent in 2014 and the percentage of households in extreme poverty rose from

24 percent in 2014 to 61 percent in 2017.² Surveys conducted by local organizations point to an increasingly dire humanitarian situation as the political crisis deepens the four-year economic crisis.³ However, the number of people in need of urgent assistance and the severity of their needs in 2018 were unclear because of the absence of reliable data at the time.

Among the effects of the crisis, a large influx of refugees is entering neighbouring countries. It is estimated that the number of Venezuelans in countries across Latin America rose from 700 000 in 2015 to over 3.4 million in December 2018.⁴ Colombia hosts the highest number – a total of over

1 ENCOVI 2017: Radiography of the Venezuelan

2 ENCOVI 2017: Radiography of the Venezuelan Crisis

3 ACAPS. thematic report 23 May 2018

4 UNHCR. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations>

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Map 5 Venezuelan displacements in Central and South America, January 2019



Source : Plataforma de Coordinación para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, February 2019

1.1 million, followed by Peru, with over half a million; Ecuador, over 221 000; Argentina, 130 000; Chile, over 100 000 and Brazil, 96 000. The total number of Venezuelans in the region is likely to be higher, as most data sources do not account for those without regular status.⁵

Migrants often lack the economic resources to buy food. According to WFP, 30 percent of migrant in Colombia are moderately or severely food insecure. In Ecuador the percentage is 38 percent and in Peru 14 percent.⁶ In some areas displaced people are homeless and sleeping out in the open or in overcrowded

camps where WASH and health services are insufficient. Emergency coping strategies include survival sex, prostitution and child labour. Armed groups often restrict access for humanitarian organizations, particularly in the border region of Colombia. Sources indicate that migration from Venezuela to countries in the region is drastically increasing because of the deepening crisis, which will place additional pressure on overstretched host communities.⁷ Many Venezuelans arrive in need of health and nutrition assistance, overwhelming local response capacities, particularly in border regions.

5 https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2018/RMRP_Venezuela_2019_OnlineVersion.pdf

6 WFP EFSA. 2018 using CARI

7 ACAPS. Thematic report: Humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. 2018

OVERVIEW OF MALNUTRITION IN FOOD CRISES IN 2018

The 2018 Joint Malnutrition Estimates report²³ indicates that worldwide nearly 51 million children under five years of age were wasted (too thin for their height – a sign of acute malnutrition), accounting for 7.5 percent of the global population of children of this age in 2017. Of the 51 million children wasted, 16.4 million were severely wasted. This marks a slight improvement since 2016 when nearly 52 million children under five (7.7 percent) were acutely malnourished and 17 million severely wasted. However, it is still a far cry from the internationally agreed global nutrition target to reduce and maintain childhood wasting to below five percent by 2025. Stunting²⁴ affected almost 151 million, or 22.2 percent, of children under five.

The high levels of acute malnutrition and stunting among children in emergency contexts remained a concern in 2018. The analyses in this report demonstrate that acute malnutrition significantly worsened between 2017 and 2018 in areas of Afghanistan, South Sudan, north-east Nigeria, the Niger, Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic (Eastern Ghouta, Ar Raqqa and Idlib). For instance, in South Sudan in the lead-up to the lean season of May–July 2018, the

nutrition situation deteriorated significantly as a result of unprecedented levels of food insecurity, outbreaks of diarrhoea and other illness, poor infant and young child feeding practices and limited access to services because of the heavy rains. Four counties were expected to have GAM levels at 30 percent or above, while most counties in the Greater Upper Nile, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, Warrap and parts of Eastern Equatoria were expected to reach very high levels.²⁵

Across the six countries of the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Senegal), which experienced severe rainfall deficits in tandem with insecurity, up to 1.6 million children were reported at risk of suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM), an increase of more than 50 percent since 2017, and 3.4 million from moderate acute malnutrition (MAM),²⁶ with the highest rates in Mauritania, Mali and the Niger.

Rates of moderate and severe acute malnutrition remained extremely concerning in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya's drought-affected arid and semi-arid districts, half of all provinces in Chad, south and southeastern Madagascar, Somalia, the Sudan and northern Uganda (Karamoja and northwestern districts).

REGULAR, DETAILED AND DISAGGREGATED NUTRITION DATA IS NEEDED

Designing actions that result in impact is impossible without adequate knowledge of who is affected by malnutrition, where and why. Gaps in nutrition, health, WASH and food security data availability occur for varied and interlinked reasons: inadequate access to the affected population because of security concerns, lack of financial and technical resources to conduct timely assessments, lack of alignment within sectors to collect data to support analysis of the drivers and the rapid situational changes in conflict-affected regions.

In recent years progress has been made by governments, international organizations, research organizations and academic institutions in gathering, collating and analysing data to help inform the nutrition response. Still more regular, detailed and disaggregated data is

needed. National averages do not adequately reflect nutritional requirements within regions in a country, particularly in a context where conflicts and droughts are localized and concentrated.

Collecting and analysing data on nutritionally vulnerable populations – such as women, adolescent girls, young children and people who are marginalised and geographically isolated – is a vital exercise. Data availability allows for a systematic and integrated nutrition situation analysis that identifies not only outcomes but also key drivers of malnutrition for a targeted and integrated response. But data collection and analysis is not enough: all stakeholders need the capacity to access and use the information to make evidence-based decisions. The data community must make the data easy to interpret by policymakers and relevant stakeholders.


23 UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group. Levels and Trends in Child malnutrition- Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. 2018

24 UNICEF. <http://unicef.in/Whatwedo/10/Stunting>

25 IPC. South Sudan. 2018

26 CILSS. Nutrition situation. Presentation at the PREGEC meeting, Abidjan 19-21 Novembre 2018

Figure 9 The global burden of undernutrition



Source: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank, Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates – Levels and Trends, May 2018

Limited access to nutritious foods for young children in crises

In food crises, when food production and distribution systems are disrupted and purchasing power is weakened, mothers and caregivers can face major challenges in providing children with the key micronutrients they need at critical growth periods. This is reflected in the dismally low number of children consuming a minimum acceptable diet in most of the countries profiled in this report: in Ethiopia, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Niger's Diffa region, the makeshift camps for Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Malawi, fewer than 10 percent of children between 6-23 months of age were receiving a diet that met the minimum nutritional requirements for adequate growth and development.

Diminished access to basic services and higher disease burden in crises

People are often forced to live in overcrowded, unhygienic settings where they are at increased risk of frequent outbreaks of infectious diseases. Displaced populations in many of the crisis-affected countries covered in this report face severely compromised access to safe water and improved sanitation. Lack of access to safe drinking water is particularly poor in the Lac region of Chad (95 percent) and the Central African Republic (70 percent) followed by Madagascar, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, north-east Nigeria, Far North Cameroon, Mozambique, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In crises health systems may be weakened or even cease to function, trained medical staff may not be available and life-saving medication can become very expensive or unobtainable. In these situations, children have limited access to micronutrient supplementation, and to immunization programmes. Families do not receive basic health services for disease treatment and children are at increased risk of frequent outbreaks of infectious diseases.

In Afghanistan, Lake Chad basin, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ukraine, South Sudan and Ethiopia conflict and instability disrupted basic health and nutrition services in 2018. In Yemen less than half of health facilities were functioning.

In 2018 there were outbreaks of cholera (Cameroon, the Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe), polio (Somalia), measles (Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar) and Ebola (the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Acute Watery Diarrhoea was commonplace among displaced communities.

Child feeding and care practices can be compromised in crises

Displacement can result in the break-down of familial and community networks that can provide the necessary support and guidance needed for looking after young children, including their nutritional requirements. Furthermore, the trauma and stress induced by frequent displacement can reduce people's ability to care for themselves and their families with serious negative ramifications for the ability of parents and caregivers to create a nourishing environment for young children. In countries like Chad, high rates of psychological trauma and the lack of socio-affective stimulation between children and caretakers have been identified as aggravating factors for children's malnutrition.

Breastfeeding practices can be influenced negatively in emergencies when mothers and young children are on the move or in temporary shelters and/or when support from health facilities and communities are not available. Without adequate support, mothers may believe that the stress and trauma caused by displacement, along with their inadequate diets, may decrease the production and quality of their breast milk, which might lead them to feed their babies in unsuitable ways compromising the health and nutrition status of children. Children who are bottle fed and/or given infant formula or other forms of powdered milk in unhygienic circumstances have an increased risk of illness. In situations when infants cannot be breastfed, there needs to be access to safe breastmilk substitutes that can be prepared in a hygienic way.

This report shows very low rates of exclusive breastfeeding in Yemen (10 percent); Chad's Lac region (11 percent); north-east Nigeria (21 percent); the Syrian Arab Republic (24 percent); Iraq (26 percent); the Central African Republic (29 percent); and Cameroon's Far North (31 percent).

Mothers may have limited time to adequately prepare and care for younger children. For example, the death of family members, changes in livelihood activities or increased economic pressure can force women to become heads of households and take responsibility for vulnerable family members, thereby reducing the time they have to care for the younger children.

SPECIAL FOCUS ON INFANT AND YOUNG CHILD FEEDING (IYCF) IN EMERGENCIES



© WFP/REEM NADA

The first 1000 days of life – roughly spanning from conception to a child’s second birthday – is a critical period for growth and development; consequently, optimal nutrition is essential in these early days for children to reach their full potential.

Appropriate breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation and exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life, and the timely introduction of safe and nutritionally adequate complementary foods, with continued breastfeeding up to two years of age or beyond, ensure that children consume a diet meeting

their minimum nutrient requirements for healthy growth and development. Appropriate IYCF practices also boost immunity to diseases and infections. Generally, the main bottlenecks to appropriate IYCF practices for children under two years include inadequate community and health system support for mothers to practise appropriate feeding; negative beliefs and practices; and lack of access to nutritious foods. As discussed above, in emergency contexts these vulnerabilities increase, putting children at a much higher risk of consuming inadequate diets.

Source: IFE Core Group, ENN (2017). Infant and Young Child Feeding in Emergencies: Operational Guidance for Emergency Relief Staff and Programme Managers. Version 3.0–October 2017.

'We've been through some rough months. We had nothing in the house, no furniture, no food and no money. Sometimes I stay out late for work, and when I come home I never wake the children up - if I woke them up they would say they wanted to eat dinner.'

Former public servant, Yemen




3. MAJOR FOOD CRISES IN 2018


AFGHANISTAN

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



World Bank, 2017



2017-18 CHANGE

▲ The number of food insecure people in need of urgent action **increased** mainly as a result of severe drought conditions that affected the 2018 harvest.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of people in need of urgent assistance will **persist** at least until the 2019 harvest.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Climate shocks



Economic shocks

- Widespread drought severely affected 2017/2018 wheat production – estimated at 28 percent below five-year average.
- Drought dried up extensive pastureland prompting distress-selling of breeding livestock and increased animal deaths.
- Increased violence, drought and other natural disasters drove massive displacement.
- Violence against aid workers blocked relief from reaching the most vulnerable.
- Secure work opportunities are very scarce and more than half of the population lives below the national poverty line (2016–2017).
- Hundreds of thousands of Afghans returned from Iran with no assets or livelihoods.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



2M children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **600 000** affected by SAM.

HNO, 2019



16% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS 2015/16



35% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS 2015/16



Poor food access, and lack of health care increased acute malnutrition in drought-affected Kandhar and Badghis provinces.



43% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS 2015/16



41% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

National Nutrition Survey, 2013

DISPLACEMENT



343 000 new IDPs as a result of conflict in 2018.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



75 000 Pakistani refugees from North-Waziristan Agency hosted in Khost and Paktika provinces.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



800 100 undocumented refugees returned from Iran/Pakistan between January and December 2018.

IOM, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

Around four decades of protracted conflict have severely undermined Afghanistan's economic and social development, causing extreme levels of harm to civilians. In the first nine months of 2018, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded the highest number of civilian deaths (2 798) from armed conflict since the same period in 2014.¹ A quarter of the labour force is unemployed, 80 percent of employment is vulnerable and insecure and more than half (54 percent) of the population lives below the national poverty line.² Given this underlying fragility - at the economic, political and security levels - the country cannot cope with the consequences of the recurrent natural disasters which affect an average of 200 000 people each year.³

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

The number of rural Afghans facing *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) was projected to reach 10.6 million (47 percent of the rural population) in the winter months (November 2018–February 2019) if urgent food assistance was not provided. Of these, 2.9 million were expected to face *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) if they did not receive support. In addition, 6.8 million people were expected to face *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) during the same period.

This marks an increase compared with August–October 2018 when 9.8 million rural Afghans (44 percent of the rural population) were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 or above while the number of people in IPC Phase 2 persisted.

Even though the 2017 versus 2018 numbers are not directly comparable (the 2018 IPC analysed the rural population of Afghanistan and the 2017 both urban and rural), they confidently support a significant year-on-year deterioration in the food security situation linked to the 2018 drought. The number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above grew from 7.6 million nationally from August–November 2017 to 9.8 million⁴ in rural areas during the same period in 2018.



Badghis province had the highest percentage of households expected to face *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) at 47 percent from November 2018–February 2019. Out of 34 provinces, five (Badghis, Nuristan, Kandahar, Badakhshan and Daykundi) were expected to be in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) and another 26 in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) in the absence of humanitarian food assistance.

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Insecurity

Violence increased across Afghanistan in 2018, as the Taliban made territorial gains, targeted Afghan National Defence and Security Forces' bases and outposts, and carried out high-profile attacks across the country.⁵

In the first seven months of the year, 23 aid workers were killed, 37 injured and 74 abducted, making Afghanistan the second most dangerous country to work in the aid sector and preventing relief from reaching civilians.⁶ Although imported staple foods were available, and a lid was largely maintained on food prices,⁷ conflict limited physical and financial access to markets.

1 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict. 3rd quarter report. 10 October 2018

2 World Bank blog: the latest poverty numbers for Afghanistan: a call to action, not a reason for despair, July 2018

3 OCHA Afghanistan: overview of natural disasters (March 2019)

4 The 2018 IPC analysed the rural population of Afghanistan while the 2017 analysed both urban and rural. If the urban population had been taken into account, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above would have been the same or slightly higher depending on how the drought conditions affected the urban population and would still result in a deterioration in food security

5 Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

6 'Time for important decisions,' head of UN in Afghanistan tells Security Council UN News

7 FAO Early Warning Early, Action report on food security and agriculture, October–December 2018

DISPLACEMENT

Protracted conflict as well as climatic events (mainly drought as well as floods and landslides) continued to force people to abandon their homes and livelihoods, depressing incomes and reducing people's abilities to buy food and other essential needs. Across the year around 343 000 Afghans were newly displaced because of conflict.¹² Constrained humanitarian access hindered assessments, preventing verification of the full extent of displacement and undermining the provision of assistance and services.¹³

Between January and November, over 258 000 people were displaced by natural disasters throughout the country with 26 out of 34 provinces experiencing either drought, floods, earthquakes or landslides). OCHA's July-September 2018 bulletin reported that despite increased efforts of humanitarian partners, living conditions for families displaced by the drought in Herat City remained harsh as winter approached,¹⁴ with many having run out of in-kind food rations and used their cash-for-food to pay debts or for health services, or bought material for shelters.

The repatriation of Afghans from neighbouring countries continued. There were over 800 000 undocumented Afghan returnees from Pakistan and Iran in 2018.¹⁵ There has been a massive increase in undocumented returns from Iran in particular, largely driven by recent political and economic issues in Iran, including massive currency devaluation.¹⁶ Many of the returnees are highly vulnerable to food insecurity as they have no livelihoods or assets. These returns have also put an end to the remittances that the former migrant workers used to send home.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The most recent national nutrition survey (2013) estimated that 9.5 percent of children under five years were wasted (GAM), four percent severely so, and 41 percent stunted.¹⁷ However, the malnutrition situation generally worsened in most provinces in 2018 according to provincial level assessments. The results indicate acute

malnutrition levels above emergency thresholds in 22¹⁸ out of 34 provinces.¹⁹ The levels of acute malnutrition were highest in the drought-affected provinces of Jawzjan (27.4 percent), Kandahar (22.3 percent), and Badghis (19.7 percent). High levels of acute malnutrition were also noted among IDPs: a rapid assessment in Herat indicated a GAM rate of 24 percent among long-term IDPs and 25 percent among the new IDPs.²⁰

This translates to an estimated two million children – or four out of 10 – being acutely malnourished and in need of immediate treatment. Out of these an estimated 600 000 children were severely acutely malnourished, around half of them IDPs, returnees or living in rapid-onset disaster-affected communities. These numbers indicate an increase from 2017 when 1.6 million children were acutely malnourished, 546 000 of them severely so.

Almost half a million (485 000) pregnant and lactating women were acutely malnourished and required care in 2018, an increase of 42 000 since the previous year. The key drivers of deteriorating nutrition in Afghanistan are increasing food insecurity, especially in the drought-affected provinces, coupled with a constrained health system. Limited access to clean water (39 percent use unimproved sources) and sanitation (43 percent have unimproved sanitation) increase the risk of child morbidity and recurrent infections.²¹

Overall, 30 percent of Afghans lack access to basic health services with people living in hard-to-reach districts most likely to be deprived of essential primary health services. Almost four in 10 health facilities do not provide services for the management of SAM. Vaccination coverage in hard-to-reach districts, such as Uruzgan, is now as low as 32 per cent. Drought-affected people are particularly prone to disease including acute watery diarrhoea (AWD), and respiratory and skin infections because of the lack of safe water. Almost half (48 percent) of drought-displaced households report cases of AWD.²²

Poor infant and young child feeding practices and micronutrient deficiencies further exacerbate the poor nutritional status of vulnerable children.

12 UNHCR 2018.i

13 OCHA Afghanistan, conflict induced displacements

14 OCHA Afghanistan Humanitarian Bulletin Issue 78, 1 July – 30 September 2018

15 IOM, December 2018

16 IOM Weekly Situation Report, 9-15 September 2018

17 National Nutrition Survey Afghanistan 2013

18 The 22 provinces are: Badakhshan, Badghis, Bamyán, Dykundi, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, Hilmand, Jawzjan, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktya, Parwan, Takhar, Uruzgan, Wardak and Zabul

19 Afghanistan HNO 2019

20 OCHA. Afghanistan HNO 2019


21 UNICEF

22 OCHA. Afghanistan HNO 2019

BANGLADESH COX'S BAZAR

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of the difference in population analysed.

- ▼ The situation reportedly **improved** for the refugee population.
- ▲ The situation reportedly **worsened** for host community in Cox's Bazar.

2019 FORECAST

The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent assistance will **persist** for refugee population and host community in Cox's Bazar.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION

Conflict/insecurity

Climate shocks

Displacement

- Rohingya refugees outnumber host community members in Cox's Bazar by about 3:1.
- Monsoon floods/heavy rains/landslides jeopardize lives and livelihoods in congested camps, and affect market access and food prices.
- Poor local communities have lost access to natural resources (e.g. farm lands, freshwater).
- Lack of firewood for cooking and the protection risks of collecting it constrain food access.
- Competition for work, diminished daily labour rates and higher food prices constrain poor local households' purchasing power.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS

133 600 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **38 400** affected by SAM.

JRP, 2019

7% of children (makeshift camps) and **30%** of children (Nyapara camp) aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

Emergency Nutrition Assessment round 2, 2018

56% of households have challenges in accessing safe drinking water.

2018

Sub optimal IYCF practices and water-related infections during the monsoon remain a serious underlying risk to children's health and nutrition in crowded camps.

50% of infants (makeshift camps) and **74%** of infants (Nyapara camp) (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

Emergency Nutrition Assessment round 2, 2018

38% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (makeshift camps) and **40%** (Nyapara camp) (>30% = very high).

2018

DISPLACEMENT

The largest camp, the Kutupalong Extension Site, hosted 610 000 Rohingya refugees.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

907 000 refugees by late 2018; over **738 000** since August 2017.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

Over 16 000 refugees have arrived in Cox's Bazar from January to December 2018.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

Since 25 August 2017, over 738 000 Rohingya refugees²³ escaping violence and persecution in Myanmar have settled in camps, settlements and within host communities in Cox's Bazar district, Bangladesh, bringing the total number of refugees in the area to nearly 907 000 by December 2018, which is more than three times the number of the host population in the district.²⁴ The growing refugee population has had a heavy impact on the lives and livelihoods of the local populations in Ukhiya and Teknaf upazilas - already among the poorest in Bangladesh.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

In 2018, almost 1.3 million people were food insecure in Cox's Bazar.²⁵ Trends of food security indicators, as shown by WFP's May-June and August-September monitoring rounds suggest that overall food security among the Rohingya refugee population has improved since the 2017 Refugee Influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment (REVA) baseline. This is likely thanks to regular and effective general food assistance through in-kind and voucher programmes on which the refugee population is almost 100 percent reliant.

A comparison between the 2017 REVA and the latest monitoring round in 2018 (August-September) showed that 91 percent of displaced households were able to maintain or improve their food consumption status.²⁶ However, food security for host communities showed a marked deterioration, with the percentage of households with poor/borderline food consumption increasing sharply from 31 percent in 2017 to 80 percent by August-September 2018.

While displaced households registered a more diverse diet during August-September than at baseline as a result of receiving vouchers and sustained food assistance, the dietary diversity of host community households decreased.²⁷

Nearly seven in 10 refugee households borrowed money to meet their food needs in August-September 2018.²⁸ They have also become increasingly likely to sell food



rations or non-food assistance, a coping strategy used by only two percent of households at the baseline, and by 30 percent by August-September 2018. For the host community borrowing money to buy food remained the most used coping strategy (48 percent), followed by the selling of jewellery and the use of savings (28 percent).

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

Since people who fled violence in Myanmar have no opportunity to produce their own food and limited opportunities to earn money and provide for their families, almost the entire displaced population (98 percent) rely on food assistance, which plays a crucial role in maintaining acceptable levels of food consumption. Assistance is mainly provided in the form of food rations although food vouchers are being scaled-up.²⁹

23 UNHCR Bangladesh Operation Update, 15-31 December 2018

24 Ibid

25 2018 Humanitarian Crisis JRP for Rohingya March-December 2018


26 WFP. Rohingya refugee emergency food security update. December 2018

27 Ibid

28 Ibid

29 WFP Rohingya Refugee Emergency Food Security Update December 2018

Map 7 Bangladesh, Cox's Bazar, refugee population density



Source: UNHCR, January 2019

Women refugees are among the most vulnerable – particularly the many who head households and must balance childcare with providing food for their families. They face movement restrictions, protection issues in highly congested sites, and limited opportunities to earn money.

Besides the general lack of jobs and access to income-generating activities and land for food production, lack of firewood, which is used as the main cooking fuel by nearly all displaced households, and the protection risks of collecting it (particularly for children), constrain food access for refugee families, according to WFP monitoring.

Climate shocks

To complicate an already critical situation, the monsoon and cyclone season (May-September) poses an additional threat to the nearly one million households at risk of landslides and flooding. The Kutupalong-Balukhali expansion site camp is the largest and most densely populated refugee camp in the world with a population of 628 000 and despite significant work to improve the site it's unlikely to withstand a direct hit from a cyclone.³⁰ Market access is particularly constrained during monsoon floods/heavy rains and landslides and because of a perception of greater violence and insecurity. After the monsoon higher food prices curtail purchasing power.³¹

30 Mediciens Sans Frontieres August 2018

31 WFP Rohingya Refugee Emergency food security update December 2018

DISPLACEMENT

The influx of refugees has aggravated the already fragile situation of one of the poorest and most vulnerable districts in Bangladesh, where most local households derive their livelihoods from farming plots of around a hectare or less and/or fishing. Many have lost access to previously farmed lands. Between August 2017 and March 2018, at least 100 hectares of crop land in Teknaf and Ukhiya have been damaged by refugee activities, either occupied by refugee settlements or rendered useless by sandy soil flowing down from the mountain slopes, which are being used for refugee housing.³²

Local farmers in Teknaf and Ukhiya have always faced a lack of fresh water for agricultural production. However, fecal contamination levels in the affected areas has intensified scarcity of clean water for cooking and normal daily hygiene, while the population increase has massively increased overall demand for fresh water.

In many cases, those who earned a living from forest resources have been deprived of their livelihood. Reportedly, almost 2 000 hectares of forest reserves have been destroyed. Around 750 000 kg of timber, vegetation and roots are collected daily from the forest for cooking fuel.³³

Since the crisis escalated in August 2017, a ban has been in place on fishing in the Naf River for security and border control reasons. This prohibition has placed significant pressure on an estimated 30 000 to 35 000 fishermen and their families. Many of them have been compelled to work as wage labourers, but the availability of cheaper refugee labour has made jobs scarce and pushed down daily wage rates.

These factors along with diminished access to basic services, and an increase in staple food prices because of higher demand could represent the main factors behind the fall in acceptable food consumption levels among host communities over the last year.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The acute malnutrition rate is below the WHO emergency threshold of >15 percent, according to the SMART nutrition surveys conducted among Rohingya women and children living in camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas in October/November 2018.³⁴ The findings indicated a decline in GAM rates in makeshift camps from 19.3 percent in October/November 2017 to 11 percent. The SAM rate decreased from three percent to two percent in the same timeframe. In Nayapara Registered Camp (NRC) GAM fell from 14.3 percent to 12.2 percent.

Anaemia among children aged 6-23 months was greater than 30 percent and stunting among children 0-59 months was greater than 40 percent: both remain major concerns.

Poor dietary diversity is a major contributor to malnutrition in the camps. Only 7.3 percent of children (aged 6-23 months) in the makeshift camps and 29.7 percent in NRC were reported to have received minimum acceptable diets. Sub optimal infant and young child feeding practices are reported with almost half of infants under six months in makeshift camps, and just over a quarter in NRC, not exclusively breastfed. One in every four children had an episode of diarrhoea two weeks before the October/November assessment – an indication that inadequate sanitary conditions remain a serious underlying risk to children's health and nutrition status in the crowded camps.

32 OCHA Joint Response Plan for Rohingya humanitarian crisis January-December 2019


33 Ibid

34 OCHA Emergency Nutrition Assessment round 3 October-November 2018

BURUNDI

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of good agricultural campaign in 2018, despite climate shocks and lingering effects of the 2015 political crisis.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks

- Erratic rains, pest attacks, high winds and hail resulted in localized crop production shortfalls.



Conflict/insecurity

- IDPs and returnees have few assets and live in drought- and flood-prone communes, straining fragile host communities.



Economic shocks

- Low access to land (high population density), poor soil fertility, lack of inputs and low yields keep Burundi import-dependent.

- Around 75 percent of Burundians live below the poverty line and cannot afford diverse diets, despite stable food prices in 2018.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



115 000 children under five years acutely malnourished.

HNO, 2019



28.5% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

SMART, 2018



26% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS, 2016/17



Relatively high prevalence of diseases (particularly malaria), and low access to health facilities, clean water and sanitation also contribute to malnutrition.



83% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

SMART, 2018



57% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

SMART, 2018

DISPLACEMENT



139 600 internally displaced persons, mainly as a result of natural disasters and the socio-political crisis.

IOM, Dec 2018



75 800 Congolese refugees hosted in Burundi.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



Over **57 900** Burundian refugees assisted and repatriated, mainly from the United Republic of Tanzania.

OCHA, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

Around three in four Burundians live below the poverty line, making Burundi one of the poorest countries in the world.³⁵ The political crisis prompted by the contested 2015 presidential elections sent 400 000 Burundians into exile and has continued to undermine economic activity and food security, prompting major international donors to halve their contributions.³⁶ A weak rural economy, heavy reliance on development aid, lack of equitable distribution of resources, vulnerability to environmental events and strong population growth constrain efforts to reduce poverty.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

The number of people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) requiring urgent assistance was projected to reach 1.72 million between October and December 2018, representing 16 percent of the population. This reflects an improvement compared to the same period in the previous year, when 2.61 million (27 percent) were classified in IPC Phase 3 or above. The eastern parts of the eastern provinces of Makamba, Rutana, Ruyigi and Cankuzo were the most food-insecure areas and classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) during this time.


From mid-April to May 2018, at the height of the lean season, the situation was fairly similar to the end of 2018 with 1.7 million people (15 percent of the total population) in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above). This is about 35 percent less than the 2017 lean season when nearly 2.6 million people were estimated to be in *Crisis* or above (IPC Phases 3 or above) - including 700 000 people in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4).

During the July-September 2018 harvest and post-harvest period the number of acutely food-insecure people was at its lowest with 1.3 million in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and another 98 000 in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4).



© WFP/GILIO DADAMO

Figure 10 Burundi, number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 3 or above in 2014-2018



Source: Burundi IPC Technical Working Group

35 World Bank country overview

36 WFP country overview

Map 8 Burundi, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, March-April 2018



Source: Burundi IPC Technical Working Group, March 2018

Map 9 Burundi, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, October-December 2018



Source: Burundi IPC Technical Working Group, August 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

Better food security outcomes were the result of two seasons of very good agricultural performances, thanks to favourable rainfall, especially in the Northern, Eastern and Imbo Plains Depressions, which were the most vulnerable to the previous water deficits. Above-average crop production allowed a large number of households to engage in agricultural activities, to replenish stocks and to improve the quantity and quality of their food intake.³⁷

However, flooding triggered by heavy rainfall in late April 2018 affected an estimated 23 000 people, damaged or destroyed at least 2 000 houses, and damaged bridges, roads, inundated agricultural fields and disrupted livelihood activities, particularly in Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, and Makamba provinces.³⁸

The food security situation was worst in the Kinyinya commune in the eastern Ruyigi Province in mid-2018. It was still suffering from the lingering effects of consecutive poor rainy seasons, as well as erratic rains during the 2018A season, fall armyworm attacks on corn crops, high winds and hail, all of which negatively affected agricultural production.

Conflict/insecurity

In addition to climatic hazards, the persistent effects of the 2015 security crisis, which led to mass internal and external displacements and loss of livelihoods, continue to undermine food security.

Most IDPs and returnees are vulnerable to food insecurity because they have few assets and live in drought-and flood-prone communes. Displaced people, returnees and refugees also strain already-fragile host communities that lack access to water, education, farmland and livelihoods, potentially generating disputes over

37 FAO GIEWS. Burundi country brief

38 USAID

scarce resources. About 140 000 people remained internally displaced in 2018, mainly because of climatic events (77 percent) followed by socio-political reasons (23 percent).³⁹

The most food-insecure areas tend to be in the Dépressions de l'Est and Buragane livelihood zones bordering the United Republic of Tanzania, where Burundian refugees are being assisted to return from the United Republic of Tanzania at an average rate of 3 800 per month.⁴⁰ From January to 30 September 2018 a total of 38 390 refugees were assisted to voluntarily repatriate to Burundi from the United Republic of Tanzania.⁴¹ As of December, the total of voluntary returns in 2018 almost reached 58 000,⁴² while an unspecified number repatriated on their own. Registered and non-registered returnees alike have difficulty re-establishing their livelihoods and obtaining agricultural inputs, particularly if they arrive after the start of a season.⁴³ According to monitoring by UNHCR and Caritas 70 percent of these returnees had only one meal a day.⁴⁴

Burundi is also receiving refugees and asylum-seekers originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo fleeing violence and armed conflict in South Kivu. Approximately 41 percent are living in urban areas, while the remaining 59 percent are living in four refugee camps. By the end of 2018 UNHCR estimated there were around 76 000 Congolese refugees in the country.⁴⁵

Economic shocks

Stable food prices made food more accessible during the October–December lean period than during the same period last year. According to the Burundi Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (ISTEEBU), national staple food prices in October declined by 2.7 percent compared to September, which is seasonally atypical given the lesser availability of food supplies during the lean season.⁴⁶

Multiple structural problems underlie chronic food insecurity in Burundi. In addition to high levels of poverty structural issues include low access to land (due to the

high density of the population), the loss of soil fertility, low yields and poor quality of production. Agriculture employs about 80 percent of the population, and yet the total annual production of food only feeds each person for 55 days a year.⁴⁷

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The nutrition situation in Burundi slightly improved in 2018. According to the February–March 2018 National Nutritional and Mortality Survey (NNMS) based on SMART methodology,⁴⁸ six of Burundi's 18 provinces had a GAM prevalence of 5–9.5 percent, compared with nine provinces in the IPC acute malnutrition analysis for October–December 2017.⁴⁹

Around 115 000 children were expected to suffer from acute malnutrition according to the latest 2018 survey, slightly less than the 125 000 estimated in the IPC analysis, which found that Karusi, Kayanza, and Kirundo provinces required particular attention. The prevalence of chronic malnutrition is 57 percent, the highest rate in Africa.⁵⁰

Major contributing factors to acute malnutrition are food insecurity and poor child feeding practices. The 2018 NNMS found just 29 percent of children aged 6–23 months received a minimum acceptable diet.⁵¹ Relatively high prevalence of diseases (particularly malaria), and low access to health facilities, clean water and sanitation also contribute to malnutrition. Two in three children were ill in the 15 days before the 2018 NNMS survey. Anaemia is a major public health problem that calls for urgent attention in all provinces.

On the upside there was a sharp fall in malaria cases and deaths in the first six months of 2018 thanks to increased efforts of health partners and donors contributing to the Malaria Response Plan. According to the Ministry of Health, the cumulative number of malaria cases reported during the first 24 weeks of 2018 was 2.4 million, 44 percent lower than the same period in 2017.⁵²

39 IOM. 2018. Burundi DTM Displacement Dashboard. December

40 FEWS NET. Burundi remote monitoring report. September 2018.

41 UNHCR. Voluntary repatriation of Burundian refugees from the United Republic of Tanzania to Burundi - 30 September 2018

42 OCHA. 2018. Regional Overview of the Burundian refugee population. 31 December

43 FEWS NET. Burundi remote monitoring report. September 2018

44 UNHCR. Voluntary repatriation of Burundian refugees from the United Republic of Tanzania to Burundi - 30 September 2018

45 UNHCR. 2018. Operational portal - Refugee situations. Democratic Republic of the Congo Situation

46 FEWS NET Burundi key message update. November 2018

47 FAO December 2017

48 ISTE. Burundi. Enquete SMART. 2018

49 IPC Burundi

50 ISTE. Burundi. Enquete SMART. 2018


51 Ibid

52 UNICEF. Burundi Humanitarian Situation Report. June 2018

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▲ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **increased** mainly resulting from conflict dynamics, but also from a difference in population analysed.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION

Conflict/insecurity

- Escalating violence destroyed livelihoods, caused repeated displacement and strained host communities.

populations of assistance as several agencies suspended operations.

Economic shocks

- Five years of poor harvests prevented farmers from investing in inputs: 2018 crop prospects well below pre-crisis levels.

- Insecurity, poor roads, lack of transport and illegal taxes imposed by armed groups disrupted markets, and inflated prices.

Displacement

- Increased attacks on humanitarian workers deprived vulnerable

- Conflict between farmers and nomadic pastoralists disrupted agricultural operations in border areas.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS

90 000 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **37 300** affected by SAM.

HNO, 2018

45% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

SMART, 2014

70% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

SMART, 2014

Displacement, illnesses, unfavourable child feeding practices, limited access to safe water, poor hygiene and sanitation and low access to healthcare contributed to an alarming malnutrition situation.

29% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

SMART, 2014

41% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

SMART, 2014

DISPLACEMENT

580 700 internally displaced persons, mainly as a result of armed conflicts and intercommunal violence.

IOM, Dec 2018

589 000 Central African Republic refugees in neighbouring countries, mainly Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and the Congo.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

375 700 IDPs and **118 600** former refugees returned to their prefecture of origin.

IOM, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

Five years into the conflict the humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic is deteriorating. The crisis is driven largely by fighting between about 12 armed groups over cattle routes and lands rich in diamonds, gold and uranium. The groups target civilians and attack health and education facilities and personnel, mosques and churches, as well as sites where displaced people have sought shelter and protection.⁵³ The majority of the population does not have access to clean water, three quarters lack access to basic sanitation and an estimated three out of four live on less than 1.90 USD a day, up from two out of three a decade ago.⁵⁴ The country ranks 188 out of 189 in the 2018 Humanitarian Development Index.⁵⁵

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


In August 2018 the number of people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) amounted to 1.89 million – or 43 percent of the population. Of these, about 550 000 people faced *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) conditions.⁵⁶ An additional 1.8 million people were estimated to be in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2). This marks a deterioration compared to 2017. Since late 2017, the quantity of the food intake for large segments of the population reportedly reduced and dietary diversity drastically worsened through the substitution of more nutritious cereals and vegetables with cassava.⁵⁷

The areas with the highest levels of food insecurity included the concentrations of Batangafo, Kaga Bandoro and Rafai and the prefectures of Ouham Pendé, Nana-Gribizi, Ouaka and Haut-Mbomou.⁵⁸

In March 2018, before the start of the lean season, already 1.6 million were facing *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) or above. Between March and August 2018 food insecurity worsened, particularly in the prefectures worst-affected by the conflict, including Haut-Mbomou, Nana-Grebizi, Ouaka and Ouham Pendé, where it deteriorated from *Crisis* to *Emergency* levels.



Figure 11 Central African Republic, number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 3 or above in 2015-2018



Source: Central African Republic IPC Technical Working Group

53 UNICEF November 2018

54 Ibid


55 UNDP 2018 Humanitarian Development Index Ranking

56 IPC République Centrafricaine. Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire Aigüe. September 2018

57 FAO. GIEWS Country brief, Central African Republic, 03 August 2018

58 IPC République Centrafricaine. Analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire Aigüe - Rapport no.10, October 2018

Map 10 Central African Republic, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, August 2018



Source: Central African Republic IPC Technical Working Group, September 2018.

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

Armed conflict continued to be the single most important factor driving acute food insecurity, with civilians, particularly women and children, bearing the brunt of it. Increasing tensions and violence since the beginning of 2018 are now engulfing the country, including several major towns and cities. In 2018 the capital Bangui experienced its highest levels of violence in at least two years.⁵⁹ Armed groups now control four-fifths of the country.⁶⁰ According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the total number of fatalities was lower in 2018 than 2017, but the level of violence against civilians was 12 percent higher.⁶¹

In 2018, acts of violence against humanitarian workers were five times higher than in 2017: by the end of October 2018, 338 cases had been recorded, forcing several organizations to suspend operations and depriving vulnerable populations of humanitarian assistance.⁶²

The persistence of conflict since 2013 has severely affected agricultural production, leading to five consecutive years of reduced harvests. People have abandoned their farms and armed gangs have often looted crops. Despite favourable weather conditions, crop prospects for 2018 - estimated at three percent below the 2017 production levels - were below-average and significantly below the pre-crisis levels.⁶³

Intercommunal conflict between farmers and nomadic pastoralists in the border areas with Cameroon, Chad,

59 UNICEF. Central African Republic. Humanitarian situation report. June 2018

60 UNICEF November 2018

61 FEWS NET. Central African Republic Update. November 2018

62 FEWS NET. Central African Republic Update. October 2018

63 FAO Crop Prospects and Food Situation, December 2018

South Sudan and the Sudan also destabilized food availability and access. Households, therefore, depleted their food stocks, inflating prices, and compelling nearly half to adopt negative coping mechanisms.⁶⁴

Economic shocks

Insecurity, lack of transportation, degradation of roads, and illegal taxes imposed by armed groups disrupt food and livestock markets, especially in northwest, southeast and central conflict-affected areas, undermining food access.⁶⁵ As of June, the prices of staples were above their December 2017 levels: the maize price was 52 percent higher, sorghum 17 percent higher and local rice 14 percent higher. According to WFP's Alert for Price Spikes, the Bria market was in alert as a result of high maize prices and in stress as a result of high cassava prices.⁶⁶ Prices were expected to seasonally decline in November thanks to availability of production from harvests.⁶⁷

DISPLACEMENT

Conflict has pushed the number of internally displaced people up from about 400 000 in January 2017 to around 581 000 in December 2018, out of a total population of 4.7 million.⁶⁸ In addition around 376 000 former IDPs and around 119 000 returnees from abroad⁶⁹ have come back – often to find their houses burned or badly vandalised. Returnees urgently need support as their coping capacities have been exhausted and livelihoods lost.⁷⁰

Around Bria, the capital of Haute-Kotto, increasing numbers abandoned their homes in 2018 to seek refuge from abuses by armed groups and security forces, mainly in the PK3 site. By the end of September 2018, Bria was hosting around 94 000 displaced people compared to around 50 000 in August 2018, putting huge pressure on humanitarian assistance.⁷¹ IDPs live in 'concentrations' in the main cities of the prefectures affected by the conflict,⁷² most (60 percent) with host families. This adds pressure to the already precarious livelihoods of local host communities: in some prefectures, including Haute Kotto, IDPs outnumber their hosts.

The most vulnerable depend entirely on humanitarian assistance, particularly during the lean season, but it does not meet the food gap. The 40 percent who live in settlements endure dire living conditions and often have movement restrictions imposed on them by armed groups, preventing them from accessing agricultural fields and buying food.⁷³

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

According to existing SMART surveys, eight sub-prefectures (out of a total of 71) have very high GAM levels (> 15 percent). SAM rates are above two per cent in more than half the country (39 sub prefectures).⁷⁴

Displaced children are particularly vulnerable to malnutrition. According to rapid surveys conducted in Ouaka, Haut-Mbomou and Basse-Kotte prefectures in 2017 and 2018, GAM rates are above the WHO emergency threshold (>15 percent) in 16 out of 18 displacement sites.⁷⁵

Chronic malnutrition, measured by stunting, affects four in every 10 children under five years of age in the country, according to the latest national data.⁷⁶ Currently, it is estimated that 350 000 children under five years of age are chronically malnourished.⁷⁷ The rates are particularly concerning in the sub-prefectures of Mamberé-Kadéi and Sangha Mbaéré, where at least half of children under five are stunted.

Malaria and acute diarrhoea are the main illnesses in children under five. Food insecurity remains a major challenge, particularly around main cities in prefectures touched by conflict with large numbers of displaced populations. Poor child feeding practices and low levels of exclusive breastfeeding for infants younger than six months old (less than 30 percent) are major contributory factors.⁷⁸ Some 70 percent of the population lacks safe drinking water and hygiene and sanitation conditions are poor. Access to primary health services and nutrition support is limited because of interruptions to services, attacks on personnel, destruction of infrastructure and looting of medicines.

64 FAO situation report Oct 2018

65 FAO GIEWS. CAF Country brief

66 WFP. République Centrafricaine mVAM bulletin no. 10, April-May 2018

67 FAO GIEWS. CAF Country brief

68 IOM

69 IOM DTM République Centrafricaine. Rapport no. 6, December 2018

70 OCHA. Central African Republic HNO 2019. October 2018

71 OCHA

72 IPC country analysis

73 FAO. Situation Report. October 2018

74 SMART 2014 and rapid SMART 2016-2018, cited in République Centrafricaine: Aperçu des besoins humanitaires 2019

75 Rapid SMART 2017-2018, cited in République Centrafricaine: Aperçu des besoins humanitaires 2019

76 SMART 2014, cited in République Centrafricaine: Aperçu des besoins humanitaires 2019

77 OCHA. République Centrafricaine: Aperçu des besoins humanitaires 2019

78 Ibid

CENTRAL AMERICAN DRY CORRIDOR

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018

DRY CORRIDOR	IPC PHASE 3 OR ABOVE	IPC PHASE 2
TOTAL POPULATION ANALYSED 10.1M	1.6M ↑ 1.2M CRISIS ↑ 340 000 EMERGENCY	2.6M ↑ ↑ STRESSED
GUATEMALA	837 500 ↑ 654 000 CRISIS ↑ 184 000 EMERGENCY	1.4M ↑ ↑ STRESSED
HONDURAS	519 000 ↑ 400 000 CRISIS ↑ 119 000 EMERGENCY	787 000 ↑ STRESSED
EL SALVADOR	219 000 ↑ 183 000 CRISIS ↑ 36 000 EMERGENCY	386 000 ↑ STRESSED

2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **remained stable** mainly as a result of different coverage, despite increased impact of climate shocks – drought.

2019 FORECAST

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **increase** due to dry spells and production shortfalls.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Economic shocks

- In El Salvador, drought and flood-related production shortfalls had a severe impact on the livelihoods of smallholder farmers engaged in subsistence agriculture.
- In Guatemala Dry Corridor areas, the prolonged and severe dryness resulted in substantial crop losses, which were estimated at about 10 percent of the national population.
- In Honduras, around 82 percent of the maize and bean production of the most-affected areas of the Dry Corridor areas have been lost, severely affecting local livelihoods, and mainly smallholder farmers.
- As household stocks of maize were depleted earlier than usual in the drought-affected areas, populations of the Dry Corridor had to rely on market purchases, facing high prices

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



Less than 5% of children under five years acutely malnourished (0.8% Guatemala, 2.1% El Salvador and 1.4% Honduras).

DHS 2012, MICS 2015, DHS 2014



Recurrent natural disasters undermine people's efforts to make a living, limiting access to a micronutrient-rich diet.



Guatemala: **46.7%** of children under five years stunted. Honduras: **22.6%** and El Salvador: **13.6%**.

DHS 2012, MICS 2015, DHS 2014

DISPLACEMENT



A significant number of migrants from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua crossed the Mexican border in 2018 transiting via Guatemala and heading mainly towards the USA.

IOM 2018/2019



Compared to the previous year, the number of migrants crossing the Mexican borders from Guatemala increased in 2018, with the largest increased reported for Guatemalan and Honduran migrants.

IOM 2018



Asylum applications lodged by people fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have also increased as a result of high levels of criminal violence and insecurity.

NRC/AECD/UNHCR, Nov 2018

BACKGROUND

The Central America Dry Corridor (CADC) is a tropical dry forest region on the Pacific side of Central America that stretches from the Pacific Coast of Chiapas, Mexico, to the western part of Costa Rica and western provinces of Panama. It is one of the most susceptible regions in the world to climate change and variability.⁷⁹ The countries that are the most prone to drought and long periods of heatwaves during *El Niño* years, as well as extreme precipitation, are Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The frequency and intensity of droughts and floods has been increasing in recent years. Small producers of basic grain crops have very limited access to infrastructure and services and little resilience to climate shocks: more than half of the region's 45 million inhabitants live below the poverty line and 20 percent in extreme poverty.⁸⁰



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Between November 2018 and March 2019, around 1.6 million people were facing *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) or *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) food security conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Around 2.5 million people were in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) conditions in these areas.

In Guatemala, approximately 838 000 people were food insecure and in need of urgent action (IPC Phase 3 or above).⁸¹ Honduras accounted for close to 519 000 people in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in the western region - in the departments of Copán, Lempira, Ocotepeque, and Santa Bárbara - and Fonseca Gulf - Choluteca, El Paraíso, Francisco Morazán, La Paz, and Valle.⁸² Additionally, around 219 000 people were in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in selected areas of El Salvador - in the departments of La Unión, Morazán, San Miguel, Usulután, Chalatenango (Cayaguanca) and Santa Ana (Candelaria).⁸³

79 FAO. Chronology of the Dry Corridor: The Impetus for Resilience in Central America. June 2017

80 Ibid

81 Guatemala IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, March 2019, covering Nov 2018 -Feb 2019

82 IPC Informe del análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda - situación actual, región 13 Golfo de Fonseca, Honduras, 14 December 2018; IPC Informe del análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda - situación actual, región occidente, Honduras, 05 February 2019

83 IPC Informe de análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda - Mancomunidad trinacional fronteriza Río Lempa, 13 November 2018 ; IPC Informe del análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda - situación actual, región oriental, El Salvador, 27 November 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks


The 2018 May-November rainy season was characterized by severe dryness from late June throughout July.⁸⁴ As this period coincides with the flowering and grain-filling phases, when crops are most vulnerable to moisture deficits, the dry conditions severely constrained yields and resulted in a reduced main season maize harvest. The resilience of smallholders was eroded by the cumulative impact of two consecutive reduced harvests in 2014 and 2015, following drought conditions associated with the *El Niño* phenomenon. Consequently the crop losses in 2018 had a severe impact on their livelihoods.

Economic shocks

Prevailing high cereal prices due to inflated production costs, mainly linked to elevated fuel prices, had a negative impact on food access for vulnerable households.

84 In Central America, there exists a 2-4 week dry period, called "canícula", during the July-August cropping season.

Map 11 Central American Dry Corridor, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, November 2018-March 2019



Source: El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala IPC Technical Working Groups

Map 12 Central American Dry Corridor, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, February-July 2019



Source: El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala IPC Technical Working Groups



GUATEMALA (DRY CORRIDOR)

In Guatemala, where the first season harvest accounts for about 60 percent of the national yearly output of maize and 35 percent of the yearly output of beans, severe dryness prevailed in July in the East and Coastal regions. In the areas of the Dry Corridor lying in these regions, no rains were received up to mid-August, resulting in substantial crop losses. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food, the drought affected about one in 10 people nationally, with the areas of major concern being Jutiapa, Chiquimula, El Progreso, Jalapa and Baja Verapaz departments.

Aiming to support second season production, the government provided farmers with seeds, tools and small irrigation systems. In addition, food aid was distributed to the farmers who lost more than 75 percent of their expected harvest.⁸⁵ Markets were adequately supplied thanks to the favourable harvest output in the northern producing region and imports from Mexico. However, prices of white maize in February were about 30 percent higher than year-earlier levels, constraining food access for vulnerable households.

85 Ministerio de Agricultura, 2018

HONDURAS (DRY CORRIDOR)

In 2018, the *Primera* and *Postrera* crop production cycles had lower than normal yields mainly because of the prolonged drought in June and August followed by excessive rainfall in October.⁸⁶ According to a Government of Honduras survey, the season A maize crop was 17 percent of expected levels and the beans crop 15 percent because of the drought. As production of first season maize represents 80 percent of the total annual production, while that of beans represents 20 percent, the drought had a comparatively greater impact on the domestic availability of maize. The areas most affected by the drought were Choluteca, Valle, El Paraíso, Francisco Morazán, La Paz and Lempira departments, lying in the Dry Corridor, where around 82 percent of both crops were lost. By contrast, crop losses in the rest of the country were estimated at 10 percent.

As the Dry Corridor area accounts for about 10 percent of the annual aggregated maize output, localized crop losses did not significantly reduce availabilities at the national level. However, they severely affected local livelihoods, and the households in the Dry Corridor, mainly smallholder farmers, had to rely on markets, facing high maize prices as in other countries of the region. To mitigate these severe food availability and access constraints, the government distributed food aid to the affected households, about 10 percent of the national population. To improve the resilience of the farming households in the Dry Corridor, the government is seeking to expand irrigation use by repairing the rainwater harvesting facilities that were already established in the region.⁸⁷

EL SALVADOR (DRY CORRIDOR)

Since 2014 most of the Dry Corridor of El Salvador has been affected consecutively by irregularities in the distribution of rain, causing periods of prolonged drought and a progressive deterioration of the livelihoods of the affected population.⁸⁸ According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, the drought-related crop losses in the 2018 *Primera* main season amounted to 46 000 tonnes,⁸⁹ about six percent of the expected output of the season, which normally accounts for about 85 percent of the yearly national maize production.

The areas most affected by the drought were Usulután, San Vicente, San Miguel, La Unión and Morazán

departments in the eastern region. Although some of these departments produce more maize in the following *Postrera* season, the production shortfalls had a severe impact on the livelihoods of smallholder farmers engaged in subsistence agriculture. Subsequently, excessive rainfall in early October resulted in the loss of 10 230 tonnes of *Postrera* season crops, harvested in November-December, despite the efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to boost production by distributing maize seeds. As household stocks of maize were depleted earlier than usual in the drought-affected areas, populations in the Dry Corridor had to rely on market purchases. They faced high prices: in February 2019, wholesale prices of white maize were more than 70 percent higher than a year earlier, due to tight supplies and high production costs.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The most recent national survey in **El Salvador** (Dry corridor) found that 2.1 percent of children were acutely malnourished and 14 percent stunted (MICS 2014). However, a UNICEF evaluation conducted in 2017 found that 17 percent of children in rural drought-affected households suffered from acute malnutrition.

In **Honduras** (Dry corridor) the acute malnutrition of children did not suffer significantly as a result of the drought: only 1.3 percent of children in the regions affected by the 2018 drought were acutely malnourished according to monitoring by UNICEF and WFP. The impact of the drought on the availability of water also seemed to be limited: 80 percent of families said they had enough water for consumption, sanitation and hygiene at the time of being interviewed, although half of them said they had less water compared to the same period in the previous year. According to the available data of ENDESA (2011-2012), no department presented acute malnutrition above five percent.

In **Guatemala** (Dry Corridor), although only 0.7 percent of the population under five was affected by acute malnutrition in 2014/15, a field study conducted by WFP and UNICEF among poor rural families in 2017 found that 3.4 percent of children aged 12-23 months were suffering from acute malnutrition, three times higher than the number registered in 2014. Chronic malnutrition continued to be a serious problem, affecting 46.7 percent of the population under five years of age.⁹⁰ Only 15 percent of children aged 6-24 months received Vitamin A supplementation.⁹¹ While 85 percent of the population used water from improved sources, only 64 percent of the population had access to basic sanitation services.⁹²

86 IPC Informe del análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda - Situación actual, región 13 Golfo de Fonseca, Honduras, 14 December 2018; IPC Informe del análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda - Situación actual

87 El Herald, 16 February, 2019

88 IPC Informe de análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda - Situación Actual, Región Oriental, El Salvador. 27 November 2018

89 La Prensa Grafica, 26 September 2018

90 ENSMI 2014/2015.


91 UNICEF Global Database 2018.

92 UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Programme.


DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



World Bank, 2017



2017-18 CHANGE

▲ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **increased** mainly as a result of an intensification of the protracted conflict, exacerbated by crop pests, floods and diseases, against a backdrop of widespread poverty.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Economic shocks



Climate shocks

- Conflict and intercommunal violence prompted massive displacement.
- Conflict disrupted agriculture, trade, access to food, safe water and basic services.
- Plant and animal diseases, floods, dry spells and landslides constrained food production.
- Ebola virus disease, cholera, measles and malaria affected livelihood activities.
- Decreased daily wages and climbing food prices impacted food access.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



4.9M children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **2.2M** affected by SAM.

HRP, 2019



8% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2013-14



51% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS, 2013-14



Low access to healthcare and safe drinking water fuelled contributed to increasing malnutrition and morbidity.



48% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2013-14



43% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

DHS, 2013-14

DISPLACEMENT



3M IDPs in the provinces of Kasai, Central Kasai, Eastern Kasai, Lomami, Sankuru, South Kivu and Tanganyika.

IOM, Dec 2018



534 828 refugees and asylum seekers mainly from Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Burundi.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



4.5M returnees in the provinces of Kasai, Central Kasai, Eastern Kasai, Lomami, Sankuru, South Kivu and Tanganyika.

IOM, Nov 2018

BACKGROUND

The second largest country in Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is ranked seventh out of 178 countries on the 2017 Fragile States Index, placing it in the highest category of risk and reflecting widespread conflict and insecurity.⁹³ Conflicts have prevailed in eastern provinces for the past two decades and recently broke out in other areas. In addition, the Congolese people suffer the effects of extreme poverty, chronic poverty, underdevelopment, and human rights violations. While the country has the agricultural potential to feed 2 billion people,⁹⁴ its population of 85 million inhabitants still faces one of the most serious food and nutrition crisis in the world. Presidential elections - originally planned for December 2016 - were subject to continuous delays and finally held on 30 December 2018.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

As of August 2018, some 13.1 million people required urgent action, consisting of 9.8 million people facing *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and 3.3 million people in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4). This represents 23 percent of the surveyed population, compared to 11 percent between June and December 2017.⁹⁵ An additional 27.4 million people were estimated to be in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2).

The most vulnerable populations were located in areas affected by armed and intercommunal conflicts. Out of 101 territories analysed, nine territories were classified in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) in the provinces of Ituri, Tanganyika, Haut-Katanga, Kasai and Eastern Kasai, and 31 territories were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3).

Among the surveyed population, 99 percent of households had to employ negative coping strategies. Two households in three only had one meal per day comprised of tubers or cereals, vegetables and palm oil.⁹⁶



FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

The severe food insecurity situation has been mainly driven by conflict and violence in Kasai, North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Haut-Katanga and Tanganyika that triggered massive population displacements as well as disruption of agriculture, trade, livelihoods, access to food, safe water and basic services.

While the food basket cost remained relatively stable in the second half of the year, households' purchasing power was particularly affected by a decrease in daily labour wages.⁹⁷

Economic shocks

In May 2018, the prices of maize and cassava flour had increased above normal levels as a result of limited supplies mainly because of the impact of conflict and localized flooding on production. From the second half of September 2018, maize prices rose significantly as a result of reduced harvests, low market supplies and the export restriction on maize from Zambia. In Haut-Katanga in the Lubumbashi market, maize prices increased by about 56 percent compared to the previous month.

93 WFP country brief


94 IPC. June 2018

95 Ibid

96 Ministère de l'agriculture, FAO, CAID & WFP Rapport Sécurité alimentaire, August 2018

97 WFP Bulletin trimestriel d'information sur la Sécurité Alimentaire no. 2, June-August 2018

Map 13 Democratic Republic of the Congo, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, August 2018-June 2019



Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC Technical Working Group, June 2018

In addition, the high inflation rate – forecast at 23 percent in 2018⁹⁸ – and currency depreciation further curtailed households’ purchasing power.⁹⁹

Human disease outbreaks, including cholera, measles and the Ebola virus disease in Equatoria, exacerbated by limited access to health services also contributed to food insecurity through loss of manpower at household level and reduced access to livelihoods for those quarantined.¹⁰⁰

98 FAO GIEWS Country Brief Democratic Republic of the Congo, November, 12, 2018

99 FAO GIEWS Country Brief Democratic Republic of the Congo, August, 8, 2018

100 Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC Technical Working Group. 2018. Current Acute Food Insecurity Situation August 2018 - June 2019, June 2018

Climate shocks

The vast majority of the rural population (60 to 70 percent) depends on subsistence agriculture to maintain their livelihoods. Agricultural production in 2017/2018 was well below that of the 2016/2017 campaign, negatively affecting food availability and access. While crops benefited mostly from favourable agro-climatic conditions, localized floods and erratic rainfalls were reported in North-Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika and in other localized areas.¹⁰¹

Fall armyworm infestations caused maize production losses.¹⁰² Conflict in the aforementioned regions as well as dry spells in localized eastern areas also undermined food production.¹⁰³ Confronted with plant pests and diseases, armed conflicts and lack of quality inputs, farmers significantly reduced planted areas compared to the previous agricultural campaign.¹⁰⁴

The livestock sector was reportedly devastated by conflicts and animal diseases¹⁰⁵ (e.g. Peste des Petits Ruminants in North-Kivu¹⁰⁶), which reduced the availability of meat and livelihood products as well as purchasing power of livestock-producing households.

DISPLACEMENT

Between February and November 2018 around 2.96 million people were reportedly displaced in the provinces of Kasai, Central Kasai, Eastern Kasai, Lomami, Sankuru, South Kivu and Tanganyika - almost all of them (93 percent) had been displaced by armed attacks and intercommunal conflicts, and more than half (58 percent) had been displaced in 2017. Over the same period, more than 4.5 million people had returned from displacement in these provinces - including over a million returnees in 2018.¹⁰⁷

In August, massive returns of displaced populations were reported in the Kasai region and in the South-Kivu, Tanganyika and Ituri provinces after security improved in these areas - in spite of inter-ethnic conflict in Uvira, South-Kivu's agro-pastoral breadbasket.¹⁰⁸ Since early October, an expulsion order issued by the Angolan

authorities also triggered large movements of returnees - more than 370 000 people returned from Angola with the majority arriving in the Kasai province.¹⁰⁹ In the first 10 months of the year there were almost a million returnees.¹¹⁰

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

More than 4.9 million children were estimated to be acutely malnourished in 2018 including 2.2 million suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM).

The level of malnutrition was of particular concern in the areas designated a level 3 emergency and was further compounded by the Ebola outbreak, centred in north-eastern North Kivu province. As of 1 January 2019, there were 608 confirmed cases of Ebola and 368 deaths, according to WHO.¹¹¹

In the provinces of Kasai, Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental one in 10 children (at least 770 000) were suffering from acute malnutrition, including 400 000 severely malnourished and at risk of death, according to a May 2018 UNICEF report.¹¹² Displaced children have been denied access to health care, safe drinking water and food in sufficient quantity and quality as displaced families were unable to plant and harvest their crops. The report found that immunization schedules for children were interrupted by the violence and more than 200 health centres were looted, burnt or destroyed. The region faced outbreaks of cholera, yellow fever and measles.

In the first nine months of the year there were over 19 000 cholera outbreaks nationally, with more than half of all the cases and deaths in Great Kasai. South Kivu and Tanganyika were also badly affected. The outbreaks are related to a lack of access to safe water, lack of medical supplies and a general lack of community interventions.¹¹³

Infant and young child feeding practices also underlie the high levels of malnutrition with just 20 percent of children aged 6-23 months meeting minimum dietary diversity requirements, and eight percent a minimum acceptable diet.¹¹⁴ High levels of anaemia among child-bearing women and children, inadequate breastfeeding practices and poor access to sanitation and clean drinking water also contribute.

101 FAO GIEWS Country Brief Democratic Republic of the Congo, August, 8, 2018

102 Ministère de l'agriculture, FAO, CAID & WFP Rapport Sécurité alimentaire, August 2018

103 FAO GIEWS Country Brief Democratic Republic of the Congo, February 26, 2018

104 Ministère de l'agriculture, FAO, CAID & WFP Rapport Sécurité alimentaire, August 2018

105 Ibid

106 FEWS NET Key message update, October 2018

107 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix The Democratic Republic of Congo - Key findings, February-November 2018

108 FEWS NET. Democratic Republic of the Congo Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire, August 201

109 OCHA. December 2018

110 OCHA. October 2018

111 WHO Ebola virus disease external situation report 22, 3 January 2019

112 UNICEF 8 May 2018


113 European Commission cholera outbreaks in central and west Africa 2018 regional update - week 36

114 DHS 2013/14

DJIBOUTI RURAL AREAS

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



WFP 2018; World Bank, 2017

157 100
FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE
IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE



112 300 MARGINALLY
FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE



2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **remained stable** mainly as a result of lingering impact of climate events and economic shocks on rural households.

2019 FORECAST

Dry spells are likely to continue to affect household food security status.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Economic shocks



Conflict/insecurity

- Poor rainfall combined with lingering effects of the past years' drought adversely affected pastoralists.

- Limited domestic production, decreased economic opportunities, and high food prices impeded rural households' food access.

- Conflict and insecurity in neighbouring countries triggered refugee influx, mainly in rural areas.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



186 000 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **5 200** affected by SAM.

HNO 2017



12% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

MICS 2012



23% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

WHO/UNICEF JMP 2017



Recurrent natural disasters undermine efforts to make a living, limiting access to a micronutrient-rich diet.



33.5% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

MICS 2012

DISPLACEMENT



28 000 refugees mainly from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Yemen in October 2018.

UNHCR



The vast majority of migration movements were composed of Ethiopians travelling to Saudi Arabia for economic reasons.

IOM 2018

BACKGROUND

One of the smallest countries in Africa with less than 1 000 square kilometers of arable land and a hot, dry climate, Djibouti's domestic agricultural production covers only 10 percent of food requirements. Its reliance on imports (and humanitarian assistance) to meet its food requirements makes it more vulnerable to external market downturns, currency fluctuations and price volatility. Despite rapid and sustained growth over the past 15 years, around 35 percent of the population is below the poverty line, with 20 percent living in extreme poverty.¹¹⁵ Overall, 78 percent of the poor population lives in rural areas.¹¹⁶ Livestock represents the main livelihood for one third of the total population, but it accounts for only three percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹¹⁷

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

As of April 2018, moderate and severe food insecurity affected 55.5 percent of rural households in the five rural regions of Ali-Sabieh, Arta, Dikhil, Obock and Tadjourah. Of these, three percent were severely food insecure. In addition, almost 40 percent of rural households were marginally food insecure. This marks a 22 percent increase in the number of people in moderate and severe food insecurity since October 2017.¹¹⁸

Moderate food insecurity prevailed in almost two in three households of Tadjourah (63 percent) and Dikhil (59 percent) regions, while it affected one in two households in Arta (51 percent) and Ali-Sabieh (39 percent) regions. The regions most affected by severe food insecurity are Ali Sabieh (six percent) and Dikhil (five percent) regions.¹¹⁹

While the recourse to negative coping strategies was less pronounced than in 2014, it mainly remained higher than in 2015, 2016 and 2017 as rural households still faced constrained food availability and access and over half of them (51 percent) reported employing negative coping strategies - with 17 percent resorting to emergency strategies such as selling houses or committing illegal acts, 15 percent resorting to crisis strategies such as



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reducing non-food expenses, and 22 percent using stress strategies, such as buying food on credit or using savings. In the region of Dikhil, more than eight households in 10 resorted to negative coping in April 2018.¹²⁰

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

In inland pastoral areas of Dikhil and Tadjourah regions, below-average 2018 March-June "diraac/sougum" rains resulted in an incomplete regeneration of rangeland resources and in a reduced availability of animal feed. Subsequently, abundant August-October "karan/karma" rains prompted a marked improvement in vegetation conditions, with a positive impact on water and pasture availability. In coastal areas, after very poor October-March 2017/18 "heys/dadaa" rains, Cyclone Sagar struck the country on 19 and 20 May, bringing torrential rains. The precipitations received, about 110 mm, were the equivalent of the average rainfall for an entire year and led to high runoff and low moisture recharge, resulting in limited improvements in vegetation conditions but

115 World Bank

116 WFP Bulletin Djibouti - Système de Suivi et Surveillance de la Sécurité Alimentaire (SSSA), May 2018.


117 World Bank

118 WFP Bulletin Djibouti - Système de Suivi et Surveillance de la Sécurité Alimentaire (SSSA), May 2018.

119 Ibid

120 Ibid

Map 14 Prevalence of food insecurity by regions and location of refugee camps, Djibouti rural areas, April 2018



Source: WFP, May 2018

triggering floods that affected about 50 000 people in the capital, Djibouti City, and in the southern Balbala suburb. Subsequently, the first part of the 2018/19 “heys/dadaa” rains was characterized by below-average precipitations, and as of late 2018 vegetation conditions were very poor in coastal areas.

Economic shocks

Rural households in inland areas faced significantly reduced financial access to food as a result of poor rains that curtailed production and sales of livestock products, as well as the governmental ban on coal and firewood sales. Urban households have also faced decreased economic opportunities in the construction industry in recent years.

In remote rural areas markets were poorly supplied with food product varieties – mainly limited to cereals, sugar and oil – and prices were almost twice as high as in the main regional marketplace, due to high transportation costs and commercial margin. Around 89 percent of moderately and severely food-insecure households relied on markets to access food, with 25 percent of them having to resort to credit to buy it. On average, rural households spent 70 percent of their income on food, and reported at least one shock – mainly lack of rains, lack of food, soaring prices, and drought-related livestock deaths – affecting their income during the three months before the survey.¹²¹

121 WFP. Djibouti – Système de Suivi et Surveillance de la Sécurité Alimentaire (SSSA), May 2018 using CARI

Conflict and insecurity

Insecurity and conflicts in neighbouring countries have led to an influx of refugees, with the majority of them (80 percent) living in three camps.¹²² As of October 2018, Djibouti was hosting around 28 000 refugees,¹²³ mainly from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Yemen.¹²⁴ There are also refugees living in urban areas outside camps in small towns, in Djibouti and in its outskirts. With the exception of those who have sufficient financial means to live in small hotels, most live in miserable conditions waiting for the chance to leave for a second country of asylum.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The prevalence of GAM, measured using mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) among under fives, reached 13 percent in October 2017, up from 7.5 percent in October 2016, but below the October 2015 prevalence of 17 percent.¹²⁵ Among them 4.5 percent were severely acutely malnourished in 2017. The regions of Obock (24.8 percent) and Dikhil (14 percent) had the highest GAM levels.

This poor nutritional situation is largely attributable to lack of dietary diversity among poor rural households, as well as inadequate child feeding practices. No child under two has a minimum acceptable diet as a result of limited physical and economic market access.¹²⁶

The 2017 Ministry of Health-produced nutrition analysis indicated that a decline in the management of moderate malnutrition – with fewer than half of cases being treated in medical facilities and high dropout rates in poor areas – has led to an increase in the number of children slipping into SAM.¹²⁷ Only 30 percent of children with SAM are cared for in health centres.¹²⁸ There is also a lack of up to date nutrition data (the latest national SMART survey was in 2013), insufficient surveillance and detection mechanisms and poor community nutrition support.

Pregnant women face cultural taboos in terms of what they can and cannot eat. Lactating women in poor households, where consumption of animal products is very limited, suffer from insufficient protein intake. In rural areas, poor sanitation, low access to clean drinking water and lack of access to basic healthcare linked to the nomadic lifestyle of the population undermine nutrition. Children's vulnerability to disease is increasing, with inadequate immunization coverage and the continuing influx of refugees intensifying the risk of epidemics.

In camps the nutritional situation of refugees is worrying. The prevalence of GAM was 17.6 percent in Markazi/Obock and 11.9 percent in Holl Holl, where new arrivals tend to have even higher levels. In both camps SAM levels were at least four percent.¹²⁹

122 WFP, Government of Djibouti, URD Revue Stratégique « Faim zero à Djibouti », June 2018

123 UNHCR East, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region – Refugees and Asylum-seekers by country of asylum, 31 October 2018

124 FAO GIEWS. Djibouti Country brief, 28 May 2018

125 WFP. Djibouti – Système de Suivi et Surveillance de la Sécurité Alimentaire (SSSA), May 2018

126 Ibid

127 URD Ministry of Health Rapport Faim Zero Djibouti December 2017

128 WFP. Djibouti – Système de Suivi et Surveillance de la Sécurité Alimentaire (SSSA), May 2018

129 URD. REVUE STRATÉGIQUE «faim zéro» à Djibouti

ESWATINI

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

- ▶ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **remained stable** mainly as a result of localized production shortfalls, high poverty and unemployment rates.

2019 FORECAST

- ▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Economic shocks



Natural hazards

- Dry conditions in eastern Lubombo and southern Shiselweni regions led to localized production shortfalls.
- High HIV prevalence, low income and chronic illness/death of bread winner undermined resilience to shocks.
- Almost two in five people live in extreme poverty and almost one in four working age people were unemployed in 2018.
- Fall armyworm has become endemic: infestations diminished crop yields in some areas.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



8 500 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **1 400** affected by SAM.

UNICEF AND HNO, 2018



38% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

MICS, 2014



32% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

SwaziVAC 2016-17



Low consumption of nutrient-rich food is compounded by high levels of morbidity and poor access to sanitation.



68% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

SwaziVAC 2016-17



21% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (20-<30% = high).

Kingdom of Eswatini, 2018

DISPLACEMENT



Migration and remittances represent a notable coping strategy as nearly one in two Swazi adults relies on domestic or cross-border remittances as a source of income.

UNCDF/Cenfri/FinMark Aug 2015



Personal remittances have doubled in financial terms between 2000 and 2017 and constituted 2.5 percent of the Swazi GDP in 2017.

UNACTD, Nov 2018



No statistics for returnees are available.

BACKGROUND

The kingdom formerly known as Swaziland became Eswatini in April 2018 to mark 50 years of independence from Britain. The small, mountainous, landlocked country has very high rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment and the highest rate of HIV infection in the world. The country's economy is closely linked to neighbouring South Africa, on which it depends for about 85 percent of its imports and about 60 percent of exports.¹³⁰

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

According to the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis conducted in November 2018, a peak number of 247 000 people (26 percent of the rural population) were expected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above, and in need of urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition. Of these, 79 000 were projected to be in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) and 168 000 in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3). Additionally, over 301 000 were in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2).


Lubombo and Shiselweni showed the highest levels of acute food insecurity with 40 percent of the rural population facing *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4). In Shiselweni 15 percent and in Lubombo 10 percent of the population faced *Emergency* conditions.

This reflects a deterioration towards the end of 2018 compared to the end of the previous year (177 000 people), mainly due to less favourable rainfall conditions in the 2018/2019 agricultural season - but a general improvement compared to the annual peak of 2017 when 350 000 acutely food-insecure people needed urgent assistance, reflecting the prolonged impact of the 2015-2016 El Niño related drought.




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Figure 12 Eswatini, number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 2 or above in 2016-2019



Source: eSwatini IPC Technical Working Group

Map 15 Eswatini, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, December 2018-March 2019



Source: Eswatini IPC Technical Working Group November 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

Production shortfalls in eastern Lubombo and southern Shiselweni regions, due mostly to a mid-season dry period, were the main factors underpinning food insecurity in 2018. About nine percent of households nationally could not harvest, mainly due to crop failure and lack of access to arable land rising to 49 percent in Lubombo. Shiselweni had the highest proportion of households whose food reserves would last less than two months.¹³¹

In addition, infestations of the fall armyworm caused yield losses in localized parts, further reducing harvests in affected areas.

Although high rates of food insecurity were estimated in southern and eastern regions, nationally an estimated increase in the cereal output to an above-average level improved food availability and resulted in an overall lower number of food-insecure people compared to 2017. Rangelands and livestock conditions were also favourable in most parts of the country throughout 2018, owing to the generally beneficial seasonal rains.

Economic shocks

Decreasing prices of maize, the main food staple, reflecting reduced prices in South Africa – the country's main source of imported grains – and good national supplies, also improved food access. In addition, imports of cereals were down in the 2018/19 marketing year, reflecting the larger domestic harvest. Any further improvement in food security in 2018 was curbed by the continuing high rates of poverty and unemployment, as well as sluggish economic growth. An estimated 38 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty (based on the international poverty line of USD 1.90 a day) and almost one in four working age people were unemployed in 2018 (23 percent).¹³² High prevalence of HIV continued to adversely affect livelihoods, through the loss of productive skills and incomes, for example, further underpinning food insecurity.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

In 2018 the GAM rate for children under five was 2.4 percent. The SAM rate was 0.8 percent. Chronic malnutrition continued to be of concern, with 21 percent of children under five years of age stunted.¹³³

A range of factors can be associated with malnutrition in Eswatini. They include poor dietary diversity and poor intake of nutrient-rich foods, high HIV prevalence (nearly 27 percent of the adult population¹³⁴) and poor access to sanitation (nearly 30 percent of households do not have access to improved sanitation facilities).¹³⁵

The consumption of nutrient-rich foods has been falling despite improvements in overall food consumption. The percentage of households consuming no vitamin A-rich foods increased from 17 percent in 2017 to 23 percent in 2018, no iron-rich foods from 33 percent to 49 percent and no protein-rich foods from seven percent to 27 percent. Around 38 percent of children aged 6-23 months have a minimum acceptable diet.¹³⁶

131 SADC. Kingdom of Eswatini – Annual Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis Report 2018

132 World Bank country overview

133 SADC. Kingdom of Eswatini. Annual Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis Report 2018


134 UN AIDS 2017

135 SADC. Kingdom of Eswatini. Annual Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis Report 2018

136 Ibid

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



World Bank, 2017

8.1M

FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE



MARGINALLY FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE



DATA NOT AVAILABLE

2017-18 CHANGE

- ▼ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of a marked but still partial recovery of pastoral conditions in 2018, from the severe 2016/17 drought.

2019 FORECAST

- ▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks

- Erratic rainfall in some areas and floods in others led to local production shortfalls.



Conflict/insecurity

- Intercommunal conflicts undermined crop and livestock production and triggered massive displacement.



Displacement

- Currency devaluation pushed up food prices.

- Lingering effects of the 2016/2017 drought continued to affect livestock production.

- Huge internal displacement and refugee influx strained relations with hosts over land, food and labour.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



3.5M children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **350 000** affected by SAM.

HDRP, 2018



7% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2019



35% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS, 2016



Drought-related reduced quality of drinking water and conflict-induced lack of basic sanitation exacerbated already-fragile nutrition situation.



58% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2016



39% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

DHS, 2016

DISPLACEMENT



2.3M IDPs - i.e. **1.8M** displaced by conflict; **498 400** displaced by climate shocks.

IOM, Dec 2018



905 800 refugees and asylum-seekers mainly from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and the Sudan.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



Over **200 000** people displaced by violence in south-western Ethiopia have returned to their area of origin.

UNHCR, Sept 2018

BACKGROUND

In large parts of the country, recurrent drought has had a severe impact on food security and livelihoods, with failing crops and lack of water and pasture for livestock, in particular between mid-2016 and late-2017.¹³⁷

Escalating competition for water and pastures between Oromia and Somali regions during times of drought, and inter-communal conflicts between SNNPR and Oromia regions also triggered massive displacement, which in turn, increased pressure on availability and access to natural resources.¹³⁸ The Ethiopian Council of Ministers declared a state of emergency on February 16 in response to violence, ethnic-based attacks and subsequent displacement.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

In 2018, an estimated 8.13 million people were food insecure and in need of urgent assistance according to OCHA. In March, around 7.9 million were in need of food-related humanitarian assistance - including 3.2 million in Oromia, 1.8 million in Somali region and 977 000 people in Amhara, according to the Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan (HDRP) for 2018, released in March.¹³⁹ In October, the estimate was revised up in the Mid-Year Review to 8 million (7 953 893) - with the largest increase observed in Tigray (15 percent).¹⁴⁰

These 2018 figures represent a decline in the population in need of food assistance in comparison to 2017, when it was estimated that 8.5 million people were in need of assistance, according to the Mid-Year Review document.¹⁴¹

As of June, the areas most affected by the 2016 and 2017 drought were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3), such as Dollo and large parts of the south-eastern Somali region,¹⁴² and such food security outcomes persisted in most of the south-eastern pastoral areas until December 2018.¹⁴³ In August, *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) or *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2!) food insecurity levels were reported in areas bordering Oromia and Somali region, and Oromia and SNNPR.¹⁴⁴ From October to December, northern pastoral



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Afar faced *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3), and so did south-eastern parts of Benishangul Gumuz,¹⁴⁵ while parts of eastern Oromia, southern Tigray, eastern Amhara, and northern SNNPR were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) or *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3).¹⁴⁶

According to FEWS NET Food Security Outlooks, areas of particular concern included northern pastoral Afar, large parts of the south-eastern Somali region, and conflict-affected areas of SNNPR, the Oromia-Somali border, and Kamashi zone in Benishangul Gumuz.¹⁴⁷

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

While pasture and water conditions had partly recovered by 2018,¹⁴⁸ the 2016 and 2017 drought continued to severely affect livelihoods in many pastoral areas with large-scale livestock deaths still reported and milk production below-average in early 2018.

In May, floods, compounded by the landfall of the Sagar cyclone,¹⁴⁹ caused a serious humanitarian situation in the Somali region, with pastures destroyed and livestock killed.¹⁵⁰ As of August, rainfall improved pasture and water conditions in these areas, although below-average milk production was forecast as a result of poor

137 FAO Crop Prospects and Food Situation no.4, December 2018.

138 WFP Food and Nutrition Assistance to IDPs in East and West Hararghe zones, September 2018; FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook, October 2018

139 Joint Government and Humanitarian Partners Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan, March 2018

140 Joint Government and Humanitarian Partners Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan Mid-Year Review, October 2018

141 Joint Government and Humanitarian Partners Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan Mid-Year Review, July 2017

142 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook, June 2018

143 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook Update, December 2018

144 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook Update, August 2018

145 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook, October 2018, December 2018

146 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook Update, December 2018

147 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook, October 2018

148 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Alert, March 1, 2018

149 OCHA Ethiopia Humanitarian Bulletin, 07-20 May 2018

150 Food Security Cluster Ethiopia Agriculture Sector HDRP monthly Dashboard, May 2018

conception rates.¹⁵¹ Parts of southern Somali and Oromia faced below-average pasture regeneration as the *Deyr/Hageya* rainy season (October-December) was delayed and dry spells were reported in most southern pastoral areas – except in and around Shabelle and Nogob.¹⁵²

Despite an increase in cereal prices, pastoralist terms-of-trade were generally stable, thanks to improved livestock body conditions and high demand for holiday festivities. In certain areas, however, households had few livestock to sell as a result of the reduced herd size from the 2016 and 2017 droughts.¹⁵³

The 2018 national crop production of the main agricultural season (*Meher*) was average.¹⁵⁴ In spite of favourable prospects in the key producing areas of the western highlands – western Oromia, Amhara and Benishangul Gumuz regions – erratic rainfall in central and eastern areas as well as unseasonal rains at harvest time caused local crop production shortfalls.^{155,156} In SNNPR close to 19 000 hectares of maize crops were infested with fall armyworm during the 2018 Belg season,¹⁵⁷ while in East and West Hararge planted areas were 60 percent below average as a result of conflict.¹⁵⁸

Conflict/insecurity

Intercommunal conflicts between Somali and Oromia, and between SNNPR and Oromia triggered massive population displacement across the country. As of December, 2.3 million people were internally displaced, of whom 1.8 million were displaced by conflict and more than 498 000 by climate shocks.¹⁵⁹ Almost the totality of the IDP population (93 percent) was located in Oromia and Somali regions.¹⁶⁰

In addition, as of 31 August, Ethiopia was hosting nearly 906 000 registered refugees and asylum seekers – mostly from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and the Sudan.¹⁶¹ The presence of large displaced populations increased competition with host communities over land resources, food and labour opportunities.¹⁶²

151 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook Update, August 2018
 152 FEWS NET Ethiopia Key Message Update, November 2018
 153 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook, October 2018
 154 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook Update, December 2018.
 155 FAO GIEWS Country Brief
 156 FEWS NET Ethiopia Key Message Update, July 2018
 157 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook, June 2018
 158 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook Update, August 2018
 159 IOM, Dec 2018
 160 IOM Ethiopia DTM Round 13, October 2018
 161 UNHCR Ethiopia Factsheet, December 2018
 162 FEWS NET Ethiopia Food Security Outlook, October 2018

Economic shocks

High food prices hindered the most vulnerable households' access to food. The devaluation of the Birr against the USD in October 2017 pushed up prices of imported goods, such as wheat grain.¹⁶³ As of March, general year-on-year inflation was about 15 percent, while food inflation was near 20 percent. The nominal wholesale price of maize reached alarming levels, increasing by up to 56 percent between March 2017 and 2018, with the highest increases in surplus-producing areas (i.e. Dejen, Bahirdar, Nazareth). On average, maize prices were 37 percent above the five-year average in monitored markets.¹⁶⁴ At the end of 2018, rising transportation costs also contributed to price increases in anticipation of the *Meher* harvest.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

According to the 2018 belg harvest assessment, 3.5 million children under five and around 1 million pregnant and lactating women were acutely malnourished in September, up from 3.8 million in January.^{165,166} The number of acutely malnourished children increased from 2.1 million in the early 2018 to 2.4 million by September. Some 370 000 of them (up from 350 000 in January) were expected to be severely malnourished, with Oromia (139 000), Somali (99 000), SNNP (54 000) and Amhara (42 000) the worst-affected regions.


In 2016 around 10 percent of children under five years were acutely malnourished,¹⁶⁷ with little change over the last decade. GAM levels were above emergency thresholds (>15 percent) in Somali and Afar states, which have benefitted less from development investment and are frequently affected by drought-induced humanitarian crises.¹⁶⁸

Although Ethiopia has seen a steady reduction in stunting among children under five from 58 percent in 2000 to 38 percent in 2016, the level remains very high.

The effect of prolonged drought, particularly in Somali region, water scarcity in pastoral areas, and the increased numbers of IDPs unable to access basic sanitation drive this poor nutrition situation. In addition, political instability in August disrupted all basic services including health and nutrition, during a period when high rates of acute malnutrition prevail.


163 WFP Ethiopia Monthly Market Watch Report, June 2018.
 164 WFP Ethiopia Monthly Market Watch Report, March 2018
 165 Humanitarian Disaster and Resilience Plan mid-year Review 2018
 166 Ethiopia Humanitarian Disaster and Resilience Plan 2018
 167 2016 Demographic Health Survey (DHS)
 168 Ibid

Map 16 Ethiopia IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification, June-September 2018



This is FEWS NET IPC compatible product, which is generated through the application of the full set of IPC tools and procedures, with the exception of technical consensus

Map 17 Ethiopia IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification, October 2018-January 2019



This is FEWS NET IPC compatible product, which is generated through the application of the full set of IPC tools and procedures, with the exception of technical consensus

The lack of health services capable of managing periodic spikes in acute malnutrition caseloads further exacerbate the risk of opportunistic disease outbreak, notably acute watery diarrhoea. Health coverage for drought-induced displaced people and pastoralist communities, in particular, fails to meet basic requirements.¹⁶⁹

These factors compound the already-fragile nutrition status of the population. Child-feeding practices are suboptimal with just seven percent of children aged 6-23 months consuming a minimum acceptable diet.¹⁷⁰ Micronutrient deficiencies in iron, vitamin A, folic acid, iodine and zinc remain common and anaemia prevalence among under-five children remains high at 57 percent.¹⁷¹


169 Ibid

170 International Journal for Equity in Health 2017

171 UNICEF

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **remained unchanged** mainly due to the prolonged effects of recurrent natural shocks.

2019 FORECAST

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **increase** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks

- Recurrent droughts and back-to-back emergencies have weakened Haitians' resilience in the face of shocks.



Economic shocks

- Besides climatic disasters, lack of access to credit, irrigation, storage and processing facilities constrained agricultural production.



Conflict/insecurity

- Prices of imported rice, maize meal and vegetable oil were well above five-year average at the end of 2018.

- Socio-political unrest disrupted supply chains and contributed to inflation in prices of essential goods.

- One in four Haitians are below the extreme poverty line and face extremely limited purchasing power.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



75 900 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **25 200** affected by SAM.

HRP, 2018



14% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2012



27% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS 2015/16



Poor water and sanitation infrastructure, infectious diseases, inadequate access to services and sub-optimal IYCF practices underscore high vulnerability to malnutrition.



40% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

EMMUS-VI 2016-2017



22% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (20-<30% = high).

EMMUS-VI 2016-2017

DISPLACEMENT



38 000 IDPs are still hosted in camps following the 2010 earthquake.

IOM, March 2018



No figures are available for returnees but **244 300** Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic were at risk of deportation.

UNHCR Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

More than 90 percent of Haitians are at risk of natural hazards¹⁷² including drought, flooding, seasonal hurricanes, landslides and tropical storms, particularly in the southern peninsula. In 2010 a devastating earthquake hit Haiti; in 2016 during the third consecutive year of El Niño-related drought Hurricane Matthew shattered western Haiti; in 2017 Hurricanes Irma and Maria caused significant flooding in the north and in 2018 the El Niño-induced drought affected the production of major crops and resulted in a significant decline in households' income.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


From October 2018 to February 2019, 2.3 million people, representing 32 percent of the population analysed, were in need of urgent food and livelihood support (IPC Phase 3 or above). Of these around 1.9 million (27 percent) were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and 386 000 (six percent of the analysed population) were classified in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4).

This is the same as the peak (February-May) lean season figure for 2017. It marks a significant deterioration compared to early 2018 when 1.3 million Haitians (18 percent of the population analysed) were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 or above. In October 2017-February 2018 over 3 million were classified in *Stressed*, falling to 2.4 million people in October 2018-February 2019 as people slipped into *Crisis* or worse.

Except for three districts located in the coastal area of the Southern department, lower North West and rice producing area of Artibonite, which were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2), all districts (18 out of 21) were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3). In terms of magnitude, the North West department had the highest percentage of food insecure (45 percent) in IPC Phase 3 or above while the West department had the highest number of people (more than 500 000) in *Crisis* or *Emergency*.




Figure 13 Haiti, number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 2 or above in 2017-2018



Source: Haiti IPC Technical Working Group

Map 18 Haiti, Acute food insecurity situation, Oct 2017 – Feb 2018



Source: Haiti IPC Technical Working Group October 2017

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks and natural disasters

Over two-thirds of Haitians depend on agriculture as their main source of food and income, therefore when a disaster strikes, it can wipe out a household’s means to make a living.¹⁷³

The worsening food security situation is driven by the prolonged effects of several years of recurrent natural shocks, reduced agricultural production of major cereals and food price volatility which have particularly affected very poor and poor households.¹⁷⁴ Recurrent droughts and back-to-back emergencies make it difficult for many Haitians to rebound, weakening their resilience against future shocks.

After a good start to the rainy season in April and May 2018, when main season beans, maize and other crops were sown, a period of drought caused by the El Niño phenomenon followed in June, which is a critical time for beans and maize crops. The drought affected a large part of the country, depressing production of the main cereal crops (except rice). Poor rainfall distribution in the spring and summer in other areas also affected crop production.

173 FAO country overview
174 IPC country analysis


Economic shocks

Haiti is the poorest country of the Americas with 59 percent living below the national poverty line and 24 percent below the extreme poverty line,¹⁷⁵ making Haitians extremely vulnerable to repeated disasters as well as to global food price spikes as it does not produce enough food to meet its needs. In October 2018 commodity prices had risen by nine percent from 2017 and general inflation stood at 14.1 percent undermining purchasing power and food access, especially for the poorest households.¹⁷⁶ At the end of 2018 markets were well supplied but prices of imported rice, maize meal and vegetable oil were well above the five-year average in monitored markets, while prices of black beans declined slightly.¹⁷⁷ The weakened value of the Haitian gourde against the US dollar¹⁷⁸ also heightened the price of imported rice and maize.

Socio-political unrest – with protests against political corruption and economic malaise – sometimes disrupted distribution and caused rises in the prices of essential goods.¹⁷⁹

Despite the resumption of agricultural activities, demand for agricultural labour was still low in October following

175 World Bank country overview
176 IPC country analysis
177 FEWS NET. Haiti. 2018.
178 FAO GIEWS. Haiti country brief.
179 IPC country analysis Oct 2018-Feb 2019

Map 19 Haiti, Acute food insecurity situation, Oct 2018 – Feb 2019

Source: Haiti IPC Technical Working Group, December 2018

the drought.¹⁸⁰ Years of shortages of demand for agricultural labour mean poor Haitians now engage in a wide diversity of income-earning activities including agricultural work in the Dominican Republic, remittances from the Haitian diaspora, petty trade, motorcycle transportation and charcoal production.¹⁸¹

Agricultural productivity is severely constrained by a number of structural factors too. Smallholder farmers generally lack access to credit, appropriate technology and key production factors, especially irrigation water.¹⁸² Post-harvest losses are considerable, often the result of a lack of storage and processing facilities and road infrastructure is poor.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The most recent national health survey (DHS 2016-2017) showed high rates of chronic malnutrition (according to WHO thresholds), with one in five children under five years of age (22 percent) affected by stunting. The survey showed that four percent of children under five years suffered from GAM, and one percent from SAM.

In 2018, 228 800 people were estimated to be in need of nutrition humanitarian assistance in the departments of

Grand-Anse, Sud, Sud-Est, Artibonite, Nord-Est, Nord-Ouest and Nord. This included 75 900 children under five years affected by GAM, 25 200 of them with SAM.¹⁸³

Inadequate feeding practices, the persistent risk of food insecurity, exposure to natural disasters, high incidence of infectious diseases (especially acute watery diarrhea and cholera) and inadequate access to services continue to make Haiti's population vulnerable to malnutrition. Nearly half of the population (45 percent) is without access to improved water, 31 percent defecate in the open and 75 percent are without access to a handwashing facility with soap.¹⁸⁴ Infant and child feeding practices are poor. Only two in five infants under six months are exclusively breastfed, and just one in four 6-23 month-olds are fed according to minimum dietary diversity criteria.¹⁸⁵

The incidence rate of cholera in the first seven months of the year was the lowest since the beginning of the outbreak in 2011. Around 2 900 cases were reported including 35 deaths – mainly in the departments of Artibonite, Centre and Ouest – with a spike in April and May 2018 because of localized outbreaks following heavy rains.¹⁸⁶

180 FEWS NET. Haiti. Key messages update. October 2018.

181 FEWS NET. Haiti Food Security Outlook. June 2018 to January 2019.

182 IFAD

183 Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2017-2018 (January-December 2018).


184 Ibid

185 EMMUS-VI 2016-2017.

186 OCHA. Haiti Humanitarian Snapshot. August 2018.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



OCHA 2018; World Bank, 2017

2.5M
FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE IN
NEED OF ASSISTANCE



MARGINALLY FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE



DATA NOT AVAILABLE

2017-18 CHANGE

- ▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **increased** mainly as a result of protracted conflict-related displacement.

2019 FORECAST

The protracted effects of the conflict on food security and livelihoods are expected to continue and result in new vulnerabilities.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Economic shocks



Displacement

- Over half of Iraq's 2 million IDPs have been displaced for more than three years and are highly vulnerable.
- Returnees and vulnerable IDP-hosting communities face limited livelihood opportunities, security concerns, lack of social cohesion, damaged housing and lack of services.
- The most urgent needs were in areas affected by hostilities where infrastructure was destroyed and services disrupted.
- Poverty rates in the areas most affected by military operations against ISIL exceed 40 percent.
- Damaged agricultural infrastructure, fertilizer shortages, supply chain disruptions, and high prices of pesticides and fuel led to low production.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



2.6% of children under five years in central/southern Iraq and **1.8%** in Kurdistan acutely malnourished.

MICS, 2018



34% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

MICS, 2018



In 2018, significant decreases in quantity and quality of public water supply impacted **25%** of population in southern governorates (approximately **1.9** million people).

HRP 2019



Micronutrient deficiencies and sub-optimal infant and child feeding practices remained a major concern.



26% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

MICS, 2018



10% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (2.5- <10% = low).

MICS, 2018

DISPLACEMENT



1.8M displaced persons (IDPs) mainly located in Ninewa, Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk.

IOM, Dec 2018



252 500 registered Syrian refugees with the majority hosted outside camps.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



4.2M former IDPs returned to their area of origin, mainly in Ninewa, Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala.

IOM, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

Iraq has been a battleground for competing global forces since 2003, enjoying only brief periods of respite from high levels of violence. This instability has hindered efforts to rebuild an economy shattered by decades of conflict and sanctions, even though Iraq has the world's second-largest reserves of crude oil. In late 2017, three years after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) started to seize control of major areas of Iraqi territory - leading to it controlling around one-third of the country in 2015 - the country's Prime Minister officially announced government forces had regained control.¹⁸⁷ Four years of active fighting across large swathes of the country led to large-scale, multidirectional, and protracted displacement, and areas that experienced active conflict remain heavily damaged or destroyed.¹⁸⁸

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Out of the 6.7 million people in Iraq who are in need of humanitarian assistance, about 2.5 million are food insecure with most of those in need of food and livelihoods assistance concentrated in Diyala, Ninewa, Dahuk, Anbar and Erbil governorates.¹⁸⁹

Meeting food security needs is particularly challenging for three population groups: displaced households (62 percent live among host communities and 30 percent live in camps), those non-displaced but living in areas that were recently retaken or are still experiencing sporadic conflict, and those returning home.

The rates of food insecurity vary little between these groups with IDPs slightly more likely to face food gaps: around 10 percent (380 000) of returnees and non-displaced people, 11 percent of in-camp IDPs and 12 percent of out-of-camp IDPs are in need of food and livelihood assistance.¹⁹⁰

Returnees face significant food consumption gaps, spend a high share of their expenditure on food and routinely resort to negative coping strategies.¹⁹¹ The three governorates with the highest number of food-insecure returnee populations are Ninewa (162 000), Salah al-Din (76 000) and Anbar (63 000).

An estimated seven percent of the approximately 253 000 Syrian refugees in Iraq¹⁹² are food insecure, with



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six percent moderately so and one percent severely so. In addition, about 39 to 58 percent of households are vulnerable to food insecurity, particularly in camps.¹⁹³

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

Small-scale attacks attributed to ISIL persisted throughout the country in 2018. Incursions and intimidation by armed security actors were also recorded with 87 violations reported from January to August across Iraq, affecting over 10 000 individuals.¹⁹⁴ Other concerns include retaliation against people with perceived affiliations to extremist groups; ethno-sectarian violence; forced, premature and obstructed returns; and high unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination of land (including private houses), delays in community reconciliation, and political and social tensions.¹⁹⁵

Years of conflict have damaged irrigation structures, wells and productive assets and caused fertilizer shortages. Supply chain disruptions have pushed up the prices of pesticides and fuel. As a result of these conflict-related input shortages, in tandem with irregular rainfall from October 2017 to early January 2018,¹⁹⁶ 2018 wheat production was estimated at 14 percent below the 2017 level and almost 20 percent below the five-year average.¹⁹⁷

187 UNSC. February 2018 Monthly Forecast

188 REACH multi cluster needs assessment round VI September 2018

189 HNO 2019 Iraq

190 REACH multi cluster needs assessment round VI September 2018

191 HNO 2019 Iraq

192 UNHCR. Syria Regional Refugee Response updated Nov 30, 2018

193 WFP. Joint Vulnerability Assessment using CARI, June 2018


194 HNO 2019

195 Ibid

196 FAO

197 FAO GIEWS. Country Briefs Iraq. June 2018

Map 20 Iraq, IDPs by governorate of displacement, December 2018.



Source: FSIN, based on data extracted from IOM, December 2018

Economic shocks

Poverty rates in the areas most affected by military operations against ISIL exceed 40 percent.¹⁹⁸ Some 60 percent of people in need had insufficient income to meet their basic needs and 34 percent were assuming debt to purchase essential items.¹⁹⁹ In Iraq’s southern governorates (Basrah, Muthanna, Qadisiyah, Missan and Thi-Qar), the poverty rate is above 30 percent, and the prevalence of child poverty is 50 percent.²⁰⁰ These governorates also suffered from ISIL as the army recruited from the south.

In areas of displacement – especially the northern governorates, which host a large proportion of IDPs – rent prices increased, negatively affecting IDPs, host communities and returnees.²⁰¹ While markets were largely functioning, additional tariffs imposed at the custom points on the Kirkuk-Erbil and Kirkuk-Sulaymaniyah roads continued to destabilize market prices in Kirkuk governorate.

According to the September 2018 Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment single female-headed households (SFHH) were almost twice as likely as non-SFHH to be food insecure.²⁰² They were less likely to have sustainable income sources and the overwhelming majority of adult women were reported to have not worked during the 30 days prior to data collection (94 percent) but were also not actively seeking employment (87 percent).

198 World Bank, Damage and Needs Assessment, 2018.

199 Iraq HNO 2019.

200 Ibid.

201 World Bank, Iraq Damage and Needs Assessment, 2018.

202 REACH. MCNA VI report. September 2018.

Displacement

Since 2014 the number of IDPs has decreased from about 6 million to 1.8 million²⁰³ – but over half of them have been displaced for more than three years.²⁰⁴ Displaced Iraqis mainly live in private dwellings (62 percent) mostly within the Kurdistan region of Iraq and Ninewa governorate, followed by camps (30 percent).²⁰⁵

IDPs have been pounded by multiple shocks including losing assets, jobs and businesses. Each employed adult in an IDP household must support more than six other household members.²⁰⁶ Over the past few years, more than 4.2 million IDPs have returned to their areas of origin.²⁰⁷ Significant barriers still exist to re-building their lives and livelihoods, including security concerns, lack of job opportunities and destroyed or damaged housing.

Just over half of IDP households in and out of camps had accessed Iraq's Public Distribution System (PDS), an important safety net that provides subsidized food items, versus 87 percent of returnee and non-displaced households.²⁰⁸ While IDP households registered in formal camps had regular access to humanitarian food distributions, a significant portion of IDPs living out of camps had lower access to both forms of food assistance.²⁰⁹

Returnees and vulnerable households in communities hosting displaced people faced limited livelihood opportunities in addition to security concerns, lack of social cohesion, damaged housing and lack of services. The most urgent needs remained in areas affected by past hostilities where infrastructure was destroyed and services disrupted. For seven governorates affected by conflict, unemployment rates increased from 13 percent to 18 percent between 2014 and 2017.²¹⁰

IDPs cited damage and destruction to housing, lack of job opportunities and lack of safety in their locations of origin as key main obstacles to returning to their homes.²¹¹ In addition they feared discrimination, trauma associated with returning, contamination with explosive hazards and lack of security forces.²¹²

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

A national nutrition survey conducted in 2016²¹³ indicated 7.5 percent of non-displaced children under five were acutely malnourished. Analysis of the nutrition situation at governorate level indicated high rates of severe acute malnutrition in Babylon, Thi Oar and Qadisiya, and among IDPs in Diyala, Salah al-Deen and Najaf governorates. The prevalence of stunting was 16.6 percent among resident children and 19.2 percent among IDP children. The highest severe stunting rates for both resident and IDP children were recorded in the Baghdad region.

The recently conducted analysis at governorate level (MICS 2018)²¹⁴ indicated high rates of moderate and severe acute malnutrition in Basra, Kirkuk, Anbar, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, and Sulaimanya. The highest severe stunting rates were recorded in Baghdad, Thiqr and Munthana.

Rates of exclusive breastfeeding (EBF) for the recommended six months are extremely low at 19.6 percent, and only 42.8 percent of women initiate breastfeeding within the first hour of a child's life. Micronutrient deficiencies and sub-optimal infant and child feeding practices remain a concern and contribute to malnutrition. More than one in five children aged 12-59 months had anaemia, iron deficiency, or iron deficiency anaemia.²¹⁵

203 IOM Iraq Mission Displacement Tracking Matrix, December 2018

204 OCHA. HNO 2019 Iraq.

205 IOM. DTM Displacement Matrix October 2018.

206 OCHA. HNO 2019

207 IOM Iraq Mission Displacement Tracking Matrix, December 2018

208 REACH. MCNA VI surveys. September 2018. i

209 Ibid

210 The World Bank, January 2018, Iraq reconstruction and investment.

211 ILA III.

212 Surveys conducted by CCCM and REACH in August 2018 with 94,000 households in 128 formal camps


213 WFP. Iraq – Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), 2016.

214 Government/UNICEF. MICS 2018.

215 Iraqi National Micronutrient Deficiencies: Assessment and Response 2011-12.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of favourable rainfall and above-average cereal production, despite the impact of climate hazards and communal conflicts.

2019 FORECAST

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **decrease** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Conflict/insecurity



Economic shocks

- Despite improvement in pastoral conditions, the impact of the severe 2016/17 drought still affected agro-pastoral livelihoods in northern and eastern ASALs.
- More than four in five refugees and asylum seekers live in camps with limited access to basic needs and 100 percent dependence on food assistance.
- Drought-prone northern areas are often affected by intercommunal conflicts and more than four in five live in poverty in Turkana, Mandera and Wajir.
- October–December short rains critical for crop and livestock production in ASALs were poor, curbing recovery.
- Widespread flooding in April/May damaged infrastructure and displaced around 300 000 people.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



510 600 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **85 100** affected by SAM.

Kenya FS Steering Group, Aug 2018



22% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2016



35% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS, 2016



Poor child care practices, high morbidity, low literacy, poverty, and limited access to health care and basic services were key determinants of malnutrition.



41% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2016



26% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (20–<30% = high).

DHS, 2016

DISPLACEMENT



311 000 people were displaced by floods mainly in the Tana River, Turkana, Mandera, and Kilifi counties.

IOM, Jul 2018



471 700 refugees and asylum-seekers mainly from Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Burundi and the Sudan.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

The World Bank reclassified Kenya's economy as lower-middle income in 2014, but poverty, food insecurity, under-nutrition and income inequality remain high. Nearly half of Kenyans live below the poverty line.²¹⁶ The most severe conditions exist in the arid and semi-arid drought-prone north, which accounts for 80 percent of the country's land-mass and is often disrupted by local conflicts. After three consecutive poor rainy seasons, households in the pastoral and agro-pastoralist north-east and north-west counties had not fully recovered or replenished their productive assets by early 2018. The 2016-2017 drought had caused livestock emaciation and animal deaths, and led to severe shortages of livestock products (mainly milk).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

The overall number of acutely food-insecure people was estimated at 2.35 million in January 2018, 30 percent down from the estimate of 3.4 million in October 2017, but still seven percent higher than the caseload of 2.2 million estimated in January 2017.²¹⁷ Despite the significant improvements recorded in most livelihood zones, in January 2018, *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity levels still persisted in several pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, including parts of Turkana, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, Tana River, Kajado, Isiolo and Garissa counties.

In August 2018, 700 000 people in arid and semi-arid (ASAL) counties were facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and higher) and required urgent humanitarian assistance, a significantly lower figure than the 2.55 million identified in February 2018 after the last short rains assessment.²¹⁸

FEWS NET predicted a deterioration in food security in the latter quarter of the year with the number of poor households in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) expected to increase in Turkana, Samburu, Wajir and Garissa counties.²¹⁹ While most households in marginal agricultural areas were able to meet their minimum food needs (IPC Phase 1), consuming two to three meals per day, most households in pastoral areas were *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2), reportedly consuming one to two meals per day.

The number of people in need of urgent humanitarian food and livelihood assistance peaked in February when 2.6 million people in the conflict-affected arid and semi-



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arid lands (ASAL) were facing acute food insecurity and needed immediate humanitarian assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above). By August this number had fallen to 700 000.

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

In mid-2018, food security was buoyed by exceptionally abundant March-May 2018 "long rains" (one of the wettest seasons in about 70 years), markedly improving crop and livestock production. In key growing areas of the Rift Valley and Western provinces, the major long-rains harvest, accounting for about 75 percent of the national yearly cereal production, was estimated at 10-15 percent above-average despite localized crop losses due to floods.²²⁰ By contrast, the output of beans, more vulnerable to excess moisture, was below-average. In pastoral areas, abundant pasture and water availability drove atypically good livestock body conditions, resulting in above average milk production and livestock prices.

However, at the peak of the rains in April, flooding caused widespread damage. By May, approximately 150 people had died and around 310 000 were displaced across 40 counties.²²¹ Cropland and irrigation infrastructure, including pumps and pipes, were extensively damaged. Standing crops in Turkana, Tana River, Embu, Kitui, Makueni, Narok, Taita Taveta, and

216 WFP country brief November 2018.


217 FAO GIEWS. Kenya Country brief 2018. .

218 IPC.

219 FEWS NET. Kenya Food security outlook. December 2018.

220 FAO

221 <https://reliefweb.int/disaster/ff-2018-000030-ken>

Map 21 Kenya IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification, February-May 2018

This is FEWS NET IPC compatible product, which is generated through the application of the full set of IPC tools and procedures, with the exception of technical consensus



Source: FEWS NET, February 2018

Kilifi counties were damaged. Health facilities, schools, markets and roads were destroyed, affecting access to health and education, the supply of food commodities and medical provisions.²²²


The short rains harvest, which accounts for just 25 percent of the yearly aggregate cereal production but is critical in south-eastern and coastal marginal agricultural areas, where it provides up to 60 percent of the total annual cereal output, was expected to be 70 percent below-average, as the October-December rains were characterized by an erratic distribution and poor precipitation amounts.

The short rains are also vital for replenishment of rangeland resources in northern and eastern pastoral livelihood zones, where poor rainfall distribution and long dry spells undermined water and forage resources. As a result, an increased reliance on consumption-based coping strategies was reported in pastoral north-eastern Garissa and Wajir counties and in agro-pastoral eastern and coastal Makeni, Tharaka Nithi, Kilifi and Taita Taveta counties in November.²²³

Fall armyworm infestations in the mixed farming and agro-pastoral livelihood zones caused substantial destruction to the maize crop and subsequent reduction in maize production. Locust invasions, mainly in Marsabit and Turkana, invaded both pasture and browse.

222 Govt. Kenya, 31 Aug 2018.

223 FEWS NET. Kenya Food Security Outlook. December 2018.

Map 22 Kenya IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification, June-September 2018

This is FEWS NET IPC compatible product, which is generated through the application of the full set of IPC tools and procedures, with the exception of technical consensus



Source: FEWS NET, October 2018

Conflict/insecurity

Conflict over grazing is usually minimal in October as livestock and wild animals are driven to wet season grazing areas. However, following the poor performance of the short rains, large numbers of camels from Isiolo county migrated into Tharaka Nithi county in October, increasing the potential for conflict. Conflict incidents over forage were reported in Kitui county, while in Isiolo, border disputes and communal tensions were reported along the Isiolo-Garissa border resulting in population displacement.²²⁴ Terror-related incidences were reported in Lamu, Isiolo, Mandera and Moyale in Marsabit.

Economic shocks

In November, maize prices across key urban and rural reference markets ranged from near-average to 36 percent below the five-year average. The exception was in Garissa market, where maize prices were seven percent above the five-year average.²²⁵ The proportion of Kenyans living on less than the international poverty line²²⁶ declined from around 47 percent in 2005/06 to 36 percent in 2015/16. In the remote, sparsely populated north-eastern parts of the country (Turkana, Mandera, and Wajir), agro-climatic shocks affect those who depend on livestock and low-productivity agricultural activities. Here poverty rates are above 80 percent.²²⁷


224 FEWS NET Kenya Food Security Outlook, December 2018 to May 2019.

225 Ibid.

226 US\$1.90 per day in 2011

227 World Bank

Map 23 Kenya IPC Acute Malnutrition situation, August 2018



Source: Kenya IPC Technical Working Group, August 2018

DISPLACEMENT

Kenya hosts over 470 000 refugees and asylum seekers, with around 257 000 from Somalia followed by 115 000 from South Sudan, 41 000 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 28 000 from Ethiopia.²²⁸ About 44 percent of them reside in the Dadaab refugee camp in north-eastern Garissa county and 40 percent in Kukuma camp in north-western Turkana. Access to basic necessities including food, shelter, water and sanitation is often precarious because of the high concentration of people. Households predominantly rely on humanitarian food assistance to meet their minimum food needs.

228 UNHCR. Kenya infographics. December 2018.

WFP and other humanitarian agencies typically deliver a full ration of 2 100 kilocalories, but some refugees are receiving about 85 percent of the full ration because of recent budgets cuts.²²⁹ In December 2018–January 2019 these settlements were classified as *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2!), with humanitarian assistance preventing worse outcomes.


NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The last national nutrition survey conducted in Kenya reported that malnutrition for children aged 6–59 months had decreased since 2000, with stunting at 26 percent and wasting at 4.2 percent in 2014.²³⁰

229 FEWS NET. Kenya food security outlook. December 2018.

230 National Bureau of Statistics Kenya and ICF International 2015. 2014 KDHS Report. Rockville Maryland USA: KNBS and ICF International.

Map 24 Kenya IPC Acute Malnutrition situation, Sept - Nov 2018



However, the rates of acute malnutrition are much higher in the ASALs. According to the August 2018 IPC acute malnutrition analysis, the situation in North Horr and in Turkana South, North and Central sub-counties had improved since the same time the previous year, but the levels remained above 15 percent in Turkana, Samburu, Mandera, East Pokot, and North Horr and at 10-15 percent in West Pokot, Tana River, Garissa, and Wajir.²³¹

Nearly 511 000 children aged 6-59 months were estimated to require treatment for acute malnutrition in the ASALs and urban areas studied with over 85 000 severely acutely malnourished. Over 31 000 pregnant and lactating women were also in need of treatment.²³²

Poor child-care practices, high morbidity, low literacy, poverty, and limited access to healthcare and basic services were identified as key determinants of malnutrition.²³³ Cholera was reported in 20 counties (nearly 6 000 cases) and measles outbreaks in six counties (744 cases with 66 confirmed).²³⁴

More than half (51 percent) of rural households have no access to improved sanitation compared to 13 percent of urban households.²³⁵

Food Security Steering Group. August 2018.

233 Ibid.

234 UNICEF

235 Development initiatives report. Enhancing access to safe water and improved sanitation. Are we on track? December 2018.

231 Government of Kenya. Long rains season assessment report. Kenya Food Security Steering Group. August 2018.

232 Government of Kenya. Long rains season assessment report. Kenya

LAKE CHAD BASIN REGIONAL CRISIS CAMEROON, CHAD, NIGER AND NIGERIA

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018

2017-18
CHANGE

2019
FORECAST

LAKE CHAD BASIN	CH PHASE 3 OR ABOVE	CH PHASE 2		
TOTAL POPULATION ANALYSED 19.6M	3.4M 👤👤👤👤👤 3.2M CRISIS ↑ 250 000 EMERGENCY	6.5M 👤👤👤👤👤👤 STRESSED		
CAMEROON/ FAR NORTH	176 000 ↑ 176 000 CRISIS	1M ↑ STRESSED	▶ Remained stable as result of a precarious security situation.	▲ Conflict/insecurity and related displacement will continue to drive food insecurity.
CHAD/LAC	159 000 ↑ 153 000 CRISIS ↑ 6 000 EMERGENCY	169 000 ↑ STRESSED	▶ Remained stable as a result of localized dry spells, insecurity and displacement.	▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to decrease in 2019.
THE NIGER/DIFFA	118 000 ↑ 110 000 CRISIS ↑ 8 600 EMERGENCY	278 000 ↑ STRESSED	▶ Remained stable as a result of persisting insecurity and population displacements.	▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to increase in 2019.
NIGERIA/ADAMAWA, BORNO, YOBE	3M 👤👤👤 2.8M CRISIS ↑ 233 000 EMERGENCY	5M 👤👤👤👤 STRESSED	▼ Decreased with better national cereal production and continuous provision of humanitarian assistance.	▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to decrease in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Climate shocks



Economic shocks

- Insecurity limited access to fields and inputs, and disrupted domestic and regional trade.
- Conflict in tandem with localized dry spells undermined agricultural production.
- The Nigerian Naira depreciation undermined cross border trade and the purchasing power of those who sold livestock regionally.
- Dry spells led to fodder deficits and drying of water points, and triggered an early lean season. Pastoralist-farmer conflicts were commonplace.
- Scarce income-earning opportunities combined with an early start to the lean season and escalating food prices squeezed food access.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS




490 000 children in total in Lake Chad Basin have severe acute malnutrition.



HNO, 2019



Children aged 6-23 months receiving 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development:




HNO, 2018

MICS, 2016-17; DHS 2012; SMART 2018; SMART 2017



Households lacking access to safe drinking water:




MICS, 2016-17; SMART 2018; HNO 2018



Ill-equipped health centres overwhelmed by casualties of the regional conflict and disrupted water and sanitation access led to major disease outbreaks.




Infants (up to 6 months old) being exclusively breastfed:



MICS, 2016-17; SMART 2018; SMART 2017



Children aged 0-59 months who are stunted (>30% = very high):




MICS, 2016-17

DISPLACEMENT




2.3M internally displaced persons



IOM, Dec 2018/ UNHCR, 2018




230 000 Nigerian refugees



IUNHCR, 2018



1.8M returnees



IOM, Dec 2018/ UNHCR, 2018

BACKGROUND

The nine-year Boko Haram insurgency in north-east Nigeria continues to spill into neighbouring Chad, the Niger (Diffa region) and Cameroon's Far North, so this is considered a regional crisis. Attacks persisted in north-east Nigeria and Far North region of Cameroon,²³⁶ as well as in Chad near the border with Nigeria, which limited humanitarian access.²³⁷ In the Niger's Diffa region, the violence disrupted aid operations in some locations.²³⁸ Armed groups stepped up raids across Lake Chad Basin conflict-affected areas in 2018. Tens of thousands of people were displaced as a result of poor living conditions, lack of access to humanitarian assistance, military operations and fear of attacks on villages, towns and camps for displaced people.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

During the June-August lean season, around 3.4 million people faced *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) food security outcomes in the four sub-national areas of the Lake Chad Basin. This represents a significant decrease compared to the same period in 2017 when 5.5 million people were in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) or above in three sub-national areas - north-east Nigeria, the Lac region of Chad and Diffa region of the Niger. In addition, 1.5 million people (34 percent of households) were considered moderately or severely food-insecure in Cameroon's Far-North as of December 2017.²³⁹ In 2018, no one was classified in *Famine* (CH Phase 5) throughout the year.

Most of these people in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance were in the three states of northeast Nigeria, where three million people were facing *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) or *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) in June-August 2018. The situation remained worst in the state of Borno, which accounted for 44 percent of Lake Chad Basin's population in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and over 80 percent of the population in *Emergency* (CH Phase 4).

In both years the situation improved following the harvest and was better in 2018 than 2017. From October-December the number of people in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and above in northeast Nigeria, Chad's Lac region and the Niger's Diffa region decreased considerably from 2.7 million - including 1 800 people in *Famine* (CH Phase 5) - in 2017 to 1.8 million in 2018.

236 OCHA. Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview. 26 July 2018

237 OCHA. Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Update No. 26. Nov-Dec 2018

238 OCHA. Besoins humanitaires revus et priorités de réponse. Septembre 2018

239 WFP. Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis Cameroon using CARI, December 2017



NUTRITION OVERVIEW OF LAKE CHAD BASIN CRISIS

In **north-east Nigeria** results from round 5 (April-May 2018) Nutrition and Food Security Surveillance indicate that the GAM rate ranged from 7-15 percent. SAM ranged between 0.3-2.5 percent, with the highest levels in Central Borno and North Yobe. In Borno there was a significant increase in the prevalence of acute malnutrition since the previous surveillance round (November-December 2017), consistent with seasonal variation but also suggestive of a worsening nutrition situation. The prevalence was not significantly different in Adamawa and Yobe.

Chronic malnutrition or stunting is estimated to be serious in Adamawa (33 percent) and Borno (37 percent) and critical in Yobe (52 percent), according to the 2015 National Nutrition and Health Survey.

In **Cameroon's Far North** GAM rates were 9.7 percent and SAM rates 1.4 percent.²⁴⁰ Stunting is a major public health issue with levels reaching 41 percent.²⁴¹


The acute malnutrition estimates for the **Lac region in Chad** have fallen from 18.1 percent in 2017 to 10.5 percent and, unlike the previous years, were better than the national rates.

In the **Diffa region of the Niger** nutrition improved very slightly with GAM rates dropping from 13.9 percent in 2017 to 12.6 percent and SAM rates from 2.5 percent to

240 United Nations Children's Fund and Government of Cameroon Ministry of Public Health, Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey, 2018

241 SMART survey 2017

Map 25 Lake Chad Basin (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states of Nigeria; Lac region of Chad; Diffa region of Niger), CH Acute Food Insecurity Situation, June-August 2018



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2018



2.4 percent at the end of 2018.²⁴² In Mainé Soroa, where children’s security is reportedly poor, the GAM rate was 20.7 percent while in N’Gourti it was 16.6 percent.²⁴³ Around 15 600 children suffering from acute malnutrition were in need of nutritional support in 2018.²⁴⁴

Besides high levels of food insecurity, the main drivers of malnutrition across the LCB conflict zone included ill-equipped health centres being overwhelmed by casualties of the regional conflict. Access to water and sanitation services were strained by insecurity and the

influx of displaced people, leading to outbreaks of disease such as measles, yellow fever, diarrhoea and meningitis.

The LCB faced its worst cholera epidemic in eight years in 2018 with more than 35 000 cases and 845 deaths officially reported between January and October in Cameroon, the Niger and Nigeria. The states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in Nigeria were the worst-affected.²⁴⁵

Low child vaccination rates and vitamin A supplementation coverage, high levels of anaemia

242 OCHA. Crise du Bassin de Lac Tchad: Besoins Humanitaires Revus et Priorités de Réponse. Septembre 2018.

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid.

245 WHO. Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and Other Emergencies. Week 44: 27 October-2 November 2018.

among children aged six to 59 months and women of reproductive age and high numbers of early pregnancies are often contributory factors.

Across the region inadequate caring and feeding practices for young children, demonstrated by low rates of exclusive breastfeeding and minimum acceptable diet among children aged six to 23 months are still prevalent, as are inadequate diets for women of reproductive age. These practices are often driven by strong social norms. In north-east Nigeria, for instance, just 16 percent of children aged 6-23 months receive a minimum acceptable diet and 21 percent of children are exclusively breastfed for the recommended six months.²⁴⁶ In Chad it is even lower: 13 percent of 6-23 month-olds have a minimum acceptable diet and 18 percent of infants are exclusively breastfed.²⁴⁷ High rates of psychological trauma and family upheavals due to conflict are also identified as aggravating factors for children's malnutrition in Chad.²⁴⁸




NIGERIA (16 STATES AND FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY)²⁴⁹

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

During the lean season in June-August, 5.3 million people were classified in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) in the 16 states of north Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), up from 3.7 million from March-May.²⁵⁰ Between October and December, the number fell by 53 percent to 2.5 million in need of urgent assistance for food, nutrition and livelihoods. Between October and December, 2.5 million people were still facing *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) food insecurity levels. Throughout 2018, no one was classified in *Famine* (CH Phase 5) in Nigeria.²⁵¹

These figures represent a significant improvement since 2017: the number of people in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) in the 16 states and FCT decreased by 40 percent between June-August 2017 and 2018. Two states (Borno and Yobe) were classified in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) during the 2018 lean season,

Figure 14 Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno, Yobe), Number of people (millions) in CH Phase 2 or above in 2017-2018



Source: Cadre Harmonisé

including two LGA in *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) in Borno, and eight states in *Stressed* (Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Plateau and Zamfara).

During the lean season 57 percent of these people in need of urgent assistance were located in the three states affected by the Boko Haram insurgency (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe). In terms of numbers this represents a 2018 peak of 3 million people in these three states (up from 2.3 million in March-May and falling to 1.7 million October-December). In the north-east, almost four in five households had to resort to negative coping strategies during the peak of the lean season in August with displaced households and those headed by women the worst affected.²⁵² In addition, some 5 million people were classified in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2) in the conflict-affected states.

246 MICS 2016-17

247 IPC Tchad Analyses IPC Malnutrition Aigüe. Juin-Sept 2017. Rédigé en Mars, 2018.


248 Chad Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019 (22 December 2018)

249 The Federal Capital Territory is a federal territory in central Nigeria, where Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria, is located.

250 CH Analysis, March 2018.

251 CH Analysis, November 2018.

252 WFP mVAM bulletin n.10 August 2018.

Map 26 Nigeria (16 states and FCT), CH Acute Food Insecurity Situation, June-August 2018

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict

Intensified attacks on military checkpoints, worship centres and civilians increased displacement: in October 2018, Nigeria hosted two million IDPs, with the vast majority (1.8 million) of them located in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, a 16 percent increase compared to early 2018. There were also 1.6 million returnees.²⁵³

Military operations and checkpoints disrupted agricultural production as well as markets and other livelihood activities. While four households in five had access to farmland in Yobe and two in three in Adamawa, almost half of them were not able to cultivate. In Borno two households in three had no access to farmland.²⁵⁴ In Adamawa, floods and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers also weakened household food security.²⁵⁵

Food availability reportedly improved in late 2018 in the north-east as a result of better security conditions

²⁵³ IOM DTM round 25-Oct; IOM DTM round 21 - Feb

²⁵⁴ WFP EFSOM, August 2018

²⁵⁵ WFP mVAM bulletin n.10 August 2018

and access to land, favourable agro-climatic conditions, gradual recovery of markets, and restoration of livelihoods following continuous provision of assistance. However, the 2018 harvest prospects in the three states were below-average mainly because of the ongoing impact of insecurity in Adamawa and Borno.^{256,257}

Livestock production was hindered by limited access to pasture in north-eastern conflict-affected areas and intercommunal conflicts in central states - Kaduna, Benue, Taraba, and Adamawa - as well as cattle rustling in the north-west.²⁵⁸

Economic shocks

In April, prices in north-eastern markets were higher than in the rest of the country, particularly in parts of Borno,²⁵⁹ because of persisting conflict, interrupted trade, poor road infrastructure, unavailability of trucks and high transportation costs.²⁶⁰ In August maize prices were 50

²⁵⁶ FEWS NET Food Security Outlook, October 2018

²⁵⁷ CHAnalysis, November 2018; FEWS NET Key message updat

²⁵⁸ FAO GIEWS Country Brief Nigeria, August 2018; FEWS NET Food Security Outlook, October 2018

²⁵⁹ FAO GIEWS Country Brief Nigeria, August 2018.

²⁶⁰ FEWS NET & WFP Nigeria Market Monitoring Bulletin, November 13, 2018.

percent above their two-year average in Borno²⁶¹ and remained high in November as a result of high demand and low supply following reduced agricultural output.²⁶²

Currency depreciation undermined households' purchasing power - particularly that of livestock owners and cash-crop exporters who rely on cross-border trade.²⁶³


Climate shocks

At the national level, the 2017 cereal output was well-above the five-year average despite substantial outbreaks of pests, such as fall armyworm, and floods.²⁶⁴ The 2018 main harvest was also forecast to be favourable across Nigeria except in areas affected by the insurgency and floods.²⁶⁵ In August, 25 states were reportedly affected by major flooding that led to population displacement, damage to houses, infrastructures, livestock and farmland.²⁶⁶ Among the 17 northern states, national disasters were declared in the Niger, Adamawa, Kebbi, and Taraba by October.²⁶⁷



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Figure 15 Chad (Lac), Number of people (millions) in CH Phase 2 or above in 2017-2018



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2018

CHAD

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

During the June–August lean season, almost one million people were classified in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) across Chad. This corresponds to a 57 percent increase compared to March–May 2018²⁶⁸ and to a 10 percent increase compared to the same period last year.²⁶⁹ By October–December 2018 the number in need had decreased dramatically to around 190 000 people.²⁷⁰

Between June and August, 19 departments were classified in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and 19 in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2). By October–December the situation had improved markedly with two departments in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and 11 in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2).

In the conflict-affected Lac region, which was classified in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) during March–May and June–August, 159 000 people faced *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) or *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) during the lean season, 30 percent more than during the same period in 2017. In addition, around 169 000 were classified in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2). Food security significantly improved between October and December with 25 000 people in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) or *Emergency* (CH Phase 4).

261 WFP VAM Borno and Yobe Market Monitoring Report - issue 19, August 2018.
 262 FEWS NET & WFP Nigeria Market Monitoring Bulletin, November 13, 2018.
 263 FAO GIEWS Country Brief Nigeria, August 2018.
 264 Ibid
 265 FEWS NET & WFP Nigeria Market Monitoring Bulletin, November 13, 2018
 266 FEWS NET Nigeria - Food Security Outlook Update, August 2018
 267 FEWS NET Nigeria Key message update, September 2018; FEWS NET Food Security Outlook, October 2018
 268 CH analysis, March 2018
 269 CH analysis, March 2017
 270 CH analysis, November 2018.

Map 27 Chad, CH Acute Food Insecurity Situation, June-August 2018



FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

National level

Climate shocks

Structural factors that affect food security in Sahelian regions even in normal years include degraded land and soil, low agricultural production, poverty and limited access to safe drinking water and sanitation.²⁷¹ During the 2017/2018 campaign aggregate cereal production was 2.1 percent below the five-year average and five percent below year-earlier levels as localized dry spells affected crop production in Kanem, Lac, Wadi Fira, Batha Hadjer Lamis and Bahr El Ghazal.²⁷²

²⁷¹ WFP Republic of Chad: EFSA in Sahelian Departments affected by rainfall anomalies, June 2018.

²⁷² FAO GIEWS Country Brief Chad, June 15, 2018.

These dry conditions caused significant fodder deficits and early dryness of water points, initiating an early onset of the pastoral lean season in late February. Transhumance from Sahelian regions to Sudanian areas occurred earlier than normal, triggering intercommunal conflicts between farmers and herders.²⁷³

During the 2018/2019 campaign, average to above-average rainfall led to favourable cereal production prospects,²⁷⁴ except in the Sudanian areas where cereal production decreased by 4.5 percent compared to 2017 because of dry spells.²⁷⁵

Economic shocks

Decreasing incomes, low livestock prices, scant demand for local labour, lack of monetary transfers, and poor agricultural production as a result of the difficult climatic conditions during the 2017/2018 campaign squeezed households' purchasing power. While cereal prices fell below the five-year average in October, terms of trade did not improve for pastoralists, as livestock prices remained low²⁷⁶ because suspended exports to Nigeria and reduced flows to the Sudan and Libya meant there was an excess of supply, which depressed prices.²⁷⁷

Conflict/insecurity

Population displacement, which mainly stemmed from conflict and insecurity in neighbouring countries, increased pressure on host communities' already stressed economic and natural resources. Approximately 662 000 people were displaced in the country by the end of December, including around 455 000 refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from the Sudan, the Central African Republic and Nigeria.²⁷⁸ In September around 2 700 Nigerian and Cameroonian transhumant herder households affected by the Boko Haram conflict arrived in the regions of Hadjer-Lamis and Chari-Baguirmi, raising the risks of disease outbreaks and exhausted natural resources.²⁷⁹

²⁷³ CH analysis, March 2018.

²⁷⁴ FEWS NET Chad Food Security Outlook Update, September 2018.

²⁷⁵ CH analysis, November 2018.

²⁷⁶ Ibid

²⁷⁷ CH analysis, March 2018.

²⁷⁸ UNHCR Chiffres des Personnes relevant de la compétence du HCR au Tchad - Résumé, December 31, 2018.

²⁷⁹ SISAAP & Food Security Cluster Rapport de mission conjointe (Hadjet Lamis et Chari Baguirmi), September 2018.

Lac region

In 2018, localized dry spells in tandem with civil conflict, which disrupted maize and sorghum production, trade and market supplies, drove food insecurity.²⁸⁰

As of April, the pastoral situation in Lac was characterized by a complete exhaustion of inland pastures, while pastures on islands could not be exploited because of the presence of Boko Haram.²⁸¹ For security reasons the government restricted other sectors of food production, such as fishing.²⁸²

Population displacements were also considerable in the Lac region: 126 000 people were internally displaced in addition to around 39 000 returnees, as of December.²⁸³ As a result of disrupted livelihoods, households resorted to negative coping strategies such as reducing non-food expenses earlier in 2018 than usual.²⁸⁴ At the peak of the lean season, in August, food prices were lower than the five-year average because of low demand.²⁸⁵

NATIONAL NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Nationally 13.5 percent of children were acutely malnourished, reaching beyond the 15 percent *Emergency* threshold in 12 out of 23 provinces and peaking at 25 percent in Kanem and 23 percent in Ennedi Ouest.²⁸⁶ Nationally four percent of Chadian children were severely acutely malnourished.²⁸⁷ Chronic malnutrition has increased from 26 percent in 2016 to 32 percent in 2017, exceeding the critical threshold of 40 percent in five regions.²⁸⁸


Besides high levels of food insecurity other contributory factors to malnutrition across the country include: high prevalence of diseases like malaria, respiratory infections and diarrhoea,²⁸⁹ along with low vaccination rates (22 percent of children completed vaccinations) and vitamin A supplementation coverage. Nationally levels of anaemia were very high among children aged 6-59 months (65.6 percent) and among women of reproductive age (42 percent).²⁹⁰

280 FEWS NET Chad Food Security Outlook Update, September 2018.
 281 FEWS NET Chad Key message update, April 2018.
 282 FEWS NET Chad Food Security Outlook, June 2018.
 283 IOM DTM Round 6, January 2019.
 284 WFP Republic of Chad: EFSA in Sahelian Departments affected by rainfall anomalies, June 2018.
 285 FEWS NET Chad Key message update, August 2018.
 286 Ministère de la Santé. Enquête nationale de nutrition et de mortalité rétrospective chez les enfants et la population générale. Selon la méthodologie SMART. Décembre 2018.
 287 Ibid.
 288 OCHA, FSC, Nutrition Cluster: Chad: Food Security and Nutrition Crisis - appeal for a response at scale, January 2018.
 289 Ministère de la Santé. SMART CHAD Septembre 2017.
 290 Ministère de la Santé. Enquête nationale de nutrition et de mortalité rétrospective chez les enfants et la population générale. Selon la méthodologie SMART. Décembre 2018.



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Figure 16 Niger (Diffa), Number of people (millions) in CH Phase 2 or above in 2017-2018




Source: Cadre Harmonisé

Despite improvements, inappropriate caring and feeding practices are still prevalent as demonstrated by low rates of exclusive breastfeeding (18 percent) and minimum acceptable diet among 6-23 month-old children (13 percent).²⁹¹ These factors are further aggravated by the high number of early pregnancies (around 29 percent of mothers in Chad are younger than 15 years).²⁹²

291 Ibid.
 292 Chad Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019 (22 December 2018)

Map 28 Niger, CH Acute Food Insecurity Situation, June-August 2018



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2018

NIGER

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

During the 2018 lean season, close to 803 000 people were in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. This number represents a slight increase compared to March-May (787 000),²⁹³ but a significant decrease compared to the 2017 lean season when over 1.3 million people were in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4).²⁹⁴ A further decrease was reported between October and December, although

around 600 000 people remained in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) during this period.

Between June and August, 11 areas were classified in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) - including five in the Diffa region - and 49 areas in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2). Between October and December the number of areas in *Crisis* decreased to four - all of them in the Tillaberi region - and the number of areas in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2) to 33.²⁹⁵

In Diffa, around 118 000 people faced *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) and *Emergency* (CH Phase 4) food security outcomes between June and August - compared to 135 000 a year earlier.²⁹⁶ This represented a slight increase compared to March-May 2018, when close to 91 000 people were in urgent need of food, nutrition and livelihood

293 Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage - Rapport du Niger, March 2018.

294 Cadre Harmonisé, situation de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest - Niger, March 2017.

295 Internal sources - no public document reporting the figures was available as of 12 Dec.

296 Cadre Harmonisé, situation de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest - Niger, March 2017.

assistance.²⁹⁷ Between October and December, the number decreased to around 55 000 people.

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

National level

Climate shocks

While the 2017/2018 agricultural campaign was characterized by an above-average cereal aggregate output, the deficit in fodder was such that only 41 percent of livestock needs could be covered.²⁹⁸ This prompted the pastoral lean season to start earlier – in February instead of March – and led to high livestock supply on markets and herd concentration in some areas, which risked triggering conflicts.²⁹⁹ As of March, the situation was critical in 69 communes and deteriorated even further between April and May.³⁰⁰

The pastoral and crop situation improved from August thanks to favourable rainfall,³⁰¹ with the exception of Tillabery and Diffa where significant deficits were reported.³⁰² Flooding also affected cropping areas in Maradi and Zinder.³⁰³ In November, the 2018/2019 national production prospects indicated an increased cereal output by 13 percent above-average and one percent above the 2017 levels.³⁰⁴

Economic shocks

The Nigerian Naira depreciation negatively affected the purchasing power of those who sold livestock across the border,³⁰⁵ while poor livestock body conditions reportedly pushed down prices.³⁰⁶ This situation compelled increasing numbers of the poorest pastoral households to migrate, sell animals and/or borrow money so that they could buy food.³⁰⁷

During the lean season, staple prices on most monitored markets were still above the seasonal average as a result of reduced – although continuous – flows in domestic

and cross-border trade. At the same time, demand for livestock was low and terms of trade decreased significantly to the detriment of pastoralist households.³⁰⁸

Conflict /insecurity

Civil insecurity also persisted throughout 2018 and even deteriorated in several areas of the country, such as Tahoua and Tillabery with repeated terrorist attacks and population displacements. It hindered the movement of people and goods, hampering trade and provision of humanitarian assistance, in particular.³⁰⁹ As of December, around 362 000 people were displaced in the Niger, including 175 000 refugees mainly from Nigeria and Mali, 158 000 IDPs and 26 000 returnees.³¹⁰

Diffa region

In Diffa, food insecurity continued to be driven by disrupted livelihoods, limited trade opportunities, poor access to rainfed and irrigated fields, limited humanitarian access and continuous flows of IDPs, refugees and returnees.

Low food stocks were reported in markets in early 2018 as a result of insecurity and stagnated domestic and cross-border trade flows. In June, the pastoral crisis was most pronounced in N’Gourti as a result of lack of access to Lake Chad’s fall-back areas and to Komadougou because of the security restrictions.³¹¹

Despite improvements in economic activity in the first quarter of 2018 people’s purchasing power remained well below-average.³¹² Households surveyed by WFP resorted at least once every five days, on average, to negative coping strategies, such as borrowing food, diminishing the number of daily meals or using credit to buy food.³¹³ Displaced populations added pressure on host communities’ already stressed sources of income and food. In December, Diffa hosted almost 119 000 Nigerian refugees in addition to around 104 000 IDPs and 26 000 returnees.³¹⁴

297 Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage – Rapport du Niger, March 2018.

298 Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage – Rapport du Niger, March 2018.

299 FEWS NET Niger Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire, Avril 2018.

300 Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage – Rapport du Niger, March 2018.

301 FEWS NET Niger Key Message Update, August 2018.

302 FEWS NET Niger Key Message Update, November 2018.

303 FEWS NET Niger Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire, September 2018.

304 FEWS NET Niger Key Message Update, November 2018.

305 FEWS NET Niger Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire, Avril 2018.

306 FEWS NET Niger Key message update, May 2018.

307 FEWS NET Niger Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire, Avril 2018.

308 FEWS NET Niger Perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire, June 2018.

309 Ibid.

310 UNHCR Population of concern, 31 December, 2018.


311 FEWS NET Niger Perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire, June 2018.

312 FEWS NET Niger Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire, Avril 2018.

313 WFP Niger mVAM bulletin no. 13, July 2018.

314 UNHCR Population of concern, 31 December 2018.

Map 29 Cameroon, CH Acute Food Insecurity Situation June-August 2018



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2018

National nutrition overview

The nutrition situation deteriorated with the national GAM prevalence among children under five at 15 percent³¹⁵ compared to 10.3 percent in 2016.³¹⁶ The SAM rate was estimated at 3.2 percent versus 1.9 percent in 2016. The regions of Maradi, Tahoua and Zinder had the highest estimates - between 15 and 20 percent. An estimated 1.7 million people needed nutritional assistance, including 380 166 children below five years in need of treatment for SAM.³¹⁷

Chronic malnutrition rates remain 'Critical' with a national prevalence of 48 percent, rising to more than 60 percent in Maradi and Zinder.³¹⁸

315 INS Niger. Note de synthèse. Enquête nationale sur la nutrition des Enfants de 0 à 59 mois. Octobre-Novembre 2018.

316 INS Niger, Unicef, and WFP. Note de synthèse. Evaluation nationale de la situation nutritionnelle par la méthodologie SMART en République du Niger. Données collectées entre 16 août et 10 septembre 2016.

317 OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview Niger 2019

318 INS Niger. Note de synthèse. Enquête nationale sur la nutrition des

In Maradi there was a cholera outbreak in July with a total of 3 814 cases and 78 deaths by November, which may have contributed to malnutrition in the region. Just 37 percent of the region's population has access to improved water sources, and 10 percent to basic sanitation.³¹⁹ Besides food insecurity, the main drivers of malnutrition are the limited access to basic services, the lack of safe water and improved sanitation, and the inadequate diets of young children and women of reproductive age.

CAMEROON

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

During the lean season (June-August), around 495 000 people were in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) across Cameroon. The Southwest, North, Northwest and Far-North regions were the most affected in terms of magnitude of food insecurity, with the latter two classified in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2).³²⁰

In the Far-North region, the number of people in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance increased from around 111 000 in March-May to over 175 000 during the lean season. A further one million people were classified in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2) during the lean period. Between these two periods, the number of departments classified in *Stressed* (CH Phase 2) increased from four to six out of seven.³²¹

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

National level

Conflict/insecurity

The 2018 aggregated agricultural output is estimated at below-average levels,³²² mainly due to the negative impact on agricultural operations of insecurity in northern areas and of the civil unrest that erupted in Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions, where households abandoned crop fields, and storage infrastructures were destroyed. In these two regions (Northwest and Southwest), over 70 percent of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods.³²³

Enfants de 0 à 59 mois. Octobre-Novembre 2018.

319 WHO. Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and Other Emergencies. Week 44: 27 October-2 November 2018.

320 CILSS Internal sources "CH estimation Pop mai et juillet 2018" database consulted on 14 December.

321 Ibid

322 FAO GIEWS Country Brief, November 9, 2018.

323 FEWS NET Cameroon Mise à jour du suivi à distance, September

In December, 437 500 people were internally displaced because of the crisis in Northwest and Southwest regions, significantly increasing the humanitarian needs of the host communities.³²⁴ In addition, close to 275 000 the Central African Republic refugees and 102 000 Nigerian refugees were hosted in the country, as of October.³²⁵

Climate shocks

During the 2017/2018 agro-pastoral campaign, the Adamawa, East, Far-North and North regions were affected by late rainfall onset/dry spells, plant diseases and epizootic diseases. In the East, 12 percent of households reported being affected by poor rains leading to a lack of food availability in markets.³²⁶

Economic shocks

In early 2018, high prices significantly limited the poorest households' access to food in the four monitored regions of Adamawa, East, Far-North and North. More than half of households resorted to food coping strategies such as consuming less expensive food, reducing portion sizes, or diminishing the number of meals per day.³²⁷

As of April, households' food stocks were depleted, forcing the poorest households to become market-dependent earlier than usual. From March staple food (sorghum and maize) prices were higher than average, despite the interdiction from authorities to export cereals, and increased imports of cereals from Nigeria and Chad. Prices of livestock also started falling from March, leading to detrimental terms of trade for pastoralists.³²⁸ At the end of 2018, prices were mostly stable as a result of low inflation, maize inflows from Nigeria in the Far-North, supplies from the 2018 harvests and delivery of food assistance,³²⁹ except in the urban areas of Northwest and Southwest regions where insecurity and increased exports to Nigeria pushed food prices upwards.³³⁰

Far-North region

Although Boko Haram incursions and suicide attacks decreased in 2018, the security situation remained precarious in the Far-North.³³¹

Falling production, high demand from other regions and companies, and stock depletion weakened food supply. Cereal production for 2017/2018 was 21 percent below average,³³² with the situation worse in the departments of Diamaré, Logone-et-Chari and Mayo Sava,³³³ mainly as a result of the ongoing conflict, displacement, input shortages and depletion of households' already inadequate productive assets. As of March, planting operations remained severely hampered by the Boko Haram insurgency and insecurity.³³⁴ Persistent insecurity and cattle-raiding compelled pastoralists to migrate to drier areas in the South.³³⁵ However, given the overall improved security conditions and favourable rainfalls in 2018, households' harvests were above average, as of November.³³⁶

By November, the region hosted around 246 000 IDPs and 106 000 returnees³³⁷ as well as a rapidly growing number of refugees (100 000 by the end of the year) mainly from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.³³⁸ Almost all of them were displaced because of the conflict, while six percent were displaced because of floods, drought and other climate hazards.³³⁹

In early 2018, sorghum and maize prices were higher than their year-earlier levels and higher than the five-year average as a result of private companies stockpiling cereals with a view to selling them during the lean season or exporting to Chad and the Sudan, which created market shortages.³⁴⁰

NATIONAL NUTRITION SITUATION

The 2018 Cameroon Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated that 541 000 people – mainly women and children under five years – were likely to be nutritionally vulnerable and at least 175 600 people were likely to suffer from acute malnutrition across the country in 2018, around 100 000 fewer than in 2017. Those estimated to suffer from acute malnutrition include 17 000 pregnant and lactating women compared to 50 000 in 2017. The number of children under five with acute malnutrition was expected to be around 158 600, including 6 500 the Central African Republic refugees and more than 1 100 Nigerian refugees.

2018.

324 OCHA Cameroon: Aperçu Humanitaire (mise à jour pour décembre 2018)

325 UNHCR Operational Portal : country/Cameroon, Dec 2018 [consulted on 11 February 2019]

326 WFP Cameroun Suivi de la sécurité alimentaire Bulletin no. 4, February 2018.

327 Ibid.

328 FEWS NET Cameroon Mise à jour du suivi à distance, April 2018.

329 FAO GIEWS Country Brief Cameroon, November 9, 2018.

330 FEWS NET Cameroon Key Message Update, November 2018.

331 FEWS NET Cameroon Mise à jour du suivi à distance, April 2018.

332 FEWS NET Cameroon Mise à jour du suivi à distance, February 2018.

333 WFP Cameroun Suivi de la sécurité alimentaire Bulletin no. 4, February 2018.

334 FAO GIEWS Country Brief Cameroon, March 26, 2018.

335 FEWS NET Cameroon Mise à jour du suivi à distance, June 2018.

336 FEWS NET Cameroon Key Message Update, November 2018.

337 IOM 2018.

338 UNHCR December 2018.

339 IOM DTM Cameroun Région de l'Extrême-Nord Rapport sur les déplacements Round 16, November 16-23, 2018.


340 WFP Cameroun Suivi de la sécurité alimentaire Bulletin no. 4, February 2018.

MADAGASCAR

SOUTHERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN DISTRICTS

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **remained stable** mainly as a result of lingering effects of past shocks and 2016 drought.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks

- Farmers had not replenished their lost assets from the preceding two years of drought.



Economic shocks

- Acute dry spells and cyclone-related flooding undermined the 2017/2018 agricultural season.



Natural hazards

- Incomplete pasture regeneration, animal diseases and theft constrained livestock production.

- Lack of seeds, fertilizers and technologies constrained agricultural productivity and exposed farmers to climatic events.

- Reduced food availability, a declining exchange rate and rising fuel costs inflated food prices.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



20 200 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom 1 400 affected by SAM.

OCHA, 2018



30% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

National Survey, 2012-13



66% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

National Survey, 2012-13



Poor access to nutrient-rich foods, safe water and health services as well as high levels of food insecurity and diseases affect malnutrition in drought-prone southern districts



42% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

National Survey, 2012-13



47% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

National Survey, 2013

DISPLACEMENT



5 700 persons have been internally displaced in the Grand-Sud mainly as a result of drought and insecurity.

IOM, Sept 2018



Remittances to Madagascar have more than tripled between 2005 and 2017 and represented 2 percent of the GDP in 2017.

UNACTD, Nov 2018

BACKGROUND

Political instability following a coup in 2009 undermined Madagascar’s economic growth and development efforts. Absolute poverty levels rose, reducing the population’s ability to recover from shocks and mitigate their impacts. Madagascar is among the 10 most vulnerable countries to natural disasters, and considered the most cyclone-exposed country in Africa, with an average of three to four cyclones affecting the country each year.³⁴¹ With an agricultural system mainly based on rain-fed small-scale subsistence farming, households are very vulnerable to the impact of cyclones, drought and floods. The Grand Sud region suffered several consecutive years of rain shortfalls, further aggravated by the El Niño weather event in 2016 and 2017. In 2018, the political situation was marked by presidential elections in December.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

In 2018, in southern and south eastern districts of Madagascar, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 and above peaked at 1.52 million during the January to March 2018 lean season. This accounted for half of the population analysed and included 392 000 (13 percent) in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) and 1.13 million (38 percent) in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3). An additional 668 000 people (22 percent) were in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2).

The situation slightly improved between March and June 2018 - the end of the lean season and start of the main harvest - when just over a million needed urgent assistance, including around 350 000 people in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4).³⁴² This positive trend prevailed in the August–October 2018 period, which corresponds to post-harvest and early lean season. Compared to the same period the previous year, food security was better in most districts, in particular in the South East (Taolagnaro, Vangaindrano and Farafangana), while it deteriorated in parts of the South (Ampanihy and Beloha).³⁴³

Late 2018 was marked by a deterioration coinciding with the beginning of the lean season with 1.3 million people (28 percent of the population analysed) in IPC Phase 3 or above, including 366 000 in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4). The most affected areas were southern districts (Beloha, Ampanihy, Tsihombe and Ambovombe, Betsioky, Bekily, Amboasary and parts of Taolagnaro).

341 WFP. Country overview.


342 Analyse IPC Grand Sud et Grand Sud Est de Madagascar, June 9, 2018.

343 Analyse IPC pour le Grand Sud, le Grand Sud Est et la côte Est de Madagascar, October 23, 2018.



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Figure 17 Madagascar, Number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 2 or above in 2017–2018*



Note: This graphs only reflects the acute food insecurity situation in 13 districts that are common across the 2017-2018 IPC analyses
Source: Madagascar IPC Technical Working Group

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY


Climate shocks

Following a prolonged period of dry weather conditions between December 2017 and April 2018, staple food production in 2018 fell to well below-average levels in southern and south-western regions, where food insecurity is most prevalent.³⁴⁴

Both the minor and main harvests were affected. In the southern districts of Betsioky and Ampanihy (Atsimo Andrefana region), there were reports of total crop

344 WFP Madagascar External Situation Report, October 2018

Map 30 Madagascar (southern and south-eastern), IPC Acute food insecurity situation, November 2017-March 2018



Source: Madagascar IPC Technical Working Group, October 2017

failure,³⁴⁵ while in the regions of Androy and Anosy, production of maize and cassava decreased significantly compared to the five-year average.

Rainfall deficits remained significant in the region between July and October 2018, thereby delaying pasture regeneration and affecting livestock conditions.³⁴⁶

The seasonal rainfall deficits also had critical impacts on pasture availability, resulting in a deterioration in livestock body conditions, as well as reduced herd sizes, conception rates and milk production.³⁴⁷

In addition to the dry conditions, tropical cyclones Ava (January 2018) and Eliakim (March 2018), which mostly affected central and eastern regions, caused flood-induced crop losses, affecting both food staples and cash

345 FEWS NET Key Message Update, May 2018.
 346 FAO/WFP Mission d'Évaluation des Récoltes et de la Sécurité Alimentaire, December 21, 2018.
 347 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook, December 2018.

crops. Nationally, cyclones Ava and Eliakim collectively affected over 212 000 people and displaced 74 000.³⁴⁸

Outbreaks of fall armyworm in several regions also caused crop losses, mostly affecting maize.³⁴⁹

The poor state of rural infrastructures, lack of seeds and access to fertilizers and limited use of technologies further expose farmers and rural households to climatic shocks.

Economic shocks

Chiefly as a result of reduced supplies, prices of rice, the main food staple, reached record highs at the start of 2018, severely limiting food access. The elevated price levels particularly affected households that had experienced consecutive years of reduced harvests, which had eroded their coping capacities.³⁵⁰

Maize prices were also at high levels during most of the year in southern regions. For instance, in November 2018, the price of white maize grain was 40 percent higher than the two-year average and 75 percent above 2017 levels in Ambovombe district (Androy region).³⁵¹


Following the low harvests in 2018, households exhausted their food stocks by August, resulting in an earlier-than-normal dependency on market supplies, heightening households' vulnerabilities to sharp price gains. Many households were forced to sell livestock and engage in survival strategies to obtain food, further eroding livelihoods.³⁵² At the end of 2018 currency depreciation and rising fuel prices also contributed to raising the cost of transporting food, adding inflationary pressure and affecting households' access to food.³⁵³

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The nutritional situation in the south remained concerning. SMART surveys conducted in February and March 2018 in four southern districts (Amboasary, Ampanihy, Beloha and Tsihombe) showed a GAM prevalence ranging from 7.1 percent in Tsihombe to 12.9 percent in Amboasary, with the prevalence of SAM reaching 3.1 percent in Amboasary. These results indicate no significant improvements since the 2017 results, except for the district of Beloha, where there was

348 SADC Madagascar Vulnerability Assessment Committee results 2018, July 2018.
 349 FEWS NET Key Message Update, March 2018.
 350 Analyse IPC Grand Sud et Grand Sud Est de Madagascar, June 9, 2018.
 351 FEWS NET Southern Africa Price Bulletin, December 2018.
 352 Ibid.
 353 FEWS NET Madagascar Food Security Outlook, December 2018-May 2019

Map 31 Madagascar, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, November 2018-March 2019



Source: Madagascar IPC Technical Working Group, October 2018

a slight improvement.³⁵⁴

Chronic malnutrition rates were also reported to be high ranging from 28 percent in Ampanihy to 41 percent in Amboasary.

In the south-east, a SMART survey conducted in April 2018 showed that the prevalence of GAM reached 10.4 percent in Nosy Varika. Chronic malnutrition rates were above 45 percent in Farafangana, Mananjary, Nosy Varika and Vangaindrano.

In 2018, according to a newly piloted Nutrition Surveillance System, 20 234 children were acutely

malnourished in the eight drought-prone southern districts (Betioky Atsimo, Ampanihy Ouest, Beloha, Bekily, Tsihombe, Ambovombe-Androy, Amboasary Atsimo, Taolagnaro). Of these, 1 419 were suffering from SAM.³⁵⁵

Factors affecting malnutrition in these eight districts included inadequate access to diverse and nutrient-rich foods; poor access to improved water sources; high levels of food insecurity; high prevalence of diseases such as diarrhoea and malaria; lack of access to health services, including maternal health; and suboptimal breastfeeding practices.³⁵⁶

354 Southern Africa Food and Nutrition Security Working Group Bulletin, April 2018


355 Humanitarian snapshot: malnutrition, August to November 2018 (OCHA)

356 National survey 2012-2013

MALAWI

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of difference in population analysed and improved cereal production in comparison with the disastrous 2016 harvest.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Economic shocks

- Prolonged dry spells cut maize production, particularly in southern and central Malawi – nationally the maize harvest was expected to be 19 percent below 2017.
- Poor farming households generally lack resources to cope and recover from increasingly frequent and intense weather events.
- Having depleted their food stocks households increased their reliance on market purchases earlier than normal.
- Decreased production pushed up maize prices, squeezing household food access, which was already limited by dwindling income sources and low wage rates.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



100 000 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **35 000** affected by SAM.

Cluster response plan, 2018-19



8% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2015-16



13% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS 2015-16



Poor maternal nutrition and education, child morbidity, lack of sanitation and dietary diversity, and poor access to healthcare drove malnutrition.



61% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2015-16



37% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

DHS 2015-16

DISPLACEMENT



22 970 refugees and asylum-seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo hosted in Malawi; **3 000** asylum-seekers from Mozambique hosted in Malawi.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



Remittances to Malawi have almost tripled between 2003 and 2017 and represented almost one percent of the GDP in 2017.

UNACTD, Nov 2018

BACKGROUND

Over the last decade Malawi has experienced a high burden of humanitarian food and nutrition needs. Even during a good year (2014/2015) 1.3 million people were in need of food assistance, escalating to 6.7 million in 2015/2016 (El Niño year). Over 80 percent of Malawians are smallholder farmers,³⁵⁷ practising rain-fed agriculture, making them highly vulnerable to climate shocks. With a poverty rate of 38 percent,³⁵⁸ households lack the resources to cope with and recover from consecutive shocks, which can significantly erode their resilience and further increase their vulnerabilities to hazards.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Approximately 3.3 million people (22 percent of the population analysed) needed urgent humanitarian food assistance between October and December 2018 to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition. Of these, 2.9 million faced *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and approximately 449 000 faced *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) conditions. A very high number of people (5 million) were in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) with minimally adequate food consumption.

This reflects a deterioration of the acute food security situation as the year progressed towards the lean season: in July the number of people in IPC Phase 3 and above was 2.2 million.

The situation was worse in the 12 southern districts. In nine districts (Balaka, Blantyre, Chikhwawa, Mangochi, Mulanje, Mwanza, Neno and Nsanje) around one in three people were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4).

This figure marks an improvement compared to the previous year, when the number of food insecure people in need of urgent action peaked at 5.1 million from January–March and the same October–December period in 2016 when there were 6.7 million people in Phase 3 and above.³⁵⁹




© WFP/BADRE BAHAJI

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

Cereal production shortfalls, mostly reflecting unfavourable rains in central and southern districts,³⁶⁰ was the primary factor driving food insecurity in 2018; weather-reduced harvests are typically cited as one of the main determinants of food shortages for households.³⁶¹

Figure 18 Malawi, Number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 2 or above in 2017-2019



Source: Malawi IPC Technical Working Group

357 USAID Malawi Agriculture and Food Security (Accessed March 2019)

358 Ibid

359 FSIN. GRFC 2017

360 The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification and Forecast, Bulletin no. 15/18 Vol.1

361 Republic of Malawi National Statistical Office, Integrated Household Panel Survey 2016

Map 32 Malawi, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, October 2018-March 2019



Source: Malawi IPC Technical Working Group, August 2018

At the national level, production of maize, the main food staple, was estimated at below-average, down 19 percent from the bumper harvest of 2017.³⁶² The largest production shortfalls were estimated in central and southern districts, prompting an atypically early start to the lean season by September with households increasing their reliance on market purchases earlier than normal. In the southern region, households were estimated to have 3-4 months of food stock from own production for consumption, while in the central region households were expected to have about nine months.³⁶³ As a result, poorer households engaged in multiple coping strategies, including reducing food consumption, increasing livestock sales, as well as increasing the intensity and frequency of other income generating activities, such as selling firewood and charcoal.³⁶⁴

Economic shocks

Although low prices of maize were registered at the start of 2018, they began increasing from the second quarter of the year and by November the national average maize price was 25 percent higher on a yearly basis.³⁶⁵ These higher prices, mostly the result of the decrease in production and consequent supply pressure, diminished households' food access and further aggravated food insecurity. Household incomes were also estimated at below-average levels in 2018, reflecting lower crop sales, as well as a decline in agricultural and non-agricultural labour opportunities.³⁶⁶

Food assistance in late October-beginning of November 2018 helped foster a short-term improvement in food security outcomes. However, there were delays in the continuation of interventions.³⁶⁷

Malawi is also hosting more than 23 000 refugees, primarily from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, the majority of whom are dependent on humanitarian assistance to meet their daily food needs.³⁶⁸

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The SMART survey conducted in January/February 2018 in seven livelihood zones indicated that the GAM rate during the peak of the lean season was 1.3 percent, a decrease from 2.2 percent in May 2017 and 4.1 percent in the lean period of December 2016.

This survey also collected information on adolescents' and adults' nutritional status, showing that underweight was at four percent among adolescents and at 5.3 percent among adults, suggesting a greater burden of undernutrition in older age groups. Increasing rates of overweight (4.4 percent among adolescents and 16.3 percent among adults) were also reported, showing that over-nutrition may be a bigger problem than acute malnutrition in these population groups.³⁶⁹ Micronutrient deficiencies are also prevalent among preschool children with 28 percent showing iron deficiency and more than 60 percent zinc deficiency.³⁷⁰ The most recent data on stunting, reported in the DHS 2015-2016, showed a very high rate at 37 percent.

Factors contributing to the high rates of stunting in Malawi included low birth weight, poor maternal nutrition, low levels of maternal education, child morbidity, lack of sanitation, lack of dietary diversity in under-fives, and poor access to healthcare.³⁷¹ The DHS 2015-16 found that nearly eight in 10 rural women in Malawi reported at least one problem accessing health care.

According to the 2018 SMART survey the morbidity rate was high, at 56 percent among children aged 6 to 59 months and just 11 percent of under-fives were given a minimum acceptable diet. An additional challenge for malnutrition is the high rates of HIV infection among adults (8.8 percent).³⁷²

362 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development, Malawi, 2018

363 FEWS NET

364 Ibid

365 WFP Southern Africa Region Monthly Food Price Update November 2018

366 FEWS NET Malawi Food Security Outlook, June 2018

367 FEWS NET Malawi Key Message Update November 2018

368 UNHCR Operational Portal - Refugee Situations Democratic Republic of the Congo/Mozambique December 2018 (consulted 20 March 2019)

369 SMART 2018. Malawi Ministry of Health. Report of seven nutrition surveys conducted in flood and drought affected livelihood zones of Malawi. January-February 2018

370 DHS 2015/2016


371 Ibid

372 WFP Malawi Country Brief. November 2018

MOZAMBIQUE

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of difference of population analyzed and slight increase in aggregate cereal production compared to the 2017 harvest.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Natural hazards



Economic shocks

- Late onset of rains, dry spells and erratic rainfall caused cereal production shortfalls in southern and central semi-arid areas.
- The impact of poor rains was compounded by plant pest attacks and diseases.
- Many households exhausted their cereal stocks earlier than normal, reaching 78 percent of households in central Tete.

- While stable in the first half of 2018, prices of staple cereals began to increase from August.
- Many vulnerable households had lost most of their livelihood assets during the 2015/16 El Niño drought and were still recovering.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



34 200 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **5 700** affected by SAM.

IPC, Apr 2018



14.5% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2011



49% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS, 2011



Low dietary diversity, poor child feeding practices, lack of safe water and in some areas, high prevalence of malaria, diarrheal disease, and HIV underscore malnutrition.



41% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2011



43% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

National Survey, 2013

DISPLACEMENT



15 100 persons are internally displaced.

UNHCR, Aug 2018



Around **27 000** refugees and asylum-seekers mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Somalia and Rwanda.

UNHCR, Aug 2018



8 000 Mozambicans have returned spontaneously from Malawi since 2016.

UNHCR, Aug 2018

BACKGROUND

Ranked 180 out of 189 countries on the 2018 UN Human Development Index, Mozambique registered years of robust economic growth following the end of the 16-year-long civil war in 1992. This helped reduce poverty rates - but about half the population still lives below the national poverty line.³⁷³ Since 2016, the country experienced an economic downturn: rising prices were not matched by increasing incomes. Although it is now emerging from this period of volatility, high inequality continues to impede inclusive growth.³⁷⁴ Mozambique is one of world's most disaster-prone countries, with floods, cyclones and droughts. An estimated 25 percent of the population face mortality risks from such events.³⁷⁵

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

From September-December 2018, about 1.78 million people were classified in IPC Phase 3 and above, with over 1.3 million in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and 0.4 million in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) and required urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition.³⁷⁶ A very large number of people (7.8 million) were in *Stressed* (Phase 2).

Gaza province was the hardest hit with more than 20 percent of its population in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and above, accounting for 318 000 people. Most other provinces were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2). These numbers reflect a deterioration of the food security situation in the second half of 2018 compared to early 2018, largely as a result of lower agricultural production.

Overall, the food security situation in 2018 improved compared with 2017, which was marked by the prolonged impact of the 2015-2016 El Niño drought felt in the first quarter of 2017.



FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

In 2018, overall cereal production was estimated to have increased slightly to an above-average level of 3.1 million tonnes. Most of the growth was related to production increases in the northern and central provinces. However, in the south and parts of the centre, and particularly in Gaza, Inhambane and Tete provinces, the late onset of the rains, dry spells and erratic rainfall during the cropping season combined with plants pests and diseases, resulted in production shortfalls that worsened the food security situation.^{377, 378} Consequently, a significant proportion of households were expected to have exhausted their cereal stocks earlier than normal, adversely affecting food access.

According to a government-led household survey in four of the most affected provinces, 65 percent of households in southern Gaza and 78 percent of households in central Tete were reported to have no maize stocks as of May 2018.³⁷⁹ Throughout the country, surveys conducted in August to September 2018 showed that only about half of households had maize reserves and of them about half expected to have depleted them within three months, by October to December 2018.

The worst-affected areas were in the interior districts of Gaza. Although households in these areas are normally able to engage in off-season crop production using irrigation systems, reduced summer rains lowered

373 The World Bank. 2015. Poverty & Equity Data Portal

374 World Bank, 2018

375 UNDP Mozambique In-Depth


376 Mozambique IPC Technical Working Group. October 2018.

377 GIEWS June 2018

378 SADC RVAA Synthesis report July 2018

379 Ibid

Map 33 Mozambique, IPC acute food insecurity situation, October 2017-March 2018 (projected)



Source: Mozambique IPC Technical Working Group, August 2017

production prospects, diminishing possibilities of augmenting food supplies later in the year.³⁸⁰

Economic shocks

Following a period of stability in the first half of 2018, prices of staple cereals began to increase from August onwards, pushing prices to levels above the preceding year. These higher prices were expected to have constrained food access, with families having to resort

380 GIEWS June 2018

to negative coping strategies such as reducing food consumption.³⁸¹ However, overall adequate national cereal supplies and a generally stable exchange rate helped to buffer inflationary pressures, curbing further price rises.³⁸²

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Based on a March/April 2018 nutrition assessment,³⁸³ the overall prevalence of GAM was below five percent with the exception of Namuno district in Cabo Delgado, which recorded a GAM prevalence of 6.4 percent, indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.³⁸⁴

A Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (VAA) carried out by SETSAN between April and May in 36 districts affected by drought and crop pests concluded that from June 2018 more than 34 000 children were suffering from acute malnutrition in Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala and Tete.³⁸⁵ This number was likely to be higher since the VAA did not cover all food-insecure districts, and food security was expected to further deteriorate during the lean season (October/November-March).

Chronic malnutrition is a serious concern in Mozambique: 43 percent of children under the age of five are stunted, rising to more than 50 percent in the northern region.³⁸⁶

Immediate causes of malnutrition include low dietary diversity, poor breastfeeding and child feeding practices, and in some areas, high prevalence of malaria, diarrheal disease and HIV. Anaemia is also a major health problem, affecting 69 percent of children aged 6-59 months and 54 percent of women of reproductive age across the country.³⁸⁷ Only 45 percent of children with undernutrition are estimated to be receiving proper health care.³⁸⁸

Water and sanitation services are poor: according to the DHS 2011 just 51 percent of people had access to improved drinking water and 22 percent had access to improved sanitation. The number of cases of cholera was lower in 2018 (863 cases) than in 2017 when there were 3 274 cases.³⁸⁹

381 FEWS NET Key Messages Update November 2018

382 GIEWS June 2018

383 Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN)

384 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook December, 2018

385 WFP country brief, June 2018


386 DHS 2011, SETSAN Baseline Study 2013

387 DHS 2011

388 WFP Insight, June 2017

389 UN Children's Fund Bulletin: cholera and AWD Outbreaks in Eastern and Southern Africa-Regional update December 2017 and 2018

Map 34 Mozambique, IPC acute food insecurity situation, September-December 2018




(Phase 1) Minimal
 (Phase 2) Stressed
 (Phase3) Crisis
 (Phase4) Emergency
 (Phase 5) Famine
 Not mapped

! Would likely be at least one phase worse without current or programmed humanitarian assistance
 Lakes
 Parks and reserves

Source: Mozambique IPC Technical Working Group, October 2018

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **decreased** – but surveys are not comparable as eight districts covered in 2018 vs four in 2017.

2019 FORECAST

High vulnerability to climate shocks combined with poor access to inputs may lead to **stable or increasing** numbers of food-insecure people in need of urgent action.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks

- Drought/drought-like conditions have prevailed since 2013 in arid south-eastern and western areas.



Economic shocks

- No water for irrigation plus poor access to seeds, fertilizer, tools and credit have led to five years of crop failures.

- Lack of water and fodder, and diseases, have resulted in deaths and distress sales of livestock.

- Reliance on unstable, low-income livelihoods – daily wage labour, sharecropping and sale of livestock products.

- Food prices in December 2018 were higher than year-earlier levels.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



473 000 children under five years acutely malnourished, and needing emergency lifesaving nutrition interventions.

NNS 2018



9% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

MICS 2014



34% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

LFS 2017



Very poor quality of food, high prevalence of diseases and poor sanitation are critical issues in drought-affected districts.



29% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

MICS 2014



48% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

MICS 2014

DISPLACEMENT



Over **63 000** Afghan refugees registered in Sindh.

UNHCR, Dec 2018


BACKGROUND

Sindh, one of the four provinces of Pakistan, is in the south-east of the country and the third largest province of Pakistan by area, and second largest by population after Punjab. It is prone to multiple hazards including floods and drought. Although Sindh has not experienced a major flood since 2015, drought/drought-like conditions have been prevailing since 2013 in the arid south-eastern and western areas of the province, resulting in successive crop failures and significant livestock losses, with severe consequences for the livelihoods of the local population.³⁹⁰ While nearly 55 percent of Pakistan's rural population is poor based on the multidimensional poverty index (MPI),³⁹¹ poverty levels are even higher in Sindh where 76 percent of the rural population is multi-dimensionally poor.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Almost half (46 percent) of households were moderately food insecure and more than a third (36 percent) severely food insecure, according to the Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI). Prevalence of food insecurity was higher among households in desert/arid areas and women-headed households.³⁹²

The majority of surveyed households had either poor or borderline food consumption: 18 percent had acceptable food consumption, 41 percent poor consumption and another 41 percent borderline.



© WFP/SILKE BUHR

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

In early December 2018, the Pakistan Meteorological Department released a drought alert indicating that parts of Sindh (and Balochistan) provinces were experiencing moderate to severe drought conditions due to persistent below-average rainfall. As of October 2018, irrigation water supplies for the "Rabi" crops were estimated to be 40 percent below the previous 10-year average, according to the Indus River System Authority (IRSA).³⁹³

The Sindh Drought Needs Assessment was conducted by the Natural Disaster Consortium (NDC)³⁹⁴ in collaboration with the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) Sindh in early October 2018 in 69 villages (Dehs), affected by drought in eight districts, namely, Tharparkar, Umerkot, Sanghar, Thatta, Badin, Jamshoro, Dadu and Kambar Shahdadkot.

390 FAO GIEWS country brief


391 MPI was calculated from 15 indicators related to education, health and standard of living. The latest MPI was based on Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) survey conducted in 2014-15

392 Sindh Drought Needs Assessment Report using CARI, Jan 2019

393 FAO GIEWS country brief

394 Natural Disasters Consortium (NDC) is composed of IOM, FAO, UNICEF, ACTED, HANDS. WFP provided technical support

Map 35 Pakistan - Sindh Province, drought notified areas



Source: Natural Disasters Consortium, January 2019

In 2017-18 wheat, sorghum and rice production was 23-25 percent below that of 2016-17 and pulses 95 percent lower. Own production of cereals for household consumption was only sufficient for about 2.8 months. Half of farming households reported water not being available at all for agriculture, while 30 percent reported less water availability than in 2017.

Besides lack of water to irrigate crops, farming households face lack of access to high-yielding seeds, fertilizer, agricultural services, tools and credit. The drought led to the deaths and distress sales of livestock because of diseases, lack of water and fodder. Some 96 percent of surveyed livestock-holders reported lack of fodder for animals, 89 percent reported lack of drinking water, and 83 percent livestock diseases.

Economic shocks

The primary sources of livelihood/income of surveyed households include non-agricultural wage labour, followed by sale of agriculture produce and sale of livestock/livestock products. Sale of agricultural produce reduced over the six months preceding the survey, particularly in desert/arid areas. Average monthly income of surveyed households fell by 11 percent between April and October 2018. Women-headed households had lower average monthly income than those headed by men.³⁹⁵

The surveyed households spent a major proportion of their income on food purchases, compromising their spending on other basic needs such as healthcare. Overall, 36 percent spent a very high share (more than 75 percent of total household expenditure) on food, while 31 percent spent a high share (65-75 percent of total expenditure) on food.³⁹⁶

Prices of wheat grain and wheat flour, the country's main staples, increased for the fifth consecutive month in December 2018, reflecting seasonally tightening market availabilities and strong exports in recent months. Overall, prices in December 2018 were higher than their year-earlier levels.³⁹⁷

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

According to preliminary results from the 2018 National Nutrition Survey (NNS) around 473 000 children under five in the eight drought-affected districts were acutely malnourished and need emergency lifesaving nutrition interventions.

All districts except one had acute malnutrition rates above the 15 percent emergency threshold, and in four of them wasting prevalence surpassed 20 percent. In the Umerkot and Tharparker districts the acute malnutrition rate increased from 18 percent to 29 percent and 23 percent respectively from the IPC analysis of 2017.³⁹⁸ Severe acute malnutrition rates were also very high, estimated at 10 percent and 12 percent in Badin and Kambar districts respectively.

The main factors contributing to acute malnutrition included very poor food consumption with the majority of households with low dietary diversity, high prevalence of diseases (over 80 percent among children under five years of age), and poor sanitation infrastructures (more than four out of five households within the eight districts do not have access to a toilet).

Access to healthcare was also critical in these districts, with households reporting challenges as long distance to healthcare facilities, poor road infrastructure, lack of transport and high cost of services. Low availability of medical equipment and staff were cited as important limitations to appropriate healthcare.

395 Sindh Drought Needs Assessment Report Jan 2019

396 Ibid


397 FAO GIEWS country brief

398 IPC: Pakistan: Acute Malnutrition Situation April-June 2017 and Projection for July-September 2017

PALESTINE

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of food-insecure people in need of urgent action **remained stable** mainly as a result of the protracted crises and recurrent conflict

2019 FORECAST

Needs in food security and livelihood support will remain significant.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Economic shocks



Displacement

- After a decline in recent years, violence increased in 2018, resulting in Palestinian casualties and damaged property.
- The 11-year blockade and three escalations of conflict in about a decade in Gaza have severely damaged the economy, infrastructure, livelihoods and public services.

- Unemployment reached its highest levels in two decades at 54 percent in Gaza during the second quarter of 2018.
- High levels of poverty (46 percent in Gaza) and indebtedness limited households' ability to afford basic food and living needs.
- Farmers and herders are denied access to fertile and grazing lands, and they lack control over and access to water resources.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



1.2% children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **0.3%** affected by SAM.

MICS 2014



40% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

MICS 2014



38% of households have access to improved water (35% in the West Bank versus 90% in Gaza Strip) (MICS 2014).

MICS 2014



Increased electricity cuts have disrupted access to safe water and sanitation and delivery of health services.



39% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

MICS 2014



7% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (2.5- <10% = low).

MICS, 2014

DISPLACEMENT



16 500 persons remained internally displaced in Gaza.

OCHA, Dec 2018



2.2M refugees, including 1.36 million in Gaza.

OCHA, Dec 2018



More than **5.4M** Palestinian refugees were registered in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, West Bank, and in the Gaza Strip in 2018, in addition to almost **580 000** other registered Palestinians.

UNRWA, Jan 2018

BACKGROUND

Palestine's protracted humanitarian crisis continues to cause repeated shocks, restrictions on movement of people and goods, limited productive capacities and lack of economic opportunities that have reduced the resilience of families and their capacity to cope.³⁹⁹ Following Israel's 11-year blockade of the Gaza Strip, the economy has spiralled downwards with high levels of unemployment and poverty.⁴⁰⁰ Palestinians continue to face complex political, socio-economic and development issues and high dependency on humanitarian assistance.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

According to the 2018 Socio-Economic and Food Security Sector Survey (SEFSec), approximately 1.7 million Palestinians (32.5 percent of the population) were severely or moderately food insecure. Food insecurity levels continued to be alarmingly high in Gaza where 68 percent of households were severely or moderately food insecure, in contrast to 12 percent in the West Bank.⁴⁰¹ Comparing with the 2013 SEFSec Survey, the prevalence of food insecurity in the West Bank was 18.6 percent (a reduction of seven percentage points in 2018) and 61 percent in Gaza (an increase in 7.5 percentage points). Food insecurity increased particularly in Hebron, the Middle Area and Rafah governorates with over 20 000 more people becoming food insecure in each governorate.⁴⁰²

In 2018, there were about 1.4 million Palestine registered refugees residing in Gaza, and around 837 000 in the West Bank. Palestine refugees accounted for 43 percent of the total population - or 70 percent of the population of Gaza and 33 percent of the population of the West Bank. In Gaza, 67 percent of refugees and 70 percent of non-refugees were food-insecure, and in the West Bank 11 percent of refugees and 14 percent of non-refugees were food-insecure.⁴⁰³

Other populations particularly vulnerable to food insecurity included female-headed households and pregnant and lactating women. Farmers and herders were also vulnerable because of their exposure to conflict and dependence on small-scale production to meet their food needs.⁴⁰⁴

399 PCBS, The Levels Of Living In Palestine, 2017

400 HNO 2019 Palestine

401 HNO 2019 Palestine using CARI


402 HNO 2019 Palestine and HNO 2018 Palestine (comparing figures between different governorates).

403 SEFsec 2018 Preliminary Results PCBS Ramallah, 10th December 2018

404 HNO 2019 Palestine




Figure 19 Palestine, Number of people (millions) in 2017-2018



Source: WFP

Map 36 Palestine, Number of food insecure people by governorate, 2018



Source: WFP, 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

The economy, infrastructure, livelihoods and public services have all been severely damaged by the three escalations of conflict in the Gaza strip since late 2008. Although the economic situation in the West Bank was not as dire as Gaza, the demolition of residential, livelihood and service infrastructure, on the grounds of a lack of Israeli-issued permits, continued throughout the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem.⁴⁰⁵

The agricultural sector, which accounts for about 6.7 percent of Palestinian employment,⁴⁰⁶ has been greatly compromised by the conflict. Farmers and herders have been denied access to fertile grazing lands, and they lack control over and access to water resources.⁴⁰⁷

405 HNO 2019 Palestine

406 PCBS. Percentage Distribution of Employed Individuals Aged 15 Years and Above from Palestine by Sex, Economic Activity and Place of Work. 2017.

407 UNCTAD. The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector, 2015.

Economic shocks

The poverty rate across Palestine was estimated at about 24 percent, with a large disparity seen between Gaza (46 percent) and the West Bank (nine percent).⁴⁰⁸ According to a survey conducted by WFP in November 2018, 59 percent of beneficiary households in Gaza had an average debt of about 5 100 USD and 66 percent of households in the West Bank reported an average debt of about 4 500 USD, borrowed from family and friends for electricity and food.⁴⁰⁹

Unemployment reached its highest levels in two decades in 2018. In Gaza, the unemployment rate was 54 percent in the second quarter of the year, substantially higher than the relatively stable rate of about 18 percent in the West Bank over the past five years.⁴¹⁰ With heads of households in Gaza and the West Bank reporting an average of 6.4 and 8.8 days of work in the month of November 2018, households were only earning an average of 177 USD in Gaza and 320 USD in the West Bank.⁴¹¹

In Gaza, power cuts of 18-20 hours a day impeded the delivery of basic services and crippled productive activity. The coastal aquifer, Gaza's sole water source, has been virtually depleted by over-extraction and the intrusion of seawater, forcing the people to buy trucked water, often of poor quality, at up to 20 times the expense of water from the network.⁴¹²

Although food prices did not increase much in Palestine overall in 2018 (by 0.01 percent between June 2017 and June 2018⁴¹³), persistent poverty, low purchasing power and debt have limited households' ability to afford their basic food and living needs. Consequently, households reported using negative coping strategies to compensate for the gap in their food needs, even for those receiving food assistance.⁴¹⁴

DISPLACEMENT

There are 1.4 million Palestine refugees⁴¹⁵ in Gaza, representing 70 percent of the total Gaza population, and almost 837 000 in the West Bank, representing 33 percent of the total population. Poverty levels are rising and the number of refugees requiring food assistance has been continuously increasing. Challenges are particularly acute for the nearly 253 245 Palestine refugees who reside in the 19 refugee camps in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.⁴¹⁶

Around 16 500 people remain internally displaced since the 2014 conflict in Gaza. With Gaza's restricted movement of people and goods, widespread loss of livelihoods from the 2014 crisis and the recent water and electricity shortage crisis, the number of refugees requiring humanitarian assistance, including for food, has increased.⁴¹⁷

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The rates of acute malnutrition among children under five are very low (1.2 percent), rising slightly to 1.7 percent in the West Bank. Stunting is also low at 7.4 percent.⁴¹⁸

The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO 2019) reports that 92 430 children under the age of five remain vulnerable to micronutrient deficiencies and illness, including about 10 000 cases of rickets and 36 000 cases of watery or bloody diarrhoea, due to the sewage crisis and deteriorating access to safe drinking water.⁴¹⁹ Recurrent conflict has damaged water and sanitation infrastructure and delivery. Electricity cuts also disrupt access to safe water and sanitation and interrupt delivery of health services.

408 World Bank. 2018. Economic Outlook October 2018. 2016/2017 poverty rates

409 WFP. 2018. Palestine Country Brief November 2018

410 World Bank. 2018. Economic Outlook October 2018

411 WFP. 2018. Country Brief November 2018

412 HNO 2019

413 MAS 2018. Food Security Bulletin Summer 2018

414 WFP Palestine Country Brief November 2018

415 Palestine refugees are defined as "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict." <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>

416 HNO 2019

417 Ibid


418 UNICEF MICS survey 2014

419 HNO 2019 Palestine

SOMALIA

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of partial recovery from the devastation caused by drought, despite floods, insecurity and localized inter-communal conflict.

2019 FORECAST

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **decrease** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION

- Conflict/insecurity
- Climate shocks
- Displacement

- The 2016/17 poor rains were followed in 2018 by the heaviest April-June rains in nearly two decades in southern and central regions, destructive flooding, cyclones and dry spells.
- An escalation in armed conflict, attacks by Al-Shabaab, disputes over borders, resources and revenues, and unresolved clan grievances restricted food access.
- Poor "deyr" rains resulted in deteriorating livestock body

conditions and limited animal reproduction in central and northern areas, thus curbing the 2016/17 drought recovery.

- Poor rainfall and pest infestations resulted in a well below-average Gu-Karan cereal harvest in northwestern areas and an estimated below-average Deyr national output.
- Armed clashes, flooding, militia roadblocks and violent incidents against humanitarian actors limited access to those most in need.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS

95 400 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **173 600** affected by SAM.

HNO, 2019

9% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

Somali IYCNA, 2011

41% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

JMP, 2015

Poor health services and health seeking behaviours, suboptimal IYCF practices, and the difficulties in accessing safe water further aggravated the nutrition situation.

33% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

Somali IYCNA, 2016

10% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (2.5-<10% = low).

FSNAU, 2016

DISPLACEMENT

1.6M displaced because of drought since Nov 2016 and **1.1M** in protracted displacement.

OCHA, Dec 2018

33 100 refugee and asylum seekers - mainly from Ethiopia and Yemen.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

87 500 returnees mainly from Kenya and Yemen.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

Over the past 20 years, Somalia has endured violence, political instability and environmental and economic shocks resulting in acute hunger and malnutrition. Most state services ceased in the 1990s, affecting education, health and food production. Since 2012, Somalia has slowly emerged from a “failed” to a “fragile” state with the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). In 2013, the FGS and the international community endorsed the ‘New Deal for Somalia’ aiming to rebuild the country, stabilize institutions and develop the federal state.⁴²⁰ Many political, social and economic challenges remain. Half of Somalis live in poverty.⁴²¹ In 2016 and 2017, a drought led to large-scale food insecurity, affecting more than six million people, although humanitarian assistance prevented many households from facing catastrophic conditions.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

According to the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis conducted in January 2018, between February and June 2018 an estimated 2.7 million people were in IPC Phase 3 and above in the absence of humanitarian food assistance (HFA). Of these 2.2 million were in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and 496 000 in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4). Even though this was estimated excluding the mitigating effects of planned HFA, the 2018 peak number in IPC Phases 3 and 4 represents a slight decrease compared with the July 2017 peak figure of 3.3 million when the country was in the grip of a severe drought.


Another 2.7 million Somalis were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) between February and June 2018, and required livelihood support to prevent future food security deterioration.

Of greatest concern were pastoralist areas in northern parts of Awdal and Woqooyi Galbeed regions, in southern parts of Sanaag region, and in eastern parts of Mudug and Galgaduud regions, where *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity were likely through June.

For the period August–December 2018, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 and above was expected to drop to 1.6 million in the absence of HFA. However, pressing humanitarian needs persisted among 17 000 people estimated to be facing *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) levels of food insecurity.




Figure 20 Somalia, Number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 2 or above in 2016-2018



Source: Somalia IPC Technical Working Group

420 WFP Somali country brief

421 World Bank

Map 37 Somalia, IPC acute food insecurity situation, February-June 2018

Source: Somalia IPC Technical Working Group, January 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

Recovery from the devastation caused by drought that spanned four consecutive rainy seasons in 2016 and 2017 has been challenged by intense climatic events. The April-June “gu” season rains were the heaviest in nearly two decades in southern and some central regions, triggering riverine and flash flooding in low-lying areas. By June, flooding had affected 830 000 people and displaced 290 000.⁴²² In May, Cyclone Sagar brought torrential rainfall and flooding to the north-west along the coast of Puntland and flash flooding in the Bari region, resulting in livestock deaths, mass displacement and the destruction of farms, property and infrastructure, including roads, fishing boats, medical facilities, boreholes and water wells. Later, in these areas, the August-September “karan” rainy season was

characterized by an erratic distribution and in the north-western agro-pastoral Woqooyi Galbeed region, the 2018 “gu/karan” harvest was about 55 percent below average, also due to pest infestations.⁴²³

Although floods caused crop losses, in riverine areas they induced farmers to expand plantings of off-season crops harvested in September and boosted yields in rain-fed areas. As a result the cereal output was estimated at almost 60 percent above the average of the previous five years.⁴²⁴


Acute food insecurity remained prevalent among pastoralist households who lost most of their animals during the 2016-2017 drought, among those affected by the April-May flooding and others who were affected by large-scale and protracted displacement due to a combination of conflict and natural hazards. However, for agro-pastoralist households food security improved substantially following the heavy “gu” rains, which regenerated rangeland resources, boosting livestock

422 OCHA. Somalia Humanitarian Snapshot. June 2018.

423 FAO GIEWS. Country Brief - Somalia November 2018

424 Ibid

Map 38 Somalia, IPC acute food insecurity situation, August-December 2018



Source: Somalia IPC Technical Working Group, August 2018

body conditions and allowing animal conception and reproduction. By contrast, in most central and northern regions, where the moisture surpluses accumulated during the “gu” season were less substantial, pasture and water were not sufficient, and livestock body conditions deteriorated.

Conflict/insecurity

For almost three decades, conflict has hampered humanitarian access to people in most urgent need, and restricted the ability of Somalis to support themselves economically.⁴²⁵

Between July and November 2018 armed conflict escalated in several parts of Somalia. Resource- and clan-based conflicts were reported in Lower Shabelle region, northern Sool, Galgaduud, Sanaag and Bari regions. In southern Somalia military clashes between insurgents and the government of Somalia and allied African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continued.⁴²⁶ In the

Middle Juba region clashes in July and August disrupted agricultural operations and caused a sharp decline in labour opportunities and wage rates.⁴²⁷

An increasing number of illegal checkpoints manned by armed clan militias block road access and since the beginning of 2018, 90 violent incidents against humanitarian actors were reported, including the deaths of eight workers.⁴²⁸

DISPLACEMENT

During the first 11 months of 2018 there were 858 000 newly displaced people, with the total IDP caseload estimated at 2.6 million IDPs as of July 31.⁴²⁹ Meanwhile Somali refugees continued to return from countries of asylum with over 87 000 refugees having returned from countries including Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti and Libya

Warning.

427 FAO GIEWS. Country Brief - Somalia November 2018


428 OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia 5 September - 4 October 2018.

429 UNHCR Somalia fact sheet 1-30 November 2018

425 ECHO. Somalia factsheet. October 2018

426 FSNAU. Quarterly Brief - Focus on Post-Deyr 2018 Season Early

Map 39 Somalia IPC Acute Malnutrition situation, June - July 2018



Source: Somalia IPC Technical Working Group, June-July 2018

from 2014–2018.⁴³⁰ Some 1.6 million Somalis have been displaced by drought since November 2016 and 1.1 million are in protracted displacement.⁴³¹

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Results from 30 separate nutrition surveys conducted by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and partners between June and July 2018 indicate an improvement in the overall nutrition situation in Somalia compared to the same period in 2017. However, the levels of acute malnutrition among 6-59 month olds were still at high levels, with a median rate of 14 percent in the July 2018 Gu analysis compared with 17.4 percent the

previous year.⁴³² Twelve out of 33 populations surveyed in 2018 were above the Emergency threshold of 15 percent.

The median rate of SAM was 2.2 percent, rising to levels above four percent in the Mogadishu IDP settlement and the Guban pastoral livelihood population group. IDPs had some of the highest rates of malnutrition (GAM 11.9 percent), although this marked a modest improvement from the 13.9 percent registered in the 2017 Deyr analysis.


Prevailing food insecurity, the limited availability of health services, poor health-seeking behaviours and

430 UNHCR, Dec 2018

431 OCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin, 1-31 Dec 2018

432 FSNAU. Nutrition situation summary for Somalia. Gu 2018.

Map 40 Somalia IPC Acute Malnutrition situation, August-December 2018



Source: Somalia IPC Technical Working Group, June-July 2018

the difficulties in accessing safe water all undermine nutrition. High prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies, suboptimal breastfeeding and poor complementary feeding practices contributed to high levels of acute malnutrition among several populations.

Malnutrition in Somalia has proven to be a generational issue in the case of adolescent girls, as poor nutrition and subsequent poor health carries over from adolescence, through pregnancy, to the child.

The insecure environment exacerbated these problems particularly among displaced and socially marginalized groups. WASH infrastructure is not sufficient to meet the

demand of mass population influxes to urban centres.⁴³³ Although the number of cases of cholera decreased since mid-July, the cumulative number reached 6 394 in October following the outbreak of the disease in December 2017.⁴³⁴


433 HNO 2019

434 WHO EMRO Outbreak update – Cholera in Somalia, October 4, 2018.

SOUTH SUDAN

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of acutely food-insecure **remained stable** mainly due to the protracted conflict, displacement, high prices and climate hazards.

2019 FORECAST

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **increase** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION

 **Conflict/insecurity**

 **Economic shocks**


 **Climate shocks**

- Widespread violence drove large-scale displacement, disrupted livelihoods and restricted humanitarian access.
- Poor seasonal rains coupled with the negative impact of conflict on agricultural activities resulted in a record low 2018 crop production.
- Prices of key food commodities were up to three times levels of two years earlier due to tight supplies, insecurity-related trade disruptions and a weak local currency.
- Infestation levels of fall armyworm were generally low, but farmers did not have access to pesticides, and damage to maize and sorghum crops was reported.
- The agro-pastoralist county of Pibor faced increased cattle raiding, lack of trade flows and minimal humanitarian access because of road ambushes and lootings.


MALNUTRITION INDICATORS

 **860 000** children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **258 000** affected by SAM.

HRP, 2019


 Poor access to health and nutrition services, high morbidity, extremely poor diets and poor sanitation and hygiene contributed to a dire nutrition situation.

MICS, 2010

 **28%** of households lacking access to safe drinking water.


MICS, 2010

 **45%** of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

 **31%** of children aged 0–59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

MICS, 2010


DISPLACEMENT

 **1.87M** people were internally displaced.

OCHA, Dec 2018

 **291 800** refugees – mainly from the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

 **658 100** former IDPs and South Sudanese refugees have returned to there area of origin.

IOM, Jul 2018

BACKGROUND

The five-year conflict is estimated to have led to nearly 400 000 deaths,⁴³⁵ displaced over 4 million people internally and to neighbouring countries⁴³⁶ and pushed two counties of South Sudan into famine in early 2017.⁴³⁷ In September 2018 the government, opposition and civil society signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCISS). Durable peace could allow the government to tackle the underlying causes of the country's macroeconomic crisis, improve food production, boost employment, build infrastructure and diversify the economy. While the intensity of conflict reduced in 2018, with clashes contained to certain regions, vulnerable people continued to experience the impacts of it.⁴³⁸ In addition, more than 600 000 people returned to their homestead resulting in another round of challenges for recovery and rehabilitation.




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ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

As of September 2018, corresponding to the end of the lean season/green harvest period, the number of people facing *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity reached 6.06 million people, accounting for nearly 60 per cent of the population. These included 1.69 million people (16 percent) in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) and 4.32 million people (42 percent) in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3). An

Figure 21 Number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 2 or above in 2014 - 2018



Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group


435 World Bank South Sudan overview

436 FAO GIEWS country brief

437 IPC country analysis

438 HNO 2019

Map 41 South Sudan, IPC Acute food insecurity, January 2018



Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, January 2018

additional 3.2 million people, corresponding to a third of the population, were in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2). These numbers reflect extremely high levels of acute food insecurity, similar to one year earlier.

Of highest concern were the 47 000 people facing *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) in Leer and Mayendit (former Unity state), Yirol East and Yirol West (former Lakes state), Canal/ Pigi (former Jonglei state), Panyikang (former Upper Nile state), and Greater Baggari in Wau (former Western Bahr El Ghazal state).

Across the country some 31 counties were classified in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4), which is associated with large food consumption gaps, very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality or extreme loss of livelihood assets, and another 39 counties in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3). Just three counties were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2).

Some improvements were expected in the post-harvest period between October and December 2018 with 4.4 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above, compared to 4.8 million a year earlier. However, extreme levels

of acute food insecurity were expected to persist with *Catastrophe* outcomes (IPC Phase 5) still likely towards the end of 2018 in Leer and Mayendit (former Unity state), Pibor (former Jonglei state), Panyikang (former Upper Nile state) and Greater Baggari in Wau (former Western Bahr El Ghazal state).


FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

Hostilities, inter-communal violence and cattle-raiding continued to cause displacement and to restrict humanitarian access, mainly in the former Central Equatoria, Western Bahr-El-Ghazal, Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states. By the end of 2018, about 1.9 million people remained internally displaced across the country.⁴³⁹

439 OCHA December 2018

Map 42 South Sudan, IPC Acute food insecurity, May-July 2018



Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, January 2018

A significant number (658 148 in the first half of the year⁴⁴⁰) were reportedly able to return home and engage in farming activities, and a slight increase in planted area was expected compared to 2017. However, widespread violence and large-scale and recurrent displacement continued to impair agricultural activities, constraining access to fields and inputs, and damaging and destroying households' productive assets. Inputs continued to be in short supply and increasingly expensive.

South Sudan is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a humanitarian worker. By May, the number of aid workers killed in the country since conflict broke out in December 2013 reached 101.⁴⁴¹ Each month between July and September there were reportedly about 65–80 security incidents, most of them targeting humanitarian actors.⁴⁴² Approximately 1.5 million people, mostly in need of lifesaving humanitarian assistance,

were located in counties with severe access constraints. Lack of access also prevented humanitarian organizations from having a clear understanding of needs.⁴⁴³

Humanitarian assistance during the first quarter of 2018 reached a smaller percentage than in previous years, as the growth of the population in need outpaced response. In April, FEWS NET warned that the absence of assistance would remove a primary food source and likely drive increased conflict over remaining scarce resources, increasing movement restrictions and preventing households from accessing food from other sources.⁴⁴⁴

Economic shocks

As a consequence of the severe impact of the protracted conflict, the country has been displaying, since mid-2016, all the signs of macro-economic collapse, with output contracting, hyper-inflation and depreciation of the local currency in the parallel market. Despite some encouraging developments beginning in mid-2018

440 IOM July 2018.


441 OCHA. South Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin Issue, 5 May 2018

442 OCHA. South Sudan Humanitarian Access Snapshot, September 2018

443 WFP news release


444 FEWS NET South Sudan food security outlook. April 2018

Map 43 South Sudan, IPC Acute food insecurity, September 2018




Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, September 2018

Map 44 South Sudan, IPC Acute food insecurity, October-December 2018



Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, September 2018

Disclaimers The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.



following the signing of the peace agreement, which boosted investors' confidence over greater political stability and the resumption of oil production, the macroeconomic situation has remained dire. The country's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by about 11 percent in 2015 and 2016, by about seven percent in 2017 and by a further 3.5 percent in 2018.

In the capital Juba, prices of key staples (maize, sorghum, wheat, cassava and groundnuts) continued their sustained upward trend in the first part of 2018, but subsequently declined by 15-50 percent in the second part of the year⁴⁴⁵ when the local currency appreciated following the signing of the peace deal and the newly harvested 2018 crops boosted food availability. However, prices of key food commodities as of end-2018 were still up to three times their levels of two years earlier, due to widespread insecurity disrupting transport and trade activities, a tight supply situation, hyperinflation and a still significantly depreciated local currency.⁴⁴⁶

Although infestation levels of fall armyworm were generally low, farmers could not afford to buy pesticides, and could only resort to traditional practices to control

the pest, which further constrained crop production, mainly of maize and sorghum.⁴⁴⁷

Climate shocks

Prolonged dry spells and below-average rains diminished yields in the latter half of 2018 in southern bimodal rainfall areas of the Greater Equatoria region, and in several northern and central uni-modal rainfall areas.⁴⁴⁸ According to the results of the 2018 joint FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission, 2018 aggregate cereal production was estimated at about 745 000 tonnes, 2.5 percent down from 2017, about 15 percent below the average of the previous five years and the lowest recorded output since the start of the conflict in 2013.⁴⁴⁹

In addition, the rainy season, which frequently renders roads impassable, hindered humanitarian access to populations in need.⁴⁵⁰

445 FAO GIEWS country brief

446 Ibid


447 Ibid

448 Ibid

449 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan, March 2019


450 OCHA. South Sudan Humanitarian Access Severity Overview, September 2018

Map 45 South Sudan IPC Acute Malnutrition situation, September 2018




Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, September 2018

Map 46 South Sudan IPC Acute Malnutrition situation, October-December 2018



Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, September 2018

Disclaimers The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.



NUTRITION OVERVIEW

In January 2018, the nutrition situation reflected typical post-harvest seasonal improvements, with lower GAM rates.⁴⁵¹ However, in the lead-up to the lean season of May–July 2018, the nutrition situation deteriorated significantly as a result of high levels of food insecurity, outbreaks of diarrhoea and other illness, and limited access to services because of the heavy rains.

During this period, Leer and Mayendit in Unity and Longochuk and Renk of Upper Nile were expected to reach *Extreme Critical* levels (IPC Phase 5) according to the IPC for acute malnutrition thresholds (GAM \geq 30%). Most counties in the Greater Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and parts of Eastern Equatoria were expected to reach *Critical* (IPC Phase 4) levels.

By September, acute malnutrition levels had improved and were slightly better than during the same period the previous year with no county reporting GAM rates above 30 percent. Nutrition was expected to further improve between October and December 2018 thanks to the seasonal availability of local produce, increased

availability of fish and milk, and better access to markets and key services.

Levels of acute malnutrition are attributed to severe food insecurity, poor access to health and nutrition services, high illness levels, extremely poor diets and poor sanitation and hygiene.⁴⁵² Only 12 percent of 6–23 month olds are given meals frequently enough and 45 percent of infants aged under six months are exclusively breastfed. Sanitation levels are extremely low with two thirds of the population defecating in the open.⁴⁵³ Insecurity continues to affect humanitarian assistance, with reports of confiscation of nutrition supplies. Malaria is the top cause of morbidity and mortality, responsible for 47 percent of deaths in 2018.⁴⁵⁴

451 IPC country analysis

452 IPC Acute Malnutrition Sept 2018


453 MICS 2010

454 OEW, WHO, Week 49, 7 Dec 2018.


THE SUDAN

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



IPC, 2018; World Bank, 2017



2017-18 CHANGE

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **increased** mainly as a result of the economic deterioration.

2019 FORECAST

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **increase** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Economic shocks



Conflict/insecurity



Climate shocks

- Food prices escalated as the currency depreciated sharply and fuel shortages pushed up production and transport costs.
- Dry spells during 2017 contributed to a reduced cereal harvest, while floods in 2018 affected 222 000 people across the country.
- Lack of income-earning opportunities made the refugee population highly vulnerable.
- In Darfur displacement fuelled persisting conflicts between herders and farmers over land and natural resources.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



2.4M children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **700 000** affected by SAM.

HRP, 2018



15% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

MICS, 2014



32% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

MICS, 2014



Families cutting health spending and reducing the quantity and quality of meals ensured rates of acute malnutrition remained extremely high.



55% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

MICS, 2014



38% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

MICS, 2014

DISPLACEMENT



21 624 newly displaced people were registered between January and July 2018.

IOM, Jul 2018



1.1M refugees – mainly from South Sudan, Eritrea, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ethiopia.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



113 500 registered returnees between January and July 2018.

IOM, Jul 2018

BACKGROUND

Since late 2017, the Sudan has been facing significant macro-economic challenges, illustrated by a spiralling parallel foreign exchange rate, dwindling foreign currency reserves and increasing inflation rates, resulting in reduced imports of fuel and agricultural inputs.⁴⁵⁵ As a result, populations in the Sudan are facing increased poverty, with ensuing significant access constraints to food, drinking water and to basic services.⁴⁵⁶ While the security improved in Darfur in 2018, intermittent clashes between armed groups and government forces persisted mainly in Jebel Marra, and the peace process for Darfur stalled.⁴⁵⁷ At least 2.1 million people were still displaced in Darfur⁴⁵⁸ and the country was hosting around 765 000 South Sudanese refugees.⁴⁵⁹

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW


According to the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis carried out in April 2018, between May and July, which corresponds to the beginning of the lean season, 6.2 million people were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4). This represents an increase compared to 2017 as the prevalence of people in need of urgent assistance rose from nine to 14 percent.⁴⁶⁰ A further 13.7 million people were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2).

The states of Darfur were of particular concern as they accounted for nearly half (43 percent) of the population in IPC Phase 3 and above. North Darfur, alone, accounted for one million people. The states of North, East, Central and West Darfur and Blue Nile were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3), and two localities (Tawila and Fashir) were classified in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4). The states of Red Sea and Kassala were also facing particularly high prevalence of food-insecure people.⁴⁶¹

The food security situation seasonally improved in late 2018 as newly-harvested crops became available, but the number classified in IPC Phase 3 and above was still 5.7 million, accounting for 13 percent of the population.⁴⁶² This was almost 50 percent higher than the same period the previous year, indicating a severe deterioration of the food security situation in 2018.



Figure 22 The Sudan, Number of people (millions) in IPC Phase 2 or above in 2016-2018



Source: Sudan IPC Technical Working Group

455 FAO GIEWS Update The Sudan, September 11, 2018

456 Sudan IPC Technical Working Group. October 2018

457 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General S/2012/912, October 12, 2018

458 IPC

459 UNHCR October 2018

460 Sudan IPC Technical Working Group. March 2017; October 2017; April 2018

461 Sudan IPC Technical Working Group. April 2018

462 Sudan IPC Technical Working Group. October 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Economic shocks

High prices constrained financial access to food in 2018, especially for the most vulnerable households with limited livelihood options, low income levels and high dependency on markets.⁴⁶³

Food prices began to increase in late 2017, after international sanctions were lifted in October ending a trade embargo and de-freezing financial assets. An upsurge in demand for US dollars from importers, coupled with limited foreign currency reserves, resulted in a sharp depreciation of the local currency in the parallel market that triggered a significant rise in the general inflation rate. In early 2018, following the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government removed wheat subsidies. This, in turn, increased demand for millet and sorghum as substitutes for wheat and exerted additional upward pressure on cereal prices.⁴⁶⁴

In an effort to narrow the gap between the official and the parallel exchange rates, the Central Bank of Sudan devalued the official exchange rate twice during 2018, thus intensifying inflationary pressures. Food prices and inflation were also underpinned by fuel shortages, which pushed up production and transport costs. In November 2018, the year-on-year inflation rate reached almost 70 percent, compared to about 25 percent in November 2017, and in December prices of sorghum, millet and wheat, despite the re-introduction of wheat subsidies, were at record levels and up to three times their year-earlier levels.⁴⁶⁵

Conflict/insecurity

By the end of the year around 1.1 million⁴⁶⁶ refugees were in the Sudan, most of them escaping the effects of conflict and insecurity in South Sudan as well as Eritrea, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ethiopia.

The Sudan also received over 30 000 arrivals in 2018.⁴⁶⁷ The refugee population remained among the most vulnerable because of lack of income-earning opportunities, especially during the lean season.⁴⁶⁸

463 Ibid

464 FAO GIEWS Special Alert no. 342 The Sudan, January 26, 2018

465 FAO GIEWS Food Price Monitoring and Analysis bulletin, December 2018

466 UNHCR December 2018

467 UNHCR Sudan population dashboard Refugees from South Sudan, October 31, 2018

468 WFP Sudan Food Security Monitoring, May 2018

The impact of conflict and population displacement in Darfur fuelled persisting conflicts between herders and farmers over land and natural resources.⁴⁶⁹

Climate shocks

In 2017, aggregate cereal production was estimated at 5.2 million tonnes, about 10 percent above the five-year average but 40 percent lower than the bumper 2016 harvest.⁴⁷⁰ The output contraction was mainly because of a decline in the area planted with sorghum and millet after farmers switched to more profitable cash crops, mainly sesame and cotton, and to drought-induced production shortfalls in northern Gedaref, North Darfur and Kassala states, where cereal production was 65-90 percent lower than in the previous year.⁴⁷¹

Heavy June-September seasonal rains triggered widespread floods and displacements, affecting over 222 000 people across 15 of the Sudan's 18 states.⁴⁷²

In Kassala, as of April 2018, the fodder gap was estimated at around 3.5 million tonnes, which significantly affected the livestock sector and the livelihoods of pastoral communities.⁴⁷³

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

The Sudan has experienced persistently high levels of undernutrition since records began in 1987. The national prevalence rate of GAM is 16.5 percent, which represents about 2.4 million children under age five, 700 000 of whom suffer from SAM.⁴⁷⁴

In 2018, 11 out of the 18 states had a GAM prevalence among under fives of above 15 percent, which is the *Emergency* threshold as per WHO standards.⁴⁷⁵

Nationally almost two in five (38 percent) of children under five are stunted.⁴⁷⁶

The Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS) for refugee camps in White Nile State, released at the end of June, indicated GAM rates above the *Emergency* threshold and SAM above two percent.⁴⁷⁷

469 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General S/2012/912, October 12, 2018

470 FAO Special Report Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Sudan, March 15, 2018

471 FAO GIEWS Country Brief, June 14, 2018

472 OCHA Sudan Humanitarian snapshot, December 2018

473 Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, April 2018


474 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2018 <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-2018-humanitarian-response-plan-january-december-2018>

475 HNO 2018

476 MICS 2014


477 Government of Sudan, WHO, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR. The Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS)

Map 47 The Sudan, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, May-July 2018




Source: Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, April 2018

Map 48 The Sudan, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, October-December 2018



Source: Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, October 2018

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The main contributing factors to persistent high malnutrition rates in the Sudan are food insecurity, diseases, lack of access to primary healthcare and basic services such as safe water and adequate sanitation facilities, and poor infant feeding practices. The MICS survey conducted in 2014 revealed that only 33 percent of the population had access to improved sanitation, and only 43 percent of children were fully immunized. Poor infant feeding practices - demonstrated by just 15 percent of children aged 6-23 months receiving an appropriate diet - also play a key role.⁴⁷⁸

Erosion of households' purchasing power as a result of the economic crisis has compelled families to cut spending on education and health, and to reduce the quantity and quality of meals, which has likely had detrimental impacts on the nutritional status of the population. Other health challenges included a chikungunya fever outbreak declared in August 2018 in Kassala state with 20 110 cases as of December 2018.⁴⁷⁹


478 Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA and WHO. Sudan Multiple Indicators Survey 2014, April 2015

479 OCHA. Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, December 2018

THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



OCHA, 2018; World Bank, 2017

6.5M
FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE



2.5M MARGINALLY FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE



2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **remained stable** in the Syrian Arab Republic mainly as a result of the protracted conflict, and related displacement and economic collapse.

2019 FORECAST

Food insecurity is expected to **remain** driven by conflict, new displacement, and the 2018 production shortfalls.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Climate shocks



Economic shocks

- The worst drought in 30 years followed by heavy rains and high temperatures caused wheat production to hit a three decade low.
- Fighting ended in some areas, but persisted in others, despite international agreements for de-escalation.
- Damaged or destroyed infrastructure (primarily irrigation) and lack of inputs

and certified seed because of import sanctions constrain agriculture.

- Unemployment has risen to 55 percent. Nearly four in five households said unemployment was their main challenge.
- Food prices decreased in some parts, but were seven times higher than the five-year pre-crisis average.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



91 800 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **19 300** affected by SAM.

HNO, 2019



32% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development (Aleppo, Idlib and Hama governorates).

KAP IYCF, 2017



2% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

WHO/UNICEF, 2015



Lack of access to health services, limited access to safe water, and poor sanitation contributed to a deterioration in nutrition.



24% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed (11 governorates).

HNO 2019



13% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (10–<20% = medium).

HNO 2019

DISPLACEMENT



6.2M IDPs, including **1.3M** new displacements of people between January and June 2018.

FAO/WFP, Oct 2018



Registered refugees hosted in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey:

UNHCR, Dec 2018



1.2M former IDPs returned to their area of origin in the first 10 months of 2018.



438,000 Palestine refugees remained hosted in the country.

UNRWA, Dec 2018



SRP Regional Strategic Review 2019-2020

BACKGROUND

Security in the Syrian Arab Republic, where the conflict is now in its eighth year, considerably improved in many parts of the country and the conflict became more localized. But it continued to undermine the country's socio-economic base and agricultural production, particularly when combined with erratic weather, making millions of Syrians reliant on food and livelihood assistance.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

The HNO 2019 estimates that 6.5 million Syrians are food insecure and an additional 2.5 million people are at risk of falling into food insecurity if their livelihoods are not supported.

This marks a five percent decrease since the HNO 2017, which can be attributed to large-scale food and livelihoods/agriculture assistance from January - October 2018.

Of great concern are the estimated 478 000 people living in last resort camps in north-west and north-east Syria, who have very limited opportunities to access a diversified diet, the Palestinian refugees who are in continuous need of assistance and the 1.27 million people living in hard-to-reach locations.⁴⁸⁰

According to the HNO 2019, 33.4 percent of IDPs and 41.2 percent of returnees are food insecure. Some 29 percent of returnees are adopting emergency coping strategies compared to 19 percent reported across all groups at national level.

The HNO also highlights the vulnerability of 600 000⁴⁸¹ farming households and 200 000 livestock breeder households.

WFP mobile surveys of nine governorates show that 27 percent of households were highly vulnerable or vulnerable to food insecurity in January-June 2018 compared with 40 percent during the same period in 2017.⁴⁸²



There were around 5.6 million Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt at the end of 2018. In total 2.5 million needed food and livelihood assistance in these countries in late 2018, comprised of 1.6 million Syrian refugees and 825 000 host community members.⁴⁸³

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

While fighting ended in some areas, it persisted in others, despite international agreements for de-escalation. From early March over 80 000 people fled fighting in Eastern Ghouta and nearly 52 000 people were accommodated in shelters in Rural Damascus, where conditions were reported to be dire, with overcrowding and poor sanitation.⁴⁸⁴

By the end of March, Duma - with an estimated 175 000 inhabitants - was the only besieged area in Eastern Ghouta. Many people were living in underground shelters, exposed to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. People had no access to agricultural land or markets and a block on commercial food flows meant humanitarian assistance was the only source of food. Severe negative coping strategies reportedly included

480 August 2018

481 Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform

482 CFSAM Oct 2018

483 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2019-20

484 WFP mVAM Bulletin, March 2018

feeding just one child a day for households that could not feed all their children at once.⁴⁸⁵

Between January and June 2018 1.3 million people were newly displaced, forced out of their homes by fighting and/or loss of livelihoods.⁴⁸⁶ While 6.2 million were displaced within the country – the largest internal displacement in the world⁴⁸⁷ – 1.2 million IDPs returned to their area of origin in the first 10 months of 2018.⁴⁸⁸ Besides the pull factor of improved safety in their community of origin, a significant push factor was the lack of basic services and lack of safety/security at the location of displacement.⁴⁸⁹

Monthly telephone surveys carried out by WFP's mVAM unit throughout 2018 consistently showed that IDPs and returnees were more food insecure and more likely to employ food-related coping strategies than residents.

Climate shocks

The worst drought in 30 years was followed by heavy, out-of-season rains. Coupled with the effects of conflict, the Syrian Arab Republic's wheat production hit its lowest level since 1989. In 2018 it was about two-thirds of 2017 levels and less than one-third of pre-conflict 2002-2011 averages.⁴⁹⁰ This marks a shortfall of 1.2 million metric tonnes to meet domestic requirements (food use) of 3.4 million metric tonnes.⁴⁹¹

In north-east Syria, most of the wheat and barley crops failed because of drought. There were substantial crop losses in Faqqa, Hama, Homs and Rural Damascus and Dar'a.⁴⁹² Livestock farmers had to contend with damaged and reduced pasture and increased fodder prices⁴⁹³ leading to irreversible coping strategies.⁴⁹⁴

The import sanctions imposed on the Syrian Arab Republic have contributed to substantial reduction in the availability of quality inputs and a severe shortfall in certified seed for the 2018/2019 winter planting season.⁴⁹⁵

Economic shocks

The HNO 2019 highlights the inseparable link between poverty and food insecurity in the Syrian Arab Republic. An estimated 83 percent of Syrians live below the upper (moderate) poverty line versus 28 percent in 2010.⁴⁹⁶ According to the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI),⁴⁹⁷ which takes into account health, education and basic needs-related indicators, the national poverty rate in the Syrian Arab Republic is 39 percent. Unemployment has risen to 55 percent and purchasing power has declined to a tenth of pre-crisis levels. A monthly food ration with staple items costs at least 80 percent of an unskilled labourer's monthly salary and 50-80 percent of a public service employee's monthly salary.⁴⁹⁸

In October 78 percent of WFP mVAM survey respondents said unemployment was their main challenge. The second most reported issue was the high cost of rent, especially in Aleppo, Damascus, Lattakia and Rural Damascus.⁴⁹⁹

Food prices fell across all governorates thanks in part to improved security and market access compared to the previous year. However, commodity prices were still seven times higher than the five-year pre-crisis average and there were still areas, such as Idlib and south Deir-ez-Zor, where market access remained very difficult.⁵⁰⁰ The main constraints to reinvigorating markets remain the high exchange rate, steep transport costs, and low demand due to high unemployment rates and limited purchasing power. Every second household purchased food on credit, which was more common among IDPs, returnees, female-headed and rural households.⁵⁰¹

485 WFP mVAM Bulletin, March 2018

486 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic (CFSAM) Oct 2018

487 UNHCR, Nov 2018

488 3RP Regional Strategic Review, 2019-2020

489 <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/picking-pieces-realities-return-and-reintegration-north-east-syria>

490 CFSAM Oct 2018

491 HNO 2019

492 GIEWS Oct 2018

493 CFSAM Oct 2018

494 HNO 2019

495 Ibid

496 The upper poverty line is equal to per capita expenditure on basic food needs (food poverty line) plus per capita non-food expenditure of households whose per capita food expenditure is close to the food poverty line.


497 In the global MPI, a person is identified as multidimensionally poor or MPI poor if they are deprived in at least one third of the weighted MPI indicators: health, education and living standards.

498 All data in this paragraph from HNO 2019

499 <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000100853/download/>

500 CFSAM Oct 2018

501 HNO 2019

Map 49 The Syrian Arab Republic, distribution of people in need of food security and agriculture assistance, 2018

Source: OCHA, March 2019

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

SMART surveys and nutrition surveillance in 2018 generally showed GAM rates under five percent. Around 92 000 children under five years of age were acutely malnourished, approximately 19 000 of them severely so.

However, in Eastern Ghouta, the GAM rate reached nearly 12 percent. GAM rates also significantly deteriorated where there were newly displaced populations and in hard-to-reach areas. In Ar-Raqqa they increased from 4.6 percent in January to 11.9 percent in June and in Idlib from 1.5 percent to four percent.⁵⁰²

SMART surveys conducted in 2015/2016 indicated the level of chronic malnutrition as measured by under-five stunting (12.7 percent) in 11 out of the 14 governorates.⁵⁰³ By 2018, pockets of particularly high stunting levels were identified in some localities, including Eastern Ghouta (36 percent) and Tel Abiyad (32 percent). Increasing stunting levels are potentially driven by longer-term inadequate dietary intake,

repeated infections in younger children, poor feeding practices (just 24 percent of infants are exclusively breastfed for six months in 11 governorates),⁵⁰⁴ and inadequate complementary feeding.

Of great concern is moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) among pregnant and lactating women (PLW), which more than doubled in one year. Nutrition screenings in July 2018 reported 10 064 cases.⁵⁰⁵ Lack of access to health services and negative coping mechanisms, such as meal reductions, are among the contributing factors to this deterioration.

More generally, limited access to safe water, inadequate healthcare provision, poor sanitation, and food insecurity, especially among displaced populations, returnees and in newly accessible areas, are negative influences.

502 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019

503 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018

504 Ibid

505 Ibid

SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE REGION

Economic shocks

The protracted crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to place an enormous burden on the surrounding countries, particularly on infrastructure, schools, and health clinics. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt host around 5.6 million registered Syrian refugees, although the total estimated number, which includes Government estimates of unregistered Syrian refugees and Syrians residing in host countries under alternative legal frameworks, is far higher (7.2 million). Around one million have been born in displacement and 70 percent of people in need in the region are women or children.⁵⁰⁶

There was no large-scale arrival of refugees in neighbouring countries over the course of 2018 as borders and admission practices remained closely managed. At the same time, none of these countries saw a substantial decrease in the registered Syrian refugee population (as of November 2018 there were almost 43 000 returns).

The welfare profile of Syrian refugees did not change significantly over the past year, with current estimates for poverty rates continuing to exceed 60 percent in most host countries. Poverty for refugees also manifests itself as low educational attainment, sub-par health and nutrition outcomes, exposure to physical insecurity and natural hazards, and substandard living conditions.

In many host countries, Syrian refugees lack legal employment opportunities and depend on emergency food assistance, while an estimated 3.9 million vulnerable host community members face deepening socio-economic challenges, particularly through lack of livelihoods and economic opportunities, and basic services. In Jordan, where 83 percent of refugees live outside camps in urban areas, 57 percent of working age Syrian refugees are unemployed and 80 percent of Syrian refugees outside of camps are below the poverty line. In Egypt 85 percent of registered Syrian refugees are unable to meet their basic needs.

Most host countries are also experiencing persistently sluggish growth - exacerbated by the crisis in the region - that has left per capita incomes near stagnant since 2008. Turkey, which hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees, the highest number in the world, is of particular concern because of increasing inflation, a weakening currency and unemployment rates of around 10 percent.⁵⁰⁷

The combination of rising inflation and weakening domestic currency is likely to exacerbate poverty levels (28.7 percent of the Turkish population in the country already live under the poverty line). Although the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) run by the European Union, the Turkish government, WFP and the Turkish Red Crescent, assists over 1.45 million registered refugees monthly⁵⁰⁸ inflation rates increased the cost of the food basket⁵⁰⁹ by 33 percent between September 2017 and 2018.⁵¹⁰

While the levels of social tension between refugees and host communities have remained relatively stable on a macro level across the region, the combined effects of these socio-economic conditions could lead to increased fatigue among host communities in some countries.

Lebanon hosts the largest concentration of refugees per capita and the fourth largest refugee population in the world, with 1.5 million Syrian refugees according to Government of Lebanon estimates, almost one million of whom were registered with UNHCR by the end of September 2018. The sixth VASyR found that while food security for Syrian refugees improved in the last year thanks to the extensive humanitarian response in the country, one third (34 percent) of Syrian refugee households still remained moderately to severely food-insecure.⁵¹¹

Higher levels of food insecurity continued to be associated with higher economic vulnerability. Although poverty levels decreased, 69 percent remained below the poverty line and just over half (51 percent) still did not reach the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket⁵¹² threshold. Nearly nine out of 10 households acquired debt and 82 percent borrowed money during the three months prior to the survey.

WFP assistance and informal debt continued to be key sources of income for Syrian households in Lebanon, indicating the challenges refugees faced in covering essential needs through employment. Unemployment among the labour force was reported at 40 percent rising to 61 percent for women. Unemployment rates in Akkar and the South were more than double those of Baalbek-El Hermel and Mount Lebanon. Sixty-one percent of Syrian refugees aged 15 to 24 were not employed, not in education, and not attending any training (NEET).

506 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2019-20

507 Internal note - Turkish economic slowdown: implications on WFP's work, WFP VAM


508 Source: The ESSN Card

509 The food basket represents the monthly minimum cost of a nutritiously balanced diet

510 WFP Turkey, ESSN Market Bulletin Q3 2018

511 VASyR Lebanon 2018 using CARI

512 Ibid

Map 50 Number of registered Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries, as of 31 December 2018

Disclaimers: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Source: UNHCR, 2018

NUTRITION OVERVIEW - SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE REGION

The most recent nutrition assessments carried out among Syrian refugees took place in 2013 in Lebanon and Iraq, and in 2016 in Jordan. They found GAM levels below five percent among children under five years of age. However, levels were nearing five percent in Domiz refugee camp in Iraq, in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and in northern Lebanon.⁵¹³

Stunting levels were overall below 20 percent. The rates among Syrian refugees living in camps in Jordan were 11 percent in Za'atri and 19 percent in Azraq, while

among refugees living in host communities they were significantly lower (6.4 percent).⁵¹⁴ Stunting rates among refugees living in Lebanon were 18.6 percent.⁵¹⁵

The Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018 found the average number of meals consumed per day increased for children under five since the previous year. However, fewer than half (44 percent) of infants under six months were exclusively breastfed and just 17 percent of children between six and 23 months had minimum diet diversity.⁵¹⁶ The percentage of children under two years old who were sick increased by seven percent from 2017, reaching 41 percent.

513 UNICEF. Joint Nutrition Assessment Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2013. UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Save the Children. Interagency Nutrition Surveys amongst Syrian refugees in Jordan 2016. Hossain et al. Nutritional situation among Syrian refugees hosted in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon: cross sectional surveys. *Conflict and Health*. 2016


514 UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Save the Children. Interagency Nutrition Surveys amongst Syrian refugees in Jordan 2016

515 UNICEF. Joint Nutrition Assessment Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2013

516 VASyR Lebanon 2018

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of improved food access and availability at the national level.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Conflict/insecurity



Economic shocks

- The influx of refugees has strained the resources of host communities, the humanitarian system and the environment.
- Refugees and host communities lack access to cultivable land, water, and formal employment opportunities.
- Small fields, lack of resources for inputs (e.g., seeds and labour), and reliance on rainwater constrains crop performance.
- In Karamoja, extremely erratic weather conditions with floods followed by significant rainfall deficits critically constrained crop production and affected livestock conditions and productivity.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



High rates of malnutrition in Karamoja are driven by lack of food, poor sanitation, diseases and inappropriate child feeding practices.



15% of children aged 6–23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2016



22% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS, 2016



66% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2016



29% of children aged 0–59 months stunted (20–<30% = high).

DHS, 2016

DISPLACEMENT



1.2M refugees mainly from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



Around **120 000** refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and **41 000** from South Sudan arrived in Uganda in 2018.

UNHCR, Jan 2019

BACKGROUND

Land-locked Uganda is East Africa's breadbasket and a major exporter of grains. However, pockets of food insecurity still persist, particularly in the north and north-eastern semi-arid Karamoja region. Peace and stability was largely restored in 2006, but protracted conflict persists in neighbouring countries. Consequently, Uganda has become the third largest refugee-hosting country in the world after Turkey and Pakistan, with over a million refugees living in settlements.^{517,518} Nationally poverty rates rose from 19.7 percent in 2012/13 to 27 percent in 2016/17.⁵¹⁹ Although the fertility rate is falling, Ugandan women still have on average 5.6 children⁵²⁰ giving it one of the highest population growth rates on Earth (3.3 percent⁵²¹).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Between September and December 2018, an estimated 1.1 million people were in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3),⁵²² mostly among the refugee population and in Karamoja.

FEWS NET analysed that most resident Ugandan households faced *Minimal* (IPC Phase 1) levels of acute food insecurity throughout 2018 as a result of normal food availability and improved food access. However, the majority of poor households in Karamoja region faced *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) conditions throughout 2018. Between April and June, almost all districts in the region were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) - except Abim. The situation improved in September in some areas such as in the western parts of Kotido and Kaabong, as well as in the south-western parts of the region. However, during the last quarter in localized hotspots, such as in Kotido and Kaabong, about 10-13 percent of the population were in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3).⁵²³

Refugees living in settlements received food assistance and met their minimum food needs, enabling *Stressed!* (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. In the absence of food assistance, most refugees faced *Crisis* (IPC 3) levels of acute food insecurity, according to FEWS NET.

517 WFP Uganda country brief July 2018

518 UNHCR

519 Uganda Bureau of Statistics September 2017

520 World Bank

521 Ibid

522 Internal source: FEWS NET internal unpublished figures as of 25 January 2019

523 FEWS NET Key Message Update January 2018; Food Security Outlooks: April 2018, June 2018, September 2018



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FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks


In the north-eastern Karamoja region, which has a unimodal rainfall pattern, the 2018 harvest was completed in October, more than one month later than normal. Excessive rains between April and June disrupted planting operations and caused flooding and waterlogging in lowland areas, forcing farmers to re-plant. Subsequently, erratic and below-average rainfall in July and August affected the establishment and development of re-planted crops.⁵²⁴ As a result, cereal production was estimated by FEWS NET at 60-80 percent below-average, with the lowest output registered in Kotido and Kaabong districts.

In Karamoja fields tend to be very small, farmers lack resources for inputs (e.g., seeds and labour), and crops are rainfed. Cropland expansion is directly competing and compromising pasture areas critical for livestock-based livelihoods.

Livestock productivity declined earlier than usual following the accelerated seasonal deterioration of pasture and water resources. As a result, seasonal livestock migration to traditional dry season grazing areas began one month earlier than normal, in October. This had a negative impact on milk availability and consumption for transhumant household members remaining at the homestead.

524 FAO GIEWS country brief

Map 51 Uganda, IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification, October 2018-January 2019



Acceptable Alert Serious Critical Extremely critical Inadequate evidence Not analyzed

↑ Better → Same ↓ Worse

Note: This is FEWS NET IPC compatible product, which is generated through the application of the full set of IPC tools and procedures, with the exception of technical consensus.

Source: FEWS NET, October 2018

In bimodal rainfall areas covering most of the country, production of the first season harvest, gathered in June and July, was estimated at above-average levels as yields benefited from exceptionally abundant March-May seasonal rains. Torrential rains triggered floods in several areas, but crop losses were limited and mainly localized in Mount Elgon, Teso and Kigezi areas. Abundant rains also suppressed the spread of fall armyworm outbreaks.

In October, below-average rains delayed planting and affected crop establishment in several areas, while in eastern highlands torrential rains triggered flash floods and landslides. Enhanced rainfall since mid-November lifted crop prospects, but localized crop losses were expected in some eastern, central and south-western

districts, where the early season dryness was most severe, and the aggregate crop output was expected at slightly below-average levels.⁵²⁵

Conflict/insecurity

The influx of refugees in Uganda (more than 1.2 million verified as of December 2018), mainly fleeing conflict in South Sudan and The Democratic Republic of the Congo, has strained the resources of the humanitarian system and put enormous pressure on host communities and the environment.

525 FAO, Crop Prospects and Food Situation, March 2019

Most refugees reside in designated refugee settlements across 11 districts mainly in the North and West Nile regions, which are among the poorest and most undeveloped areas in the country, and in Kampala. The Government allows freedom of movement and provides land to refugees settling in designated areas, the right to work and access to national services. However, both refugees and host communities are challenged by the lack of access to cultivable land and water, poor market connectivity, limited skills and few formal employment opportunities.⁵²⁶ For all refugees, humanitarian food assistance along with minimal levels of own crop production, petty trade, and some remittances remain the key sources of food and income.

Economic shocks

Low food availability and reduced food access in the northern Karamoja sub-region strained households' capacity to cope. Poor households in Kotido and Kaabong districts were the worst-off, commonly buying and/or borrowing food on credit and/or from friends and relatives, reducing food portion size, and restricting adult meals to preserve enough food for children. By November, most poor households had already depleted their stocks from the harvest and were primarily relying on markets for their food needs, with some supplementing this with wild fish, game and vegetables when available. While surplus bimodal supply from other areas of the country mitigated staple food commodity price increases through September, sorghum prices rose 68 percent above year-earlier levels in Kotido in October and 18 percent above the five-year average.⁵²⁷

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Most regions have GAM rates below five percent, except for Karamoja (10.4 percent) and North West (10 percent) regions, according to the most recent national nutrition estimates.⁵²⁸ The stunting prevalence is high, at 29 percent, with estimates ranging from 18 percent in Kampala to 41 percent in Tooro.⁵²⁹

Factors contributing to persistently high levels of acute malnutrition in Karamoja include food insecurity,

diseases and inappropriate child caring practices (just eight percent of children between 6–23 months receive an appropriate diet for growth and development).⁵³⁰ Nevertheless, figures seem to be improving in this region, which has been the focus of sustained action from the government and international agencies. In districts with the historically highest rates of GAM, estimates from July 2018 were lower than during the same period in 2017 (10.6 percent versus 18.5 percent in Kotido and 12 percent versus 18.5 percent in Moroto).⁵³¹

The prevalence of acute respiratory infection among children in Karamoja is more than double that of other regions in Uganda. Children experience persistent diarrhoea because of poor sanitation (two in three households do not have a toilet). High fertility, teenage pregnancy and inadequate birth spacing have a negative impact on the nutritional status of children, adolescent girls and women.

In the West Nile region the GAM prevalence increased from 6.2 percent in 2011 to 10.4 percent in 2016.⁵³² This deterioration was related to the increased influx of refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries. A Food Security and Nutrition Assessment conducted in the districts hosting refugees in October 2017 showed GAM reached 10.1 percent in Lamwo and 10.8 percent in Arua.⁵³³

Since the beginning of 2018, Uganda has suffered outbreaks of cholera, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, Rift Valley fever and rubella. However, no Ebola case has been reported despite the ongoing arrival of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and regular trade activities across the border.⁵³⁴


526 UNHCR
527 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook December 2018-May 2019
528 DHS 2016
529 Ibid

530 UNICEF, WFP and IBFAN Uganda. Food security and nutrition assessment for Karamoja sub-region. January 2018
531 FEWS NET Food Security Outlook December 2018 to May 2019 and UNICEF, FAO and WFP. Food Security and Nutrition Assessment in Karamoja Sub-region. June 2017
532 DHS 2016
533 Government of Uganda, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP: Food Security and Nutrition Assessment in host community 2017
534 WHO AFRO Outbreaks and Other Emergencies, Week 52 December 2018

UKRAINE LUHANSK AND DONETSK OBLASTS

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



World Bank, 2017

1.1M

FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE



MARGINALLY FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE



DATA NOT AVAILABLE

2017-18 CHANGE

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **remained stable** mainly as a result of persisting conflict.

2019 FORECAST

Food insecurity is likely to remain significant as a result of persisting conflict and economic hardship among local population of the Donbas.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Economic shocks

- Two million live close to the contact line where landmines and shelling risk lives and damage homes, hospitals, roads and water supply systems.
- In Donetska the unemployment rate has doubled and in Luhanska it has almost tripled since 2013.
- Income levels, social payments and pensions do not cover the rising cost of basic needs.
- In the freezing winter Kilocalorie requirements are higher – but food prices rise and heating expenses increase.
- The armed conflict, currency devaluation and rising prices of inputs have weakened the agricultural sector.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



Disrupted healthcare, water supply damage and low immunization rates raise the risk of communicable disease outbreaks.



19.7% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

MICS 2012



27% of people close to the contact line experience daily or weekly water shortages. 3.2M require direct water supply and sanitation assistance.

HNO 2019

DISPLACEMENT



1.5M people were internally displaced, according to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine.

IOM, Dec 2018



Population movements across the contact line increased by 20 per cent in 2018 compared to the previous year, with a monthly average of 1.1 million civilian crossings.

IOM, Dec 2018



Over half of the IDPs returning are over the age of 60, while young people tend to stay in cities in search of better job opportunities.

OCHA, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

Since May 2014 Ukraine has experienced protracted military conflict around the 500 kilometre line of contact (LoC) between the government of Ukraine's forces and armed opposition groups across Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in the eastern region of Donbas. During almost five years of conflict there have been repeated ceasefire violations and violence that have created serious security risks for civilians with 2 725 civilian deaths and between 7 000 and 9 000 injured between April 2014 and May 2018.⁵³⁵ Critical infrastructure has been damaged, people have faced great difficulty accessing services and employment, and livelihoods and markets have been disrupted, leading to significant humanitarian needs. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 3.5 million people need humanitarian assistance and protection.



© WFP/TATIANA STOLIARENKO

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

About 1.1 million people, including IDPs outside of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, are food insecure and in need of food security interventions, agriculture inputs and/or livelihood support, according to the Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019.

According to the REACH GCA winter assessment (February 2018), moderate and severe food insecurity in Government Controlled Areas (GCA), within five kilometres of the LoC, increased from 15 percent of households in June 2017 to 18.7 percent in February 2018. Of these, 1.7 percent were severely food insecure up from 0.9 percent in June 2017. Some 78 percent of households in these areas applied negative coping strategies – the highest level since April 2016 and up from 53 percent in June 2017.⁵³⁶

Additionally, 59 percent of households in the GCA within five kilometres of the LoC (and 57 percent overall) were marginally food secure,⁵³⁷ and at risk of greater food insecurity if there was an escalation in conflict, economic shocks, drastic shrinking of humanitarian assistance, or they had to contend with any other shocks.

The June 2018 REACH sectoral analysis highlighted that populations living within 5km of the LoC were 50 percent more likely to have borderline or poor food consumption scores than the overall population. The analysis found that 14 percent of households within 5km of the LoC were moderately or severely food insecure compared with 10 percent in GCAs overall.⁵³⁸

The most recently available data for Non Government Controlled Areas (NGCA) found that 17.4 percent of households were moderately and severely food insecure in October 2017, according to REACH MSNA-2 data. Of these, 3.2 percent were severely food insecure.⁵³⁹ According to the HRP 2019 the percentage of severely food-insecure people in the NGCA rose from 5.2% in 2017 to 32% in 2018.⁵⁴⁰

The elderly; individuals and households with no employment, especially households headed by people aged 40-60; single-headed households with children; female-headed households; people living with chronic illnesses and/or disabilities; and IDPs and host communities are particularly vulnerable.

535 Office of the United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2018, Report on Human Rights in Ukraine

536 Food Security & Socio-Economic Trend Analysis – Eastern Ukraine 29 March 2018

537 REACH Winter Assessment of Government-Controlled Areas within 5km of the Contact Line, February 2018 (CARI methodology)

538 REACH trend analysis using CARI, June 2018

539 Food Security & Socio-Economic Trend Analysis – Eastern Ukraine 29 March 2018

540 OCHA. 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan

Map52 Ukraine, Food security and livelihood severity map, 2018

Disclaimer The United Nations Office in Ukraine follows the global standards, according to which the range and concentration of data for each area is represented through easily differentiated color shading, no shading is used for graphical presentation of the areas where no data/limited is available.

Source: OCHA, December 2018

DRIVERS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Conflict/insecurity

Two million people live close to the contact line on both sides where they have to contend with landmines and other explosives on a regular basis. Shelling and small-arms fire regularly damage homes, hospitals, schools, roads, and water supply systems.

Infrastructural disruptions between GCA and NGCA affect the demand for goods and services. In 2018 1.1 million crossed the contact line each month, a 15 percent increase since 2017, to access pensions, hospitals, markets, social services, or to visit friends or family. Over half of these were over the age of 60, crossing mainly to collect their pensions in GCA. They

often wait in long lines for several hours at checkpoints, and sometimes stay overnight, in a volatile environment with shelling and landmine contamination.⁵⁴¹

The conflict has paralysed economic activities in Ukraine's once-thriving industrial region of Donbas, seriously affecting people's wellbeing and living standards. Rural families' access to farmland has been curtailed by widespread mine contamination. With transport connections damaged and disrupted by hostilities, and prices of seeds, fertilizers, tools and livestock fodder very high, pursuing agricultural activities is extremely difficult. In conflict-affected areas, production of food crops has remained well below pre-crisis levels, constraining food availability and access.⁵⁴²

⁵⁴¹ Ukraine HNO 2019

⁵⁴² FAO. The Agricultural Sector in Eastern Ukraine; Analysis and Recommendations 2018

Economic shocks

Economic recovery in Donbas is slow because of increasing prices and very limited access to the labour market. Unemployment in the region has increased over the past four years and is higher than in the rest of Ukraine. In Donetska oblast, the unemployment rate has doubled since 2013, while in Luhanska Oblast, it has almost tripled.⁵⁴³ There is a direct link between food insecurity and unemployment in Ukraine.⁵⁴⁴ Some 37 percent of households in the GCA, near the contact line, and headed by an unemployed 40-60 year old were food-insecure in February 2018.⁵⁴⁵

Despite some socio-economic improvements in 2018, including pension reform, and real salary growth reaching pre-crisis levels,⁵⁴⁶ some vulnerable groups (e.g. pensioners with the minimum pension and the unemployed) were not able to benefit as household expenditures (food and utilities) grew faster than income levels.⁵⁴⁷

Elderly men and women are particularly vulnerable as they have specific health and nutritional needs, and are highly prone to economic insecurity. Their pensions do not cover the rising cost of basic needs, particularly during the winter.⁵⁴⁸

The cost of the WFP monitored food basket⁵⁴⁹ increased significantly between June 2017 and June 2018, when it reached the highest historical level of UAH 996 (approx. US\$40).⁵⁵⁰

Historically needs increase in winter in Ukraine, when temperatures can fall as far as 25 degrees below zero, higher heating expenses force families to make cuts in areas such as medication, schooling or food. Kilocalorie requirements increase and access to food becomes restricted as prices increase. Bad road conditions make basic services even more difficult to access.⁵⁵¹

There were more than 1.5 million IDPs from Crimea and eastern Ukraine in mid-December 2018, according to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine.⁵⁵² The average monthly income of IDPs was considerably lower compared to Ukrainian households, according to the latest IOM survey.⁵⁵³ IDPs tend to face more difficulty in securing stable employment and accessing housing and social benefits, such as pensions, on which many rely to survive. IDPs' coping strategies differed in their severity, from stress strategies such as borrowing money, to emergency strategies such as selling property.

Host communities also observed an increase in rental and food prices, and downward pressure on wages and employment opportunities. Displacement has at times caused tension between IDPs and host communities, risking undermining social cohesion.

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Shelling of water, sanitation, electrical and heating infrastructure is threatening access to safe drinking water for 3.2 million people in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which, alongside low immunization rates, raises the risk of communicable disease outbreaks. Two-thirds of health facilities in areas closest to the 'contact line' have been damaged, hindering people's access to healthcare and cutting off the regular supply of medicines and equipment for those highly dependent upon life-saving care. As years of conflict pass, healthcare costs (transport, diagnostics, and medications) have increased. Over 1 500 healthcare professionals have left the conflict-affected areas since 2014.

Donetska and Luhanska oblasts are still among the most-affected by HIV/AIDS in Ukraine. Issues such as displacement, migration, and widespread multidrug-resistant (MDR) and extensively drug-resistant (XDR) tuberculosis (TB) compound systemic gaps and contribute to higher rates of HIV and TB in the conflict-affected areas and beyond.

543 Ukraine HNO 2019

544 REACH. Winter assessment February 2018

545 Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, Food security & Socio-Economic Trend Analysis - Eastern Ukraine, March 2018

546 WFP, Market Monitor Review January-June 2018, August 2018

547 Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, Food security & Socio-Economic Trend Analysis - Eastern Ukraine, March 2018

548 Ibid

549 WFP monitored food basket includes 23 main food commodities from the national food basket of Ukraine (which includes 45 items).

550 WFP, Market Monitor Review January-June 2018, August 2018


551 REACH Winter Assessment of Government-Controlled Areas within 5km of the Contact Line, February 2018

552 This figure is somewhat distorted as a number of the registered IDPs are displaced for registration purposes, which is due to Ukraine's IDP policy which links access to social payments and pensions to their IDP registration.

553 IOM

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **Increased** mainly due to conflict escalation, economic collapse, and lack of access for humanitarian assistance.

2019 FORECAST

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **increase** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict/insecurity



Economic shocks



Climate shocks

- Multiple impacts of escalating conflict included destruction of livelihoods, houses and infrastructure, mass displacement, and currency devaluation.
- Lack of foreign currency and high import taxes cut imported food supplies while movement restrictions and insecurity disrupted markets.

- The average cost of the monthly minimum food basket was 140 percent higher than before the crisis.
- Lack of work, low wages and non-payment of public salaries depressed purchasing power.
- The small proportion of food produced domestically was constrained by rainfall shortages and cyclones, lack of inputs and high fuel costs.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



2M children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **357 500** affected by SAM.

HRP, 2019



15% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS, 2013



41% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS, 2013



Conflict and economic collapse have resulted in the breakdown of the health system and the spread of preventable diseases, exacerbating the dire nutrition situation.



10% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2013



47% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

DHS, 2013

DISPLACEMENT



2M people were internally displaced, and almost all (89%) for more than a year.

UNHCR, Dec 2018



279 000 refugees and asylum seekers mainly from Somalia and Ethiopia were hosted in the country.

UNHCR, June 2018



1M former IDPs have returned to their area of origin.

UNHCR, Dec 2018

BACKGROUND

The escalation of conflict since 2015, in an already fragile state, has resulted in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Yemen, labelled as the worst human-made disaster in the modern history of the world⁵⁵⁴ and the largest food security crisis in the world in 2018. Following week-long peace talks in Stockholm the two warring parties committed to an immediate ceasefire in Hudaydah and its surrounding governorate in mid-December 2018. If it holds, this agreement has the potential to allow the ports of Hudaydah and Saleef to operate at near-normal capacity, allowing the free flow of food, fuel and commercial and humanitarian goods into Yemen and preventing further increases in food prices.⁵⁵⁵

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Despite substantial humanitarian food assistance (HFA), Yemen's food insecurity situation remained dire in 2018. As of December, some 15.9 million people - more than half (53 percent) of the total population - were in IPC Phase 3 or above, even when taking the mitigating effects of the current levels of food assistance into account.

Specifically, about 5 million people (17 percent of the population analysed) were in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) and around 10.9 million people (36 percent) in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3). Of greatest concern were the 64 000 people in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) experiencing extreme food gaps and/or unable to meet basic food needs without full employment of coping strategies. This was actually the first time that the Yemen IPC Technical Working Group classified people in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5), thereby reflecting the very high severity of food insecurity for some population groups. A further 8.9 million were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2).

An additional analysis was conducted by the Yemen IPC Technical Working Group to estimate the severity and magnitude of food insecurity excluding the mitigating effects of the HFA delivered. It found that about 20.1 million people or 67 percent of the total population would have been in need of urgent action to save lives and livelihoods at the end of 2018 had HFA not been delivered. In the hypothetical case of a complete absence of humanitarian assistance, a number of districts would have been classified as *Famine Likely*.⁵⁵⁶ At 238 000, the number in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) would



© WFP/JONATHAN DUMONT

have been nearly four times the actual number and at 10 million the number in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) would have been nearly double the actual number.

Food insecurity was more severe in areas with active fighting, and particularly affected IDPs and host families, marginalized groups as well as landless wage labourers facing difficulties in accessing basic services and conducting livelihood activities.

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY⁵⁵⁷

Conflict/insecurity

A stop-start battle for control of Yemen's Red Sea coast prevailed from the middle of 2018. By the end of October fighting reached the outer edges of the port city of Hudaydah, a gateway for the trade of food and medicine supplies and lifeline for two thirds of the country's population.⁵⁵⁸ The fighting compounded the hardships facing the highly vulnerable population of the city, home to 600 000 people, exacting a high civilian toll and destroying hospitals and health centres.

554 WFP Yemen Market Watch, September 2018.

555 UN Department of Public Information, December 2018

556 *Famine Likely* means famine is likely happening but limited evidence does not allow confirmation.

557 Unless when stated otherwise, the main source in this section is the IPC brief issued in Dec. 2018.

558 International Crisis Group. How to Halt Yemen's Slide into Famine, Middle East Report N°193 | 21 November 2018.

Fighting made humanitarian movement and access to warehouses and to people in need in Hodeidah governorate difficult or impossible in some cases. Some humanitarian programmes were scaled back and the staff overseeing them left.⁵⁵⁹ From mid-October to mid-November, WFP was unable to access 51 000 metric tonnes of wheat grain stored at the Red Sea Mills, enough to feed 3.5 million people for a month. Similarly, a key UNHCR warehouse where emergency shelter and non-food items were stored became inaccessible because of fighting.⁵⁶⁰

Limited funding and access issues created huge gaps in humanitarian assistance in the areas most affected by the conflict. The IPC analysis attributed the sharp increase in the number of populations in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) and *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) to populations in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) not being targeted with Humanitarian Food Assistance. The analysis called for an urgent scale-up of humanitarian food and livelihood assistance and for access to be granted to all districts under active fighting, with special attention given to IDPs.

As of the last week of October, IOM recorded that more than 545 000 people had fled their homes since 1 June 2018, equating to almost 3 700 each day. Of this population, 83 percent came from Hodeidah governorate and 14 percent from Hajjah to the north of Hodeidah.⁵⁶¹ The overwhelming majority (89 percent) of the country's two million IDPs⁵⁶² had been displaced for more than a year, straining host communities that are struggling to cope with already-stretched limited resources.⁵⁶³ There were around a million returnees, and the country was also hosting 279 000 refugees, mainly from Somalia.⁵⁶⁴

Economic shocks

Yemen is highly import-dependent for food, yet lack of foreign currencies as a result of the continued depreciation of the Yemen Riyal against the USD severely curtailed imports of essential commodities. High import taxes, double taxation of commodities, movement restrictions and insecurity disrupting market supplies, lack of credit for traders, and shortages and high prices of fuel increasing transport/storage costs

all pushed up the cost of food, putting what limited food there was beyond the reach of many families. Between July and November, no wheat grain imports had been reported in the seaports of Al-Mukalla and Aden to supply Hadramout and the other neighbouring governorates.⁵⁶⁵ Governorates including Hodeidah and Sa'ada that experienced intensified conflict in 2018 continued to suffer the most from soaring prices of basic commodities.⁵⁶⁶

In October retail prices of food commodities were 70-180 percent higher than in the pre-crisis period and national average fuel prices 140-260 percent higher and expected to rise further. The average cost of the monthly minimum food basket was 140 percent higher than before the crisis.⁵⁶⁷ In December 2018, prices of the most important staples had increased significantly - between 12 and 43 percent - compared to their year-earlier levels.⁵⁶⁸

Limited job opportunities and decreased wages as well as lack of payment of public salaries and pensions undermined people's ability to purchase (increasingly expensive) food and other essential goods: this lower demand weakened the ability of traders to buy supplies and keep commercial imports flowing, adversely affecting market availability in general. More than 80 percent of Yemenis live below the poverty line.⁵⁶⁹

Access to low quality water and in diminishing quantities at household level challenged food preparation as did the increasing cost and low availability of cooking fuel.

Climate shocks

Although only a small proportion of food is produced domestically - constrained by natural conditions and lack of inputs - increases in local production could help improve local market supplies and improve farmers' livelihoods. However, rainfall shortages, costly and unavailable farm inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, tools, veterinary services, and fuel for pumping irrigation water, have contributed to shortages of locally-produced food too. Fishing opportunities have been affected by either conflict, or climatic events such as cyclones and hurricanes.

559 OCHA. Mr. Mark Lowcock, Briefing to the Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in Yemen, 16 November 2018

560 OCHA. Yemen: Al Hudaydah Update Situation Report, 16 October-13 November 2018

561 Norwegian Refugee Council. Update on the situation in Hodeidah, Yemen, 9 November 2018

562 UNHCR December 2018

563 UNHCR. Yemen update, 27 October-9 November 2018

564 UNHCR December 2018

565 FAO & FSTS, Monthly Market Monitoring Bulletin, December 2018


566 WFP Yemen Market Watch September 2018

567 WFP Yemen Market Watch October 2018

568 FAO & FSTS. Monthly market monitoring bulletin. December 2018

569 OCHA

Map 53 Yemen, IPC acute food insecurity situation, December 2018- January 2019



Source: Yemen IPC Technical Working Group, December 2018

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Nutrition cluster partners conducted SMART surveys in six governorates during the first half of 2018 and confirmed alarming rates of malnutrition, with 357 500 children and babies under five years estimated to be in need of treatment for SAM.⁵⁷⁰ In Hodeidah, one in every 20 children under five years was suffering from SAM. In June 2018 more than 15 percent of children were acutely malnourished in four governorates. GAM rates were 10-15 percent in a further five.⁵⁷¹

Yemen has one of the highest burdens of chronically malnourished children in the world with nearly half (47 percent) stunted.⁵⁷²

Conflict and economic collapse have resulted in the breakdown of the health system, the spread of

preventable diseases, and reduced access to food, which have all contributed to a dire nutrition situation. Fewer than half of health facilities are functioning, and even these face severe shortages in medicines, equipment and staff. More than half (55 percent) of the population does not have regular access to safe water and basic hygiene.⁵⁷³

In 2018 the number of suspected cholera cases across the country was 379 288, with 517 associated deaths. Children under five represented 32 percent of the total suspected cases.⁵⁷⁴

Inadequate infant and young child feeding practices also exacerbate malnutrition, with only 15 percent of children aged 6-23 months consuming a minimum acceptable diet and 10 percent of infants under six months being exclusively breastfed.⁵⁷⁵


570 Yemen Nutrition Cluster. Bulletin issue 6. 2018
 571 Yemen Nutrition Cluster, Bulletin April-June 2018
 572 DHS 2013

573 OCHA Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2018
 574 WHO Outbreak Update - Cholera in Yemen, January, 2019
 575 DHS 2013

ZAMBIA

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **increased** mainly as a result of dry spell and pest outbreak leading to shortfall in crop production and increased price of staples.

2019 FORECAST

▶ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **remain unchanged** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Climate shocks



Natural hazards



Economic shocks

- Prolonged dry spell during the key cropping stage led to 34 percent year-on-year fall in 2018 maize harvest.
- An outbreak of fall armyworm also contributed to below-average aggregate maize production.
- The reduced harvest and consequent drawdown in national inventories, followed by abrupt currency depreciation, pushed up food prices.
- High levels of rural poverty (77 percent) and urban unemployment constrain access to food and ability to withstand recurrent shocks such as floods and drought.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



6.2% children under five years acutely malnourished.

DHS 2013-14



11% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

DHS 2013-14



35% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

DHS 2013-14



High morbidity and food insecurity are the key drivers of malnutrition of children in Zambia.



73% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS 2013-14



40% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (>30% = very high).

DHS 2013-14

DISPLACEMENT



76 000 current and former refugees and asylum seekers mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Somalia were hosted in the country.

UNHCR
Dec 2018



In 2018, over **9 000** refugees and asylum-seekers arrived in Zambia, mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi.

UNHCR
Feb 2019

BACKGROUND

Economic growth slowed in recent years, in part reflecting reduced copper prices, one of Zambia's main export earners - but Zambia still has one of the better performing economies in the subregion. Droughts and floods are recurrent natural hazards that have frequently inflicted damage on the agriculture sector. Poverty is endemic in rural areas, where livelihoods are not diversified and are mainly centred on agricultural activities.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

From October 2018-March 2019, 1.17 million people, representing 39 percent of the population analysed, were estimated to be in need of urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition. Of these around 839 000 people (12 percent) were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and approximately 333 000 people (five percent) were classified in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4). In addition, 2 million people were classified in *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) and at risk of slipping into *Crisis* without support to build their resilience.


The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action was higher than the post-harvest period (May-September 2018), when 825 500 people were classified in IPC Phase 3 or above. During this period, out of 58 districts analysed, just two (Mambwe and Lunga) were classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3), and the remaining districts were in *Minimal* (IPC Phase 1) and *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2). The number of districts classified in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) rose to 19 from October onwards, corresponding to the lean season, with eight (Mambwe, Lunga, Chirundu, Luwangwa, Limulunga, Lukulu, Mitete and Molubez) having more than 30 percent of the population in IPC Phase 3 or above.

When comparing conditions to the previous year, the food security situation in 2018 worsened considerably. In 2017, the majority of the population was assessed to be food secure, mostly thanks to the bumper agricultural output in 2017 that significantly augmented households' food supplies.



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Map 54 Zambia, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, May-September 2018



Source: Zambia IPC Technical Working Group, July 2018

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Climate shocks

As a result of a dry spell during a key cropping stage for cereal crops, the 2018 maize harvest, the key food staple, decreased by about 34 percent year-on-year to a below-average level. In aggregate, cereal production in 2018, including paddy and wheat crops, was estimated at 2.6 million tonnes, a 34 percent drop from the record high of 2017.⁵⁷⁶ An outbreak of fall armyworm also contributed to the fall in production.

The production decline resulted in cuts to households' food reserves, with the largest output decreases estimated in the central, eastern and southern provinces. As a result, the proportion of households with food stocks lasting more than nine months fell from about 80 percent in 2017 to 63 percent in 2018,⁵⁷⁷ diminishing households' food availability and increasing their market reliance.


576 FAO, GIEWS-Country Brief, Zambia, 12 December 2018.
577 Zambia Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC), 2018 In depth Vulnerability and Need Assessment Report, July 2018

Economic shocks

At the national level, the lower harvest resulted in a significant drawdown in national inventories to meet consumption needs,⁵⁷⁸ which spurred prices of cereals upwards at the end of 2018; food price inflation rose from 4.8 percent in December 2017 to 8.1 percent in December 2018.⁵⁷⁹ An abrupt depreciation of the local currency in late 2018 added further inflationary pressure.⁵⁸⁰ By October 2018 Zambia was one of nine countries in the world where the cost of the basic food basket had increased severely i.e. >10 percent in the third quarter of the year.⁵⁸¹

Although prices of maize meal still remained below the record highs of March 2017, the elevated levels curbed food access for poorer households, particularly given that the bulk of households spend 75 percent of their income on food purchases.⁵⁸²

578 FPMA bulletin, FAO, December 2018
579 Monthly bulletin, Zamstat, December 2018
580 FAO, GIEWS-Country Brief, Zambia, 12 December 2018
581 WFP VAM Market Monitor October 2018
582 ZimVAC 2018

Map 55 Zambia, IPC Acute food insecurity situation, October 2018-March 2019

Source: Zambia IPC Technical Working Group, July 2018

Underpinning the rise in food insecurity is the high level of chronic poverty, particularly in rural areas where the prevalence was estimated at 77 percent compared to an estimated 23 percent in urban areas.⁵⁸³ Poor households are more susceptible to the impact of recurrent shocks, which can gradually weaken their resilience to further shocks. The urban population is also vulnerable with 61.4 percent of people unemployed.⁵⁸⁴

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Chronic malnutrition (measured by stunting) is of greater concern than acute (measured by wasting) in Zambia. The DHS 2014/15 found very high stunting rates of children under five years (40 percent with 17 percent severely stunted). Almost six percent of children were wasted.⁵⁸⁵

Micronutrient deficiencies are concerning. Some 60 percent of children under five suffer from anaemia and 54 percent are deficient in vitamin A.⁵⁸⁶ Only 12 percent of children aged 6–23 months receive a minimum acceptable diet, meaning 88 percent do not consume a diet that has adequate nutrients and quantity for growth and development.

High morbidity and food insecurity are the key drivers of undernutrition in Zambian children.⁵⁸⁷ Zambia has a high HIV prevalence of 13 percent among adults aged 15–49 (15 percent of women and 11 percent of men). HIV may exacerbate undernutrition through limited food intake, coupled with increased energy requirements and poor nutrient absorption. Limited access to adequate health facilities further compounds the poor nutritional status of the population.

583 Republic of Zambia Central Statistical Office, Zambia Living Condition Monitoring Survey 2015

584 Republic of Zambia Central Statistical Office, Zambia in Figures 2018

585 Zambia DHS 2014/2015


586 Zambia Food Consumption and Micronutrient Survey 2008

587 USAID. Zambia Nutrition Profiles. May 2018

ZIMBABWE

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

2018



2017-18 CHANGE

▼ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action **decreased** mainly as a result of stabilized cereal supply resulting from good harvests for two consecutive years 2016/2017 and 2017/2018.

2019 FORECAST

▲ The number of food-insecure in need of urgent action is forecast to **increase** in 2019.

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Economic shocks



Climate shocks

- Devaluation of local currency and shortages of US dollars inflated food production costs.
- By December 2018, food prices were more than 50 percent higher than year earlier levels.
- Lack of income generating opportunities eroded households' ability to purchase food.
- Over 70 percent of Zimbabweans live below the national poverty line.
- Late onset of rains and long mid-season dry spells led to localized household food production shortfalls.

MALNUTRITION INDICATORS



234 000 children under five years acutely malnourished, of whom **7 800** affected by SAM.

DHS, 2017



4% of children aged 6-23 months received 'Minimum Acceptable Diet' for growth and development.

NNS, 2018



33% of households lacking access to safe drinking water.

WHO/UNICEF



Diseases, and poor access to drinking water and sanitation contributed to persistent malnutrition.



48% of infants (up to 6 months old) exclusively breastfed.

DHS, 2015



27% of children aged 0-59 months stunted (20-30% = high).

DHS, 2015

DISPLACEMENT



2 300 people were internally displaced as a result of flooding and hosted among local communities.

IOM, Nov 2018



Around **14 000** refugees, asylum-seekers and others persons of concern mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique.

UNHCR, Oct 2018



Remittances from the Zimbabwean diaspora constitute a major source of income as USD 2 million entered the country every day, on average, in 2018.

IOM, Nov 2018

BACKGROUND

After experiencing about a decade of political and economic crises from 2000, Zimbabwe's economy underwent a period of economic recovery (2010 to 2014), which was followed by a period of stagnant economic growth, due to the impact of an El Niño-induced drought and growing fiscal deficit.⁵⁸⁸ The country's economy is heavily based on agriculture with agricultural activities providing employment and income for about 65 percent of the population and contributing to about 15-20 percent of the country's GDP.⁵⁸⁹ The country is especially vulnerable to weather-related hazards, such as tropical cyclones, floods and dry conditions that affect agriculture.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY OVERVIEW

Approximately 1.9 million people were estimated to be food insecure from October-December 2018, representing 20 percent of the rural population⁵⁹⁰ and requiring urgent humanitarian assistance to save lives and protect livelihoods. Areas in the north-western part of the country, particularly Kariba and Binga and north eastern parts of Rushinga, had higher numbers of people in need compared to other districts.⁵⁹¹

Overall, the food security situation in 2018 improved compared to 2017 when an estimated 4.1 million were acutely food insecure during the peak hunger period, chiefly as a result of the severe El Niño-induced drought of 2015/2016.⁵⁹² However, the 2018 food insecurity trend deviated from a typical year when food insecurity usually peaks during the lean season in the first quarter. The number of food insecure people in October-December 2018 was higher than the 1.1 million in the January to March lean period.⁵⁹³



© WFP/FIONA GUY

FACTORS DRIVING ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Economic shocks

The improvement in the food security situation in 2018, when compared to the peak annual figures of 2017 can be attributed to the bumper cereal output of 2017 and an above average harvest in 2018. Both stabilized supplies at generally satisfactory levels and curbed significant increases in food prices during most of the year.

However, towards the end the year, severe economic challenges curtailed labour and income generating opportunities, eroding households' ability to purchase food. Prices of maize meal, wheat flour and rice climbed sharply from October 2018, mostly due to the drop in the local currency and shortage of foreign exchange that increased production and distribution costs.⁵⁹⁴ As of December 2018, food prices were more than 50 percent higher than year-earlier levels.⁵⁹⁵ These significantly elevated prices severely affected poorer households' ability to purchase food. A large proportion of the population (over 70 percent) live below the national poverty line.⁵⁹⁶

588 World Bank 2018 Zimbabwe Overview

589 FAO Zimbabwe at a glance

590 ZimVac 2018, ZimVac 2018 SADC Dissemination, an unpublished PowerPoint presentation.

591 Ibid.

592 ZimVac, 2016 Rural Livelihoods Assessment


593 ZimVAC 2017

594 GIEWS. 2019. Zimbabwe Country Brief January 20, 2019

595 Zimstat, Consumer Price Index, December 2018

596 World Bank. Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) 2011 data.

Map 56 Zimbabwe, IPC acute food insecurity, May - June 2018



Source: Zimbabwe IPC Technical Working Group, May 2018

Climate shocks

Reduced rains at the start of the cropping season and during the mid-season period caused a contraction in the area sown and lower yields.⁵⁹⁷ Production of the main food staple, maize, remained above the five-year average in 2018, although the harvest declined by 21 percent on a yearly basis and the overall aggregate cereal output was 24 percent lower. Western parts experienced the biggest year-on-year production declines, constraining households' cereal stocks.⁵⁹⁸

The drier weather conditions in 2018 also negatively affected non-agricultural livelihoods, such as small-

scale manufacturing and construction work, as well as non-arable agriculture, including livestock production, since pasture availability and quality deteriorated and an increase in veld fires also aggravated the situation in localized areas.⁵⁹⁹

Zimbabwe faced multiple economic challenges in 2018 that acutely degraded households' food access. Liquidity constraints and foreign currency shortages adversely affected availability and access to inputs needed for planting, as well as for the payment of agricultural workers.^{600, 601}

597 GIEWS. 2019. Zimbabwe Country Brief January 20, 2019 E


598 IPC Zimbabwe Technical Working Group. 2018. Current and projected acute food insecurity situation May-June 2018, July-March 2019.

599 FEWS NET. 2018. Zimbabwe Food Security Outlook Update, September 2018.

600 GIEWS. 2019. Zimbabwe Country Brief January 20, 2019

601 World Bank. Zimbabwe economic update, the state in the economy, June 2017 Issue 2.

Map 57 Zimbabwe, IPC acute food insecurity, July 2018 - March 2019



Source: Zimbabwe IPC Technical Working Group, May 2018

NUTRITION OVERVIEW

Stunting rates affect over one quarter (27 percent) of children under five years of age.⁶⁰² Micronutrient deficiencies are widespread. Around 37 percent of Zimbabwean children aged 6-59 months and 27 percent of women are anaemic.⁶⁰³ GAM prevalence among children under five years is 2.5 percent.

A cholera outbreak was declared in Zimbabwe in September 2018, leading to the Government declaring a state of emergency. Harare was the epicentre of the outbreak. By November more than 10 000 cholera cases had been reported with a fifth estimated to be children under five years of age.⁶⁰⁴ Although declining, national HIV prevalence remains among the highest in the world, affecting 13 percent of the adult population.⁶⁰⁵

Deteriorating food consumption patterns may partially explain persistent malnutrition rates. There has been a drop in the proportion of rural households consuming an acceptable diet (from 63 percent in 2015 to 55 percent in 2017) and an increase in the share of households consuming a poor diet (from eight percent in 2015 to 16 percent in 2017).⁶⁰⁶ The minimum dietary diversity for women was 40 percent and even lower in Matabeleland South and North.⁶⁰⁷ According to 2018 data, just four percent of children are receiving a minimum acceptable diet.⁶⁰⁸

While access to safe drinking water and sanitation is improving, defecating in the open is still prevalent at 30 percent among rural households.⁶⁰⁹

602 Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey 2015

603 Ibid

604 UNICEF. Zimbabwe Cholera Outbreak Report. November 2018

605 UNAIDS. Country Factsheets Zimbabwe 2017

606 ZIMVAC. 2017 Rural Livelihoods Assessment Report

607 Ibid

608 Nutrition National Survey 2018

609 ZIMVAC. 2017 Rural Livelihoods Assessment Report

4. 2019 FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION FORECASTS



2019 MAIN DRIVERS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION



Conflict and insecurity

Conflict and insecurity are likely to remain the primary drivers of food security crises during 2019. Conflict is expected to persist in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, the Niger, north Nigeria, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen. Local insecurity and intercommunal violence will continue to undermine food availability and access in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya's Arid and Semi Arid Lands, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan.

In addition to causing direct loss of lives, conflict and insecurity will continue to have a direct impact on agricultural production and on the functioning of markets. Violence will continue to deprive households of their livelihood assets and accentuate their use of negative coping strategies, deepening their vulnerability to shocks. Conflict and insecurity will contribute to increasing displacement, internally or towards neighbouring countries, or will ensure people remain displaced for prolonged periods of time, aggravating, in most cases, the food insecurity status of those fleeing.

Large displacement created by conflict or insecurity also poses concerns for some of the countries hosting refugees and migrants. In particular, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey hosting Syrian refugees; Bangladesh, especially in the district of Cox's Bazar, hosting Rohingya from Myanmar; Uganda hosting refugees from both South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Cameroon and Burundi hosting refugees from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; countries affected by the Lake Chad crisis hosting populations displaced by Boko Haram-related insecurity; and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru hosting migrants from Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).



Climate shocks

Weather shocks are expected to have a severe impact on agricultural and livestock production in several regions of the world in 2019, and consequently on food security. In the southern Africa region, dry weather has already

reduced prospects for the 2019 agricultural output,¹ with expected negative repercussions for food availability and likely increases in prices in Angola, Lesotho, Southern Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, central South Africa and northern Namibia.²

In mid-March tropical Cyclone Idai made landfall in Sofala province in Mozambique bringing devastatingly strong winds and heavy flooding. At the time of publication, according to the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, there were at least 200 fatalities and 600 000 people in Mozambique, over 125 000 in Malawi and nearly 10 000 in Zimbabwe affected,³ though these numbers were likely to increase. The tropical cyclone followed a week of heavy rains and flooding across south-east Africa that had already killed dozens of people in Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa. Although the true scale of the damage was still not known at the time of publication – particularly as many areas were cut off – it was bound to further exacerbate the food insecurity in the region because of the massive destruction of livestock, livelihoods and planted crops just before the harvest season.

In East Africa, wet conditions and above-average rainfall are forecast in south-eastern Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia through April 2019,⁴ which may be beneficial for crops and pastureland, but will exacerbate the structural fragilities of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities if flooding occurs, destroying/damaging homes, infrastructure and livelihoods and washing away seeds and seedlings. In the Sudan the June to September 2019 rainy season is forecast to be above-average, which may lead to favourable crop yields but also to flooding and an increase in the prevalence of waterborne disease.⁵

In Latin America and the Caribbean, dry weather associated with El Niño conditions are expected to have an impact on agricultural production and food prices in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). However, in Nicaragua the *apante* season bean crops, harvested in March, were generally favourable thanks to good rains and in Haiti, rainfall conditions were also favourable for crops except in drought-affected areas in Nord and Nord-Est.⁶

In the Central America Dry Corridor the drought during the *primera* harvest and the damages to *postrera* production due to excess rainfall will compel poor households in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador to

1 FAO GIEWS Crop Prospects and Food Situation, March 2019

2 FEWS NET Southern Africa Key Messages February 2019

3 EC-DG-Echo ERCC. Daily map. Tropical cyclone Idai impact overview. 18 March 2019

4 FAO 2018-2019 El Niño brief

5 FEWS NET Sudan Food Security Outlook February 2019

6 FEWS NET

Table 6 Acute food insecurity forecast

Country	2018 peak number		Estimates for 2019 peak number		Highest expected area classification	Trend in 2019 peak number compared to 2018 peak no.	Main drivers
	Period	Pop'n in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (millions)	Anticipated Peak Period	Pop'n in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (millions)			
Afghanistan	Nov-Dec 2018	10.6	Jan-Apr 2019	10.6	PHASE 4 Emergency	►	Conflict/insecurity; Climate shocks - dry spells, and related displacement
Bangladesh (Cox's Bazaar)	Aug-Dec 2018	1.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Climate shocks - floods
Burkina Faso	June-Aug 2018	1.0	June-Aug 2019	0.7	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Conflict/insecurity
Burundi	Oct-Dec 2018	1.7	Mar-Apr 2019	N/A	N/A	►	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related displacement
Cabo Verde	June-Aug 2018	0.02	June-Aug 2019	0.0	PHASE 2 Stressed	►	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
Cameroon*	June-Aug 2018	0.5	Feb-Sep 2019	1.0 - 2.99	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement
Central African Republic	Aug-18	1.9	Apr-Aug 2019	N/A	N/A	►	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement
Chad	June-Aug 2018	1.0	June-Aug 2019	0.5	PHASE 3 Crisis	▼	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement
Colombia (Venezuelan migrants)	Dec 2017-Jan 2018	0.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Economic shocks - low purchasing power, and related displacement
Cote d'Ivoire	Oct-Dec 2018	0.04	June-Aug 2019	0.1	PHASE 2 Stressed	►	Climate shocks - localized floods
Democratic Republic Of the Congo	Aug 2018-June 2019	13.1	Varies in each area/region	13.1	PHASE 4 Emergency	►	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; health shocks - disease outbreaks
Djibouti	May-18	0.15	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Climate shocks - dry spells
Ecuador (Venezuelan migrants)	Jan-Feb 2018	0.02	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Economic shocks - low purchasing power, and related displacement
El Salvador (Dry Corridor)	Nov 2018-March 2019	0.2	Feb-July 2019	0.3	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
eSwatini	Dec 2018-March 2019	0.2	Jan-March 2019	0.2	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - dry spells and related production shortfalls
Ethiopia	Jan-Dec 2018	8.1	June-Aug 2019	N/A	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - floods; Conflict/insecurity and related displacement
Gambia	Oct-Dec 2018	0.1	June-Aug 2019	0.2	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
Guatemala (Dry Corridor)	Nov 2018-Feb 2019	0.8	March-June 2019	1.1	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
Guinea	Oct-Dec 2018	0.1	June-Aug 2019	0.2	PHASE 2 Stressed	▲	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
Guinea-Bissau	Oct-Dec 2018	0.01	June-Aug 2019	0.0	PHASE 1 Minimal	▼	Political crisis; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Haiti	Oct 2018-Feb 2019	2.3	March-June 2019	2.6	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Economic shocks - low purchasing power; Climate shocks - dry spells and related production shortfalls
Honduras (Dry Corridor)	Dec 2018-Feb 2019	0.5	March-June 2019	0.6	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - dry spells, floods, and related production shortfalls
Iraq	Jan-Dec 2018	2.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Jordan (Syrian refugees)	Apr-18	0.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Kenya	Jan-March 2018	2.6	Aug-Oct 2019	1.0 - 2.99	PHASE 3 Crisis	▼	Climate shocks - dry spells
Lebanon (Syrian refugees)	April-May 2018	0.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Lesotho	Dec 2018-Feb 2019	0.3	Jan-March 2019	0.3	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - dry spells
Liberia	June-Aug 2018	0.04	June-Aug 2019	0.0	PHASE 1 Minimal	►	Climate shocks
Libya	Jan-Dec 2018	0.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Madagascar*	Nov 2017-March 2018	1.5	Jan-March 2019	1.3	PHASE 4 Emergency	►	Climate shocks - dry spells
Malawi	Oct 2018-March 2019	3.3	Jan-March 2019	3.3	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - dry spells, floods
Mali	June-Aug 2018	0.9	June-Aug 2019	0.4	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement
Mauritania	June-Aug 2018	0.5	June-Aug 2019	0.6	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
Mozambique	Sept-Dec 2018	1.8	Jan-March 2019	2.0	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - dry spells, floods
Myanmar	Jan-Dec 2018	0.8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement
Nicaragua	Jun - Jul 2018	0.02	Jun-Aug 2019	0 - 0.09	PHASE 2 Stressed	▲	Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
Niger	June-Aug 2018	0.8	June-Aug 2019	1.2	PHASE 3 Crisis	▲	Conflict/insecurity and related displacement
Nigeria (16 states and Federal Capital Territory)	June-Aug 2018	5.3	June-Aug 2019	4.5	PHASE 3 Emergency	▼	Conflict/insecurity and related displacement; Climate shocks - floods
Pakistan (Sindh drought-affected areas)	Oct-18	2.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Climate shocks - dry spells; Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement
Palestine (occupied territories of)	Jan-Dec 2018	1.7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Peru (Venezuelan migrants)	Jun-18	0.04	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Economic shocks - low purchasing power, and related displacement
Senegal	June-Aug 2018	0.8	June-Aug 2019	0.4	PHASE 3 Crisis	▼	Climate shocks - dry spells
Sierra Leone	Oct-Dec 2018	0.1	June-Aug 2019	0.1	PHASE 2 Stressed	►	Climate shocks
Somalia	Feb-May 2018	2.7	Feb-June 2019	1.6	PHASE 4 Emergency	▼	Conflict/insecurity; Climate shocks - dry spells, and related displacement
South Sudan	Sep-18	6.1	May-July 2019	6.9	PHASE 4 Emergency	▲	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Climate shocks - dry spells; Economic shocks - downturn
Sudan	May-July 2018	6.2	Aug-Sep 2019	5.0 - 9.99	PHASE 4 Emergency	▲	Economic shocks - downturn; Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement
Syrian Arab Republic	Jan-Dec 2018	6.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Climate shocks - dry spells, and related production shortfalls
Turkey (Syrian refugees)	April-Aug 2018	0.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Uganda	Sept-Dec 2018	1.1	Apr-Jun 2019	1.0 - 2.99	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Conflict/insecurity and related displacement; Climate shocks - dry spells and related production shortfalls
Ukraine (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and IDP)	Jan-Dec 2018	1.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Conflict/insecurity and related displacement; Economic shocks - low purchasing power
Yemen	Dec 2018-Jan 2019	15.9	Jul-Sep 2019	15+	PHASE 4 Emergency	▲	Conflict/insecurity, and related displacement; Economic shocks - downturn
Zambia	Oct 2018-Mar 2019	1.2	Jan-March 2019	1.2	PHASE 3 Crisis	►	Climate shocks - dry spells
Zimbabwe	Oct 2018-Mar 2019	1.9	Feb-May 2019	2.9	PHASE 4 Emergency	▲	Economic shocks - low purchasing power; Climate shocks - dry spells, floods

* Due to differences in areas covered between analyses, the 2018 and 2019 peak numbers are not directly comparable

The situation in southern African countries (eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) is expected to deteriorate in late 2019. The estimates peak numbers for Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, eSwatini, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia remained unchanged between 2018 and 2019 as the same analysis was used to assess the peak numbers of both years. The estimate for Somalia covering Feb-June 2019 was produced excluding the mitigating effects of humanitarian food assistance. For Burkina Faso and Mali, the trend reflects not only the peak to peak comparison, but also the increasing insecurity that affects food security in the country

be market-dependent well before the traditional lean season (March instead of May).⁷ These households have already exhausted their capacities to cope with weather-related shocks and many face income losses because of decreased international price of coffee.

While expected above-average precipitations in large portions of Asia, including Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and northern Pakistan, are expected to be largely beneficial for crop production and pasture regeneration, they could also cause destructive flooding, while in Far East Asia, dry conditions were expected to occur in Papua New Guinea and the Philippines.

In addition, insufficient rainfalls in 2019 are expected to affect crop and livestock production in Djibouti, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda. Extreme climate events are very likely to occur and affect food security in other countries already confronting food crises, such as Bangladesh (floods/landslides) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (drought and floods). Recurrent hazards are expected in Mauritania (dry spells), north Nigeria (floods) and Myanmar (floods).



Economic instability

Conflict, local insecurity, or political volatility can result in economic instability or severe growth slowdowns. These situations can manifest in reduced living standards, sharp currency depreciations and limitations in the capacity of governments to respond effectively to food crises. Some of the most pertinent consequences of economic instability include a reduction in a country's import capacity that can reduce national food supplies, and sharp increases in food prices that curb access to food. Higher fuel costs, often resulting from currency depreciations, can further push up food prices and lack of work opportunities weaken the ability of farmers and smallholders to invest in inputs needed to increase crop yields or to build their resilience to shocks.

In 2019, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe are expected to continue to be afflicted by economic instability, with acute repercussions for the food security of vulnerable households. The poorest households are normally the most affected by rising prices of food commodities, and other essential items, given the relatively high proportion of household expenditure allocated to food purchases. In addition, lack of employment in a weak economic environment erodes households' purchasing power, exacerbating food insecurity.



Disease outbreaks

In emergencies, populations – particularly when displaced in overcrowded camps – are more susceptible to disease outbreaks and epidemics, which strained health systems cannot prevent or control.

In Yemen, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lake Chad Basin and Cameroon's Anglophone regions persistent or increased conflict is expected to further hinder access to health and nutrition services. Cholera outbreaks will persist in 2019 in many conflict and displacement-affected countries and to potentially rise in settings with poor sanitation infrastructure, contamination of drinking water and lack of health services. Following outbreaks in Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, Madagascar, Ethiopia and Kenya in 2018, measles cases will persist particularly in areas experiencing or recovering from a natural disaster or conflict, where routine immunizations are interrupted, and overcrowding in residential camps greatly increases the risk of infection. Measles outbreaks can result in epidemics that cause many deaths, especially among young, malnourished children.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY FORECAST FOR 2019

Regional forecast for Africa




Below-average October-December 2018 rains curb recovery in drought-affected East African countries

In **Somalia**, south-eastern **Ethiopia** and northern and eastern **Kenya**, exceptionally abundant April-June 2018 rains resulted in an above-average main season crop production and prompted a substantial regeneration of rangeland resources. This triggered a marked improvement in livestock body conditions and allowed animal conception and reproduction. However, the October-December 2018 rains were generally poor, resulting in reduced second season harvests and incomplete pasture regeneration. This curbed a full agricultural recovery from the severe drought-induced losses of 2017, especially in pastoral areas.

In **Somalia**, nearly 1.6 million people, mainly in central and northern pastoral areas, are expected to be in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) through June 2019, driven by below-average *deyr* October-December rains

Map 59 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (ranges) in 2019



Source: FSIN GRFC March 2019

in tandem with destitution and displacement from the 2016/2017 drought and protracted conflict. While this is significantly lower than the 2.7 million estimated in February-May 2018, sustained humanitarian assistance will still be vital to reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition, to save lives and protect livelihoods.

In **Kenya**, the lasting impacts of an above-average main season harvest in 2018, high livestock prices and milk production, will generally limit the deterioration in food security beyond *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) levels between February and May 2019. Still, some northern pastoral areas (parts of Wajir, Garissa, Turkana, and Samburu counties) are likely to face *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity following severe rainfall deficits during the second cropping season and/or intercommunal conflicts disrupting livelihoods and food access.

In bimodal rainfall areas covering most of **Uganda**, abundant carryover stocks from the above-average 2018 first season harvest and low cereal prices are expected to support *Minimal* (IPC Phase 1) food security outcomes through May 2019. By contrast, in the unimodal northeastern Karamoja region, as a result of sharply reduced 2018 crop production following poor seasonal rains, large segments of the population are likely to face *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity levels in the first half of 2019. The food security of refugees from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo could deteriorate from *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) to *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) if adequate levels of humanitarian assistance are not provided. Risk of the Ebola virus disease spreading regionally from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where it is currently contained, is very high, given the displacement of Congolese refugees to Uganda.⁸ By 1 March 2019 no cases of Ebola had been reported in Uganda.

In **Ethiopia**, vulnerable pastoral households in the southern Somali region and northern areas of the Afar region, both affected by the rainfall deficits, are expected to face *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) until May 2019. *Crisis* levels of food insecurity are also expected in areas of Oromia, SNNPR, Somali, and Benishangul Gumuz, affected by intercommunal clashes and displacement in 2018, and in parts of Eastern Oromia (East and West Hararghe), where livelihood losses from conflict-related displacement were compounded by localized crop production shortfalls following erratic June-September *kiremt* rains.



Conflicts and economic crises will continue to aggravate food insecurity in parts of central and eastern Africa

In **South Sudan** a steady deterioration in food insecurity levels is forecast throughout the first half of the year driven by the cumulative effects of national and localized conflicts, continued mass displacement, and prolonged years of asset depletion. Only 52 percent of the 2019 national cereal needs have been met by harvests while the ongoing economic crisis will continue to inhibit households' purchasing power and push up food prices. The number of people facing *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity is set to rise from nearly 6.2 million (54 percent of the population) in January 2019 to 6.9 million (60 percent of the population) by May to July. An estimated 50 000 people are expected to be in *Catastrophe* (IPC Phase 5) by the middle of the year.⁹


Despite the good 2018 cereal harvest in **the Sudan**, *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity are expected to persist in the first half of the year in parts of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where the economic crisis is obstructing any potential security improvements, as well as in parts of North Kordofan, Red Seas and Kassala states. Food insecurity is expected to deteriorate during the June-September lean season in line with the worsening macroeconomic situation driving extremely high food and non-food prices and constraining food access for market-dependent households. In addition fuel shortages are likely to negatively affect agricultural production and livelihoods. Hard currency shortages will continue to hamper imports and humanitarian operations. Of highest concern are the IDPs in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North (SPLM-N) controlled areas of South Kordofan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army - Abdel Wahid (SPLA-AW) controlled areas of Jebel Marra, which are expected to be in *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) during the August-September peak of the lean season.

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** food insecurity is expected to remain severe in conflict-affected eastern and southern regions in 2019. In late 2018, an improvement in the security situation in the Kasai region and in the Tanganyika province prompted some displaced households to return, but a resurgence of violence has been reported in other parts of the country, including Ituri, North and South Kivu provinces. The persistence of the Ebola virus disease in North Kivu and Ituri provinces will likely exacerbate the negative impact of conflict on livelihoods. Food availability in

8 WHO. EVD Democratic Republic of the Congo External Situation Report No. 24, 16 January 2019

9 IPC South Sudan

Map 60 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (ranges) and primary drivers and risks in Africa in 2019



Source: FSIN GRFC March 2019

the agricultural surplus producing Beni-Butembo area, at the epicenter of the Ebola outbreak, continues to be diminished by movement restrictions hindering trade flows. In the southern Haut-Katanga region, an agricultural production deficit area that imports 70 percent of its food, especially maize, from Zambia and South Africa, food availability will be undermined by reduced cereal production following poor seasonal rains in several southern African countries.

In the **the Central African Republic**, seven years since the start of the conflict, severe insecurity still prevails across the country. The final months of 2018 were defined by large-scale security incidents, with clashes between armed groups in Ouaka, Ouham, Haute-Kotto, Mbomou, and Nana-Grebizi prefectures and intercommunal conflict in Mbomou, Basse-Kotto, and Haut-Mbomou prefectures. Violence continued in early 2019, resulting in new displacements internally and to Cameroon and other neighbouring countries, and livelihood losses,¹⁰ although a peace agreement was reached in February between the government and armed groups bringing new hopes for reconciliation and lasting peace. Agricultural operations will continue to be severely affected by the widespread conflict, which will continue to cause input shortages and further deplete households' scant productive assets. The 2018 agricultural output was again well below the pre-conflict average, triggering an early start to the lean season.

The situation in **Burundi** remains complex. While security has improved since 2016, the underlying political crisis that erupted in 2015 remains unresolved, and the severe economic crisis that followed will persist in 2019, mainly in the form of foreign currency shortages constraining imports and public spending cuts aggravating high levels of chronic poverty. Administrative obstacles and insecurity are obstructing needs assessments and hindering humanitarian response, particularly in remote areas where needs are highest. Late and poorly distributed rainfall in October–December delayed the 2019 first harvest to January/February 2019, prolonging the lean season by 1–2 months and delaying planting of Season B, which accounts for about half of annual production. A second consecutive poor season would have grave consequences for food security in these areas. In Kirundo, Muyinga, and Bubanza provinces most poor households are expected to face *Stressed* (IPC Phase 2) levels of food insecurity through May 2019, with the worst-affected households likely to be in *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3).



Political crises, insecurity and displacement will restrict food access in parts of northern Africa

For more than 40 years the **Sahrawi refugees** have been living in extremely harsh and isolated conditions in the Sahara Desert in south-western Algeria. Hosted in five refugee camps, refugee families rely primarily on humanitarian assistance to secure their food needs as employment opportunities are limited.¹¹ This situation is unlikely to improve in the coming year, while funding for the crisis is unpredictable.

Since 2011 **Libya** has faced interlinked political, security and economic crises that are driving protracted conflict, increasing displacement, damaging its economy, weakening State institutions, and facilitating criminal gangs and the existence of armed militias. A major liquidity crisis is having a severe impact on vulnerable people who have limited access to cash. This, in tandem with low incomes, limited savings and spiralling food prices, is curtailing their access to food. The majority of households that are still engaged in agricultural production report challenges such as power cuts, increased insecurity and the inability to access or afford inputs, including animal fodder and veterinary services. An estimated 298 000 people need food assistance in 2019 including 94 000 migrants and 23 000 refugees, according to the 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview.



Reduced seasonal rains diminish 2019 production prospects across areas of southern Africa

In most countries of southern Africa, the number of food insecure was projected to remain stable at the start of 2019, corresponding with the peak of the lean season. However, in **Zimbabwe**, owing to spikes in staple food prices since October 2018, food security worsened significantly between January and March 2019. The sharp price increases were instigated by severe fiscal challenges, primarily foreign currency deficits and a significant loss in the value of the Zimbabwean bond note on the parallel market that caused a steep hike in import costs. The price increases, notably for cereal products, reduced access to food, at a time when households are increasingly reliant on market supplies.

Harvesting of the 2019 main season food crops from April is expected to foster transitory improvements in food security, except in **Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique,**

10 FAO GIEWS Crop Prospects and Food Situation, March 2019

11 WFP Food Security Assessment 2018

Namibia and **Zimbabwe** where reduced seasonal rains between October 2018 and January 2019 are likely to result in below-average 2019 harvests, especially as most agricultural production is rainfed. Dry weather conditions have particularly affected Namibia, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, where sharp production contractions will tighten household supplies, and reduce incomes from crop sales.

A further risk to subregional food security is a projected decline in cereal production in **South Africa**, the main exporter of grains for structurally cereal-deficit countries in the sub-region. Increased South African grain prices are expected to raise import costs for these countries. This, in turn, would exert additional upward pressure on domestic food prices in import-dependent countries. By contrast, in **Madagascar** and **Malawi**, weather conditions have been more favourable, boosting the food production outlook for 2019. At the national level, the number of food insecure is not expected to rise, but higher prices of staple foods and localized weather shocks are likely to prevent any significant improvements. In **Zambia**, the outlook is more mixed. In southern parts, crop conditions point to a second consecutive annual decline in food production, which would accentuate the impact of the poor harvest in 2018 and likely result in further stresses to food security, compounded by the higher year-on-year food prices. Elsewhere in the country, production prospects for the 2019 staple crops are more favourable, which should allow households to recover from the comparatively stressed conditions in 2018.



Food security generally set to improve in West Africa and the Sahel except in conflict-affected areas

In **northeastern Nigeria**, large numbers of poor and/or displaced households will remain heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance as severe insecurity continues to disrupt agricultural and marketing activities. About 4.5 million people are projected to face *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) food insecurity or worse during the lean season from June to August 2019.¹² This projected number is 15 percent lower than the same period in 2018, when the estimate peaked at 5.3 million. Favourable weather and localized security improvements resulting in increased yields and plantings, and better market functionality, are likely to improve food availability and access, while sustained humanitarian interventions will continue to avert extreme food insecurity outcomes, saving lives and restoring livelihoods.

More than six years after the start of the conflict in northern **Mali**, intercommunal violence and clashes between armed groups continue to trigger displacements and disrupt the livelihoods of thousands of households, whose capacity to withstand shocks has been progressively eroded by consecutive droughts, floods, epidemics and chronic poverty. Above-average 2018 crop and livestock production thanks to favourable weather conditions, coupled with declining food prices and sustained humanitarian assistance, are expected to improve food security in 2019. According to the Cadre Harmonisé analysis, during the June–August 2019 lean season, about 416 000 people are forecast to face *Crisis* or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), less than half that of the corresponding period in 2018. However, the highly volatile security context will ensure that protection, food, health and education needs remain substantial.

Insecurity in Mali is also affecting northern **Burkina Faso**, which is hosting refugees from Mali as well as IDPs. Attacks from armed groups formed in Mali increased in frequency and intensity in the third quarter of 2018, spreading from the regions bordering Mali to others closer to the capital and toward the east of the country. There are now concerns that these groups could further destabilize the country, leading to waves of displacement in 2019. During the lean season in June–August 2019, 676 000 people are expected to be in *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) or *Emergency* (CH Phase 4), about 32 percent less than in the corresponding period in 2018, mainly due to the above-average 2018 cereal output. However, food security is not expected to improve in the northern Sahel region (Oudalan and Soum provinces), where *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) levels will prevail because of severe insecurity disrupting livelihoods and markets.

Similarly, in **Chad**, the 2019 lean season numbers of acutely food-insecure people are expected to be substantially lower than in 2018. In June–August 2019, about 519 000 people are forecast to face *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) food insecurity or worse, about 40 percent less than in the corresponding period in 2018, mainly thanks to an increased 2018 crop production. However, food security is not expected to improve in the Lac region where *Crisis* (CH Phase 3) levels will prevail, driven by the persisting spillover effects of the conflict in northeastern Nigeria. Furthermore, food insecurity is expected to deteriorate in the Tibesti region from *Stressed* (CH Phase 2) to *Crisis* (CH Phase 3), because of the disruption of livelihoods following the outbreak of conflict around gold-bearing areas since October 2018.

Both **Senegal** and **Liberia** are expected to have fewer food-insecure people during the 2019 lean season than during that of 2018 mainly because of the better 2018 cropping season, while numbers are expected to remain steady in **Mauritania**.

12 CH 2018

AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD) is an organization currently comprising seven countries in eastern Africa, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD’s mission is to assist and complement the efforts of the member states to achieve their multiple development efforts, especially in the areas of food security, environmental protection, peace and security, and economic cooperation and integration in the region.

Since the drought catastrophe in 2011, IGAD coordinates a regional approach (IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative or IDDRSI) to strengthen drought resilience in eastern Africa. The IDDRSI proposes operational and institutional implementation arrangements to end drought emergencies. The strategy recognises the need for a comprehensive and holistic approach to combating chronic food and nutrition insecurity and addresses the poverty and environmental degradation to build the resilience of communities and households to the effects of droughts and other shocks in the region.

For more information on IGAD: <https://igad.int/>

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an inter-governmental organization comprising 16 southern Africa countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its objectives are to achieve economic development, growth, peace and security, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of southern Africa, and support an increased regional integration between member countries.

For more information on SADC: <https://www.sadc.int/>

The Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and The Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA)

The Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (Comité permanent inter-État de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel, or CILSS) is a regional organization consisting of 13 countries in the Sahel region of Africa, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Senegal and Togo. Its objectives are to invest in research for food security and fight against the effects of drought and desertification in the Sahel.


CILSS facilitates the consistent use of the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) by 18 countries in West Africa and the Sahel (its member states, members of the regional Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) and Cameroon) to prevent food crises by quickly identifying affected populations and proffering appropriate measures to improve their food and nutrition security.

The Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires (RPCA) is an international consultation and co-ordination platform drawing on the political leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and West African Economic and Monetary Union and Economic Community (UEMOA) Commissions, including all CILSS countries, plus Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Its technical management is co-ordinated by the CILSS, with the support of the Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat. As an open forum for discussion and information-sharing, the network analyses the food and nutritional situation of the region, and promotes consistent and concerted action. The RPCA priority work areas are the Regional System for the Prevention and Management of Food Crises (PREGEC) and the Global Alliance (AGIR) for fostering synergy, coherence and effectiveness of resilience initiatives in West Africa and Sahel.

For additional information on CILSS: <http://www.cilss.int/>

For additional information on RPCA: <http://www.oecd.org/site/rpca/aboutus/>

Map 61 Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, drivers and risks in Asia and Eastern Europe in 2019



Source: FSIN GRFC March 2019

By contrast, in **the Niger**, the number of acutely food insecure during the June–August 2019 lean season, is forecast at 1.22 million,¹³ more than double the same period the previous year. Violent conflict and instability in neighbouring countries along with tensions within the Niger continue to result in population displacements, particularly in the Diffa, Tillabery and Tahoua regions. The effects of the state of emergency in these areas will continue to hinder the movement of people and goods, and access to markets as well as to farming fields and grazing areas, resulting in price increases, the disruption of livelihoods, and rising levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. Land degradation, pest attacks, floods and forage deficits due to drought in agricultural and pastoral areas have also had negative impacts on food insecurity in the country and put pressure on already limited natural resources, resulting in reduced production outcomes.

In **Cameroon**, food security is set to improve in 2019 in the Far North region thanks to improved security and favourable weather conditions increasing crop production. By contrast, it will deteriorate in Anglophone North West and South West regions, where clashes between armed secessionists and security forces are disrupting agricultural and market activities. As of late February 2019 around 440 000 people were internally displaced in South West, North West and Littoral and West regions.¹⁴

REGIONAL FORECAST FOR ASIA



Drought in East and Central Asia will affect the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

In the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**, poor rains and abnormal high temperatures between mid-July and mid-August, followed by heavy rains and floods in late August and early September, have caused significant crop damage, resulting in a below-average 2018 main season harvest. In addition, the 2018/19 secondary season output, including wheat, barley and potatoes, is estimated at a below-average level, due to erratic precipitations (rains and snow) during the winter months. Reflecting the tight domestic supplies, the already precarious food security situation, with most households having borderline or poor food consumption rates, is expected to further deteriorate in 2019.



High levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist in parts of South and South-east Asia

Food insecurity in **Afghanistan** is expected to remain severe, although conditions are not foreseen to deteriorate significantly. This outlook mostly reflects a projected increase in wheat production following beneficial rainfall recorded in late 2018 that facilitated planting, and sufficient snowfall boosting water availability for irrigation of spring crops. High temperatures, forecast for March–April, could accelerate snow-melt run-off and contribute to flooding in basins that already have high snow-water volumes. An estimated 80 percent of the soil is already in poor condition and subject to erosion following years of dryness.¹⁵

Conflict will continue to limit economic growth, livelihood opportunities and incomes, which will force many households, particularly the poorest, to engage in negative coping strategies, rendering them even more vulnerable to ongoing climate and conflict-related shocks.

In **Myanmar**, violence and discrimination against the Rohingya is likely to persist in 2019, with the most affected populations located in the states of Rakhine, Kachin and Shan. The persisting insecurity is anticipated to impede the full delivery of humanitarian aid. Market disruptions and movement restrictions are expected to persist in 2019, limiting the Rohingya people's ability

13 CH 2018

14 UNHCR buea weekly operational update, 18–22 February 2019

15 FEWS NET Afghanistan Seasonal Monitor February 2019

to engage in income-generating activities needed to strengthen food security. Moreover, the fragile security situation continues to impair production prospects for 2019 food crops in the aforementioned states.

With little prospect of repatriating Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar, the large-scale humanitarian operation targeting Rohingya refugees in **Bangladesh's** Cox Bazar district will continue to stabilize the acute situation in the vast and overcrowded camps, where nearly the entire refugee population, estimated at 911 000 Rohingya as of January 2019, receive food assistance. The influx of refugees is likely to continue to strain the already-limited resources of the host communities. The monsoon and cyclone season risk damaging dwellings and livelihoods. Further population displacement is expected as the government identified a potential location (Bhashan Char) for over 100 000 Rohingya refugees to ease the pressure on overcrowded settlements in Cox's Bazar.¹⁶

In **Pakistan**, below-average irrigation water supplies, coupled with reduced precipitations between October and December 2018 especially in Sindh and Balochistan provinces, raised concerns for the performance of the *rabi* wheat crop, to be harvested in April and May 2019.



Protracted conflicts to prolong severe humanitarian crises in large areas of Western Asia/Middle East

After the end of military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in late 2017, the humanitarian context in **Iraq** has transitioned into a post-conflict phase, with an estimated more than 4 million IDPs returning to their areas of origin in late 2018. However, a volatile security situation and unpredictable dynamics throughout the country still affect livelihoods and humanitarian assistance. Attacks by armed groups continue to be carried out along with small-scale military operations, resulting in new displacements and affecting the IDP return rate. In addition, new sources of instability are emerging linked to rising poverty rates, delays in community reconciliation, lack of livelihood opportunities, and political and social tensions, which cause small-scale new displacement.

In **Yemen**, the humanitarian situation is expected to deteriorate further in 2019, especially in western Al Hodeidah, Amram, Hajjah, Taizz and Sa'ada governorates, which are among the areas worst-affected by the conflict. Four years of protracted conflict have left the country's critical economic and civil infrastructure in ruins, displaced millions of people, led to massive loss

of income and livelihoods, sharply increased prices of basic foods and pushed the economy towards collapse. In January prices of imported staples (wheat flour, wheat grains, non-basmati rice, sugar) were above their year-earlier levels, and the quantity of commercial food imports reportedly reached its lowest since July 2016. Significant disparities in food and fuel prices between urban and rural areas exist, depending on the security situation, the proximity to main ports, the state of supply routes as well as the integration with other market networks such as humanitarian assistance programmes.¹⁷

In **Palestine**, the conflict with Israel continues to generate severe humanitarian needs among the Palestinian populations of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. In 2018 the highest escalation of violence since the 2014 war resulted in increased shelter, protection, health, and livelihoods needs, as well as disruptions to humanitarian access on an intermittent and often unpredictable basis. In the Gaza Strip, the increased violence and the continuous degradation of the economic environment, with soaring unemployment rates, has the potential to intensify the already alarming levels of food insecurity.

March 2019 marked the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the conflict in **the Syrian Arab Republic**. The humanitarian situation remains dire and has been exacerbated by harsh winter conditions, including torrential rains. The security situation considerably improved in 2018, but with only the governorates in the north-east and north-west remaining outside government control, the war could enter its final and possibly most violent stages, with dismal humanitarian consequences. In addition, wheat production hit its lowest levels in 30 years in 2018, as a result of drought and conflict, and this will negatively affect food security in 2019. The ongoing conflict and lack of agricultural inputs will likely limit production in 2019.¹⁸



Syrian refugees in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey face depleting resources and falling donor funding

A robust response to the Syrian crisis provided by governments and the international community has provided a crucial safety net for Syrian refugees in camp and out of camp in neighbouring countries to meet their basic food and nutrition needs. However, a number of risks face them in 2019 including potential tension with host communities, particularly over employment opportunities, weakening domestic economies, decreasing donor funding and government attention shifting away from the emergency refugee response.

16 JRP for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, February 2019

17 FAO and FSTS Monthly Market Monitoring Bulletin, January 2019

18 GIEWS Crop Prospects and Food Situation No. 1 March 2019

Given the protracted nature of the crisis, refugees' limited resources are continuing to erode, leaving their situation increasingly insecure. In February 2019 5.7 million Syrian refugees were registered, chiefly in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, and many without seeking refugee registration according to UNHCR.¹⁹ Continued commitment and well-targeted programming are essential to keep the situation from deteriorating.

Regional forecast for Europe



Protracted conflict in Eastern Ukraine will undermine food access, especially for the elderly

The civil conflict, which began in spring 2014 in the eastern part of the country, has become increasingly protracted. Unemployment, reduced income and high inflation rates severely limit the food access for about 1.1 million people with the elderly, individuals living alone and women-headed households particularly vulnerable, especially during the cold winter months, when higher heating expenses force families to make cuts in areas such as medication, schooling or food. The humanitarian community in Ukraine is striving to establish a platform of activities that seek better collaboration across institutional boundaries, advocating efforts on issues that cannot be solved by either humanitarian or development partners but require political action.

Regional forecast for the Pacific Islands



Climate shocks and structural fragilities threaten food security of Pacific Island inhabitants

The Pacific Islands region is highly vulnerable to droughts, floods and cyclones, particularly during an El Niño year. Rising sea levels and cyclones destroy already-limited agricultural land, and increase salt intrusion, reducing productivity of land. Traditionally the region has relied on diets consisting of readily available indigenous foods, such as root crops, fish and vegetables. But rapid urban population growth is happening at the expense of rural communities, where agricultural output is falling, while reliance on imported foods with lower nutritional value (e.g. processed meats) is rising. Consequently, households are vulnerable to international price volatility, particularly in urban areas.

These factors, combined with high poverty, limited sources of cash income and low awareness about nutritional requirements will influence hunger risk. Around 3.5 million people (approximately one third of the region's population) live under their countries' national poverty lines and are unable to meet their basic needs. Resilience-building measures are urgently required.

Regional forecast for Latin America and the Caribbean



Dry weather conditions and high food prices bleak food security outlook in the CADC

The Central American Dry Corridor (CADC) is one of the most susceptible regions in the world to climate change and variability with Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua the most prone to drought and long periods of heatwaves during El Niño years, as well as to extreme precipitation. The frequency and intensity of droughts and floods has been increasing in recent years.

CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION SYSTEM

The Central American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana, or SICA) is the institutional framework of regional integration in Central America, composed of the states of Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.

The Program of Information Systems for Resilience in Food and Nutrition Security of the SICA region (PROGRESAN-SICA) aims to increase the sustainability of livelihoods and increase countries' adaptation capacities to climate change. It seeks to generate relevant, timely, valid and reliable information as a basis for the development of effective public strategies and policies. It focuses on building people's resilience to shocks with the ultimate aim of defeating poverty, hunger, and malnutrition.


More information at:
http://www.sica.int/index_en.aspx

19 UNHCR Syria

Map 62 Number of people in Phase 3 and above (ranges), drivers and risks in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2019



Estimates of food insecure population in need of urgent assistance in 2019 (millions)



Forecast drivers of acute food insecurity in 2019



Source: FSIN GRFC March 2019

The outlook for 2019 is even worse than that of 2018 when the El Niño phenomenon prompted extremely dry conditions and an extended heatwave. Around 2 million people are expected to be in *Crisis* or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2019. More than half of these people live in the Guatemalan Dry Corridor and the remainder in El Salvador and Honduras.

The prolonged 2018 heat wave, which caused very high maize and bean losses, will compel poor households to continue to buy food when in a normal year basic grains would be available from their own harvest. As a consequence the annual lean season began in January instead of March/April. While markets will remain supplied, lowering grain prices, low international coffee prices are likely to depress wages and cause an income shortfall, limiting food consumption to basic products, such as maize and beans. The poorest households have already exhausted their capacity to employ survival strategies, such as taking loans, selling breeding animals, using seed stocks, and cutting spending on health, education and agricultural inputs, to ensure access to a basic minimum of food. In addition, political instability in Nicaragua presents a further risk to food insecurity, with potential negative impacts on markets and retail prices.



Food insecurity and emigration are likely to remain high or increase in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

In **Venezuela**, the humanitarian and food security situation is likely to remain very severe over the coming quarters, as hyperinflation and local currency devaluation continue to critically erode households' purchasing power and access to food. A collapse of real salaries and in the value of the local Bolivar currency, shortages of food, medicine and basic supplies, and the deterioration of health-education and infrastructure are heavily affecting people's lives.

In January 2019, the National Assembly President Juan Guaidó declared himself interim leader and has been recognised by several countries. Demonstrations and protests have escalated across Venezuela, and external pressure has mounted to back the self-declared interim president, while other countries back the current government. At this stage, it remains unclear how the political impasse will be resolved.

Large numbers of Venezuelans will continue to leave the country. **Venezuelan refugees and migrants** worldwide were estimated at 3.4 million in January 2019, with 80 percent of them hosted in Latin America and the Caribbean (1.1 million in Colombia, 506 000 in Peru, and 288 000 in Chile). At the end of 2018, UNHCR and IOM estimated that an additional two million people

might leave the country over the upcoming 14 months.²⁰ Humanitarian needs to assist refugees and migrants in host countries are expected to remain significant in 2019.



Inhabitants of Caribbean islands continue to face frequent and intense natural disasters

According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) the **eastern Caribbean islands** are the second most hazard-prone in the world (after the Asia-Pacific region). Inhabitants face tropical storms and hurricanes from early June to the end of November (particularly in the small island states of St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda as well as Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti) and floods, with regular annual losses from disasters estimated at 3 billion USD per year. In its 2018 Caribbean Outlook report, ECLAC recommended that governments in the region improve resilience by undertaking recovery and reconstruction assessments.

Food insecurity is projected to intensify in **Haiti** following below-average harvest output in 2018 chiefly because of dry weather conditions. Inadequate harvests in tandem with increased demand and the impact of local currency depreciation on inflation ensured the prices of maize and locally produced and imported rice, the primary food staple, were higher than year-earlier levels at the start of 2019. Dry conditions and elevated inflation are likely to continue through May: 2.6 million people are expected to face *Crisis* (IPC Phase 3) and *Emergency* (IPC Phase 4) during the lean season between March and June.²¹

The persistence in Haiti of the socio-political crisis, inflation and the depreciation of the local currency against the USD will also contribute to low purchasing power. Public discontent poses a further risk to food security in 2019: violent demonstrations in the capital and other cities have severely cut access to basic services and goods. However, the increase in rice production mainly thanks to an expansion in the planted area and the government's efforts to increase yields through rehabilitation of irrigation and other agricultural infrastructure, will avert a more severe deterioration in food insecurity.

²⁰ UNHCR Venezuela RMRP 2019

²¹ IPC December 2019; FEWS NET

ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project	IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid lands	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
CADC	Central America Dry Corridor	IHL	International Humanitarian Law
CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security	IOM	International Organization for Migration
CFSAM	Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission	IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
CH	Cadre Harmonisé - Harmonized framework	IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
CNSA	Haitian National Coordination for Food Security Office	ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
DHS	Demographic Health Survey	IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	LCB	Lake Chad Basin
FCS	Food Consumption Score	LoC	Line of Contact (Ukraine)
FCT	Federal Capital Territory	MUAC	Mid-upper arm circumference
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
FIES	Food Insecurity Experience Scale	MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
FSC	Food Security Cluster	MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
FSIN	Food Security Information Network	mVAM	mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
FSMS	Food Security Monitoring System	NGCA	Non-Government Controlled Area (Ukraine)
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit	NNMS	National Nutritional and Mortality Survey
GAM	Global acute malnutrition	NRC	Nayapara Registered Camp
GCA	Government Controlled Area (Ukraine)	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
gFSC	Global Food Security Cluster	SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System	SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
gNC	Global Nutrition Cluster	SENS	The Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises	SETSAN	The Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises	SICA	Central American Integration System
HAZ	Height-For-Age z score	SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
HFA	Humanitarian Food Assistance	SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus / acquired immunodeficiency syndrome	SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (Ethiopia)
HDRP	Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan	SOFI	The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview	UN	United Nations
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding		
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee		
IDP	Internally displaced person		

UNHCR.....	High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF.....	United Nations Children’s Fund
USD.....	United States Dollar
VAA.....	Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis
VAC.....	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
VASyr.....	The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
WASH.....	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP.....	World Food Programme
WFZ.....	Weight-for-Height in z-score
WHO.....	World Health Organization

Maps notes

The designations employed and the presentation of material for all the maps in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Annex 1 Acute food insecurity reference table for area classification

Purpose To guide short-term strategic objectives linked to medium- and long-term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.

Usage Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.


	Phase 1 Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Famine
Phase name and description	More than four in five HHs are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse: Minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse: Food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition; OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse: Large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short-term.	Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have an extreme lack of food and other basic needs where starvation, death, and destitution are evident. (Evidence for all three criteria of food consumption, wasting and CDR is required to classify Famine.)
Priority response objectives 	Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.	URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and reduce acute malnutrition.	URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.	URGENT ACTION required to prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.
Area outcomes (directly measured or inferred)					
Food consumption and livelihood change	More than 80% of households in the area are able to meet basic food needs without engaging in atypical strategies to access food and income and livelihoods are sustainable.	Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 2 or worse.	Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 3 or worse.	Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 4 or worse.	Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 5.
Nutritional status*	Acute malnutrition: <5% BMI <18.5 prevalence: <10%	Acute malnutrition: 5-10% BMI <18.5 prevalence: 10-20%	Acute malnutrition: 10-15% OR > usual and increasing BMI <18.5 prevalence: 20-40% 1.5x greater than reference	Acute malnutrition: 15-30% OR > usual and increasing BMI <18.5 prevalence: >40%	Acute malnutrition: >30% BMI <18.5 prevalence: far >40%
Mortality*	CDR: <0.5/10,000/day U5DR: ≤1/10,000/day	CDR: <0.5/10,000/day U5DR: ≤1/10,000/day	CDR: <0.5-1/10,000/day U5DR: 1-2/10,000/day	CDR: 1-2/10,000/day OR > 2x reference. U5DR: 2-4/10,000/day	CDR: >2/10,000/day U5DR: >4/10,000/day

*For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits must be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of a Phase classification. For example, elevated malnutrition due to disease outbreak or lack of health access – if it is determined to not be related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for an IPC classification. Similarly, excess mortality rates due to murder or conflict – if they are not related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for a Phase classification. For acute malnutrition, the IPC thresholds are based on percentage of children under 5 years that are below 2 standard deviations of weight for height or presence of oedema. BMI is an acronym for Body Mass Index. CDR is Crude Death Rate. U5DR is Under 5 Death Rate.

Annex 2 Acute food insecurity reference table for household group classification

Purpose To guide short term strategic objectives tailored to the needs of household groups with relatively similar Phase classifications, which should complement medium and long term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.

Usage Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.

	Phase 1 None	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe
Phase name and description	HH group is able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.	Even with any humanitarian assistance: HH group has minimally adequate food consumption but is unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.	Even with any humanitarian assistance: HH group has food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition; OR HH group is marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.	Even with any humanitarian assistance: HH group has large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR HH group has extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short-term.	Even with any humanitarian assistance: HH group has an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, and destitution are evident.
Priority response objectives 	Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.	URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition.	URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.	URGENT ACTION required to prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.
Household outcomes (directly measured or inferred)					
Food consumption* (quantity and nutritional quality)	Quantity: adequate (2,100kcal pp/day); stable HHDS: no recent deterioration and > or = 4 food groups (based on 12 food groups) FCS: 'acceptable consumption'; stable. HHS: 'none' (0) CSI: = reference, stable HEA: No 'livelihood protection deficit'.	Quantity: minimally adequate (2,100kcal pp/day). HHDS: recent deterioration of HHDS (loss of 1 food group from typical, based on 12 food groups). FCS: 'acceptable' consumption; (but deteriorating). HHS: 'slight' (1). CSI: = reference, but unstable. HEA: 'small or moderate livelihood protection deficit'.	Quantity: food gap; below 2,100 kcal pp/day OR 2,100 kcal pp/day via asset stripping. HHDS: severe recent deterioration of HHDS (loss of 2 food groups from typical based on 12 food groups). FCS: 'borderline' consumption. HHS: 'moderate' (2-3). CSI: > reference and increasing. HEA: substantial 'livelihood protection deficit' OR small 'survival deficit' of <20%.	Quantity: large food gap; much below 2,100kcal pp/day. HHDS: <4 out of 12 food groups. FCS: 'poor' consumption. HHS: 'severe' (4-6). CSI: - significantly > reference. HEA: 'survival deficit' >20% but <50% with reversible coping considered.	Quantity: extreme food gap. HHDS: 1-2 out of 12 food groups. FCS: [below] 'poor' consumption. HHS: 'severe' (6). CSI: far > reference. HEA: 'survival deficit' >50% with reversible coping considered.
Livelihood change (assets and strategies)	Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets;	Livelihood: stressed strategies and assets: reduced ability to invest in livelihoods. Coping: 'insurance strategies'.	Livelihood: accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and assets that will lead to high food consumption gaps. Coping: 'crisis strategies'.	Livelihood: extreme depletion/liquidation of strategies and assets that will lead to very high food consumption gaps. Coping: 'distress strategies'.	Livelihood: near complete collapse of strategies and assets. Coping: effectively no ability to cope.
For contributing factors, specific indicators and thresholds for inferring Phase need to be determined and analysed according to the unique causes and livelihood context of household groups. General descriptions are provided below. See IPC analytical framework for further guidance on key aspects of food availability, access, utilization, and stability.					
Contributing factors					
Food availability access, utilization and stability	Adequate to meet food consumption requirements and short-term stable. Safe water ≥15 litres pppd.	Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements. Safe water marginally ≥15 litres pppd.	Highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements. Safe water 7.5 to 15 litres pppd.	Very highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements. Safe water 4 to 7.5 litres pppd.	Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements. Safe water <4 litres pppd.
Hazards and vulnerability	None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption.	Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption.	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits.	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or food consumption deficits.	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits.

Annex 3 Differences and complementarities between the Global Report on Food Crises and the State of Food and Nutrition Security in the World (ex-SOFI)


The Global Report on Food Crises and the State of Food and Nutrition Security in the World (ex-SOFI) represent multi-partnership efforts that aim to complement each other in providing a comprehensive picture of food security/insecurity around the world. Yet, they have well distinguished objectives and rely on different data and methodologies. The most important differences between the two global reports are presented below.

	The Global Report on Food Crises	The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
Main objective	Informs on the severity, magnitude and drivers of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in food crisis situations across the world.	Informs on the progress towards ending hunger, achieving food security and improving nutrition (Sustainable Development Goal 2) by monitoring long-term trends in chronic food insecurity and malnutrition regardless of drivers.
Geographical coverage	Focuses on the countries/areas affected by food crises. Coverage may vary every year.	Present estimates at national, regional and global level. Includes all countries where data are available.
Information sources	Secondary information mainly based on available Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé (CH) reports.	National official statistics provided by countries in line with SDG indicators endorsed by the UN Statistical Commission for global monitoring of Targets 2.1 and 2.2 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Reference periods	Short-term food insecurity estimates refer to the peak of the situation during the year	Estimates refer to the average situation over a period from 1 to 3 years, depending on the indicator and the timeliness of data reporting.
Timeliness	Provides the most recent and up-to-date information to inform decision-making and resource allocation in crises.	Structural indicators are expressed on a yearly basis or as 3-year moving averages and may be reported with a delay and/or provisionally "nowcasted" to the latest reporting period.
Indicators and methods	<p>IPC and CH acute food insecurity analyses aim to identify populations in need of urgent action, to support response planning.</p> <p>The figures are based on convergence of evidence from a wide range of sources on food security and nutrition outcome indicators as well as contributing factors (e.g. assets, markets, shocks).</p> <p>The methodology is standardized allowing for comparable results across countries and time periods.</p>	Two indicators are used to monitor progress towards SDG target 2.1. The prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) , which calculates the proportion of the population that does not have regular access to enough dietary energy for a healthy, active life using information on the apparent average consumption of food (in terms of caloric food energy) estimated from food balance sheets and on the distribution of food consumption within the population, based on household survey data on food consumption. The prevalence of food insecurity based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), is a timely estimate of the percentage of people facing food insecurity, based on data obtained by asking people, directly in a survey, to report on the occurrence of conditions and behaviours that are known to reflect constraints on access to food. FIES-based estimates can be disaggregated by age, gender, geographic area of residence and socio-economic status.
Figures for 2017	124 million in IPC Phase 3 or above out of 891.5 million total studied population.	821 million undernourished/770 million severely food insecure, out of 7.55 billion total population.

Annex 4 IPC acute malnutrition (AMN) reference table

Usage Classification of areas based on the prevalence of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) measured either by Weight for Height Z-score and/or oedema (WHZ) or Mid-Upper Arm Circumference and/or oedema (MJAC).

Purpose To guide decision-making on addressing acute malnutrition in the short and long term.

Phase Name and Description	PHASE 1 Acceptable	PHASE 2 Alert	PHASE 3 Serious	PHASE 4 Critical	PHASE 5 Extreme critical
	Less than 5% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by WHZ measure or Less than 6% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by MUAC measure	Even with any humanitarian assistance, about 5-10% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by WHZ measure or about 6-11% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by MUAC measure	Even with any humanitarian assistance, about 10-15% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by WHZ measure or about 6-11% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by MUAC measure	Even with any humanitarian assistance, 15-30% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by WHZ measure or 11-17% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by MUAC measure, showing conditions for excess mortality ¹	Even with any humanitarian assistance, >30% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by WHZ measure or >17% of children are acutely malnourished by GAM by MUAC measure, showing conditions for widespread death ³
Priority Response Objective to decrease Acute Malnutrition ²	Maintain the low prevalence of acute malnutrition	Strengthen existing response capacity and resilience. Address contributing factors to malnutrition. Monitor conditions and plan response as required.	Urgently reduce acute malnutrition levels through: 		
			Scaling up of existing capacity and response as well as addressing contributing factors to malnutrition	Significant scale up with external help, if needed, of nutrition response and addressing of contributing factors to malnutrition in close co-ordination with other sectors	Addressing widespread acute malnutrition and death by all means. Also address all causes of malnutrition through greater scaling up of all public health programme interventions in close co-ordination with all other sectors.
GAM by WHZ <-2 standard deviation and/or Oedema	< 5%	5.0 to 9.9%	10.0 to 14.9%	15.0 to 29.9%	≥30%
GAM by MUAC < 125 mm and/or Oedema	<6%	6.0 to 10.9%		11.0 to 16.9%	≥17%
Notes:					
1) The use of MUAC as an alternative for classification and the cut-offs are provisional and pending validation. The GAM by MUAC cut-offs are based on CDC analysis of survey data (unpublished) that best correlate with the WHZ thresholds. Further analyses are also currently underway to determine the need for regional thresholds and potential use of convergence of evidence for classification of severity of acute malnutrition. The application of these thresholds will be evaluated through IPC for Acute Malnutrition Lessons Learning Process in 2016/17. IPC for Acute Malnutrition done by MUAC will have a lower confidence level, which will be indicated by hash lines on the IPC maps.					
2) GAM by WHZ may come from representative surveys or sentinel sites and GAM by MUAC may come from representative surveys, sentinel sites, or screening (either exhaustive or sample screening). See box 2 below for details on reliability score, preference ranking as well as minimum criteria to be considered when conducting IPC for Acute Malnutrition.					
3) GAM by WHZ is preferred over GAM by MUAC. If GAM by WHZ and GAM by MUAC are both available, GAM by WHZ should be used in the classification. If information is available on multiple indicators preference ranking should be used to determine the final Phase.					

¹ Refers to the increased risk of mortality with the increased levels of acute malnutrition.

² Priority response objectives recommended by the IPC for Acute Malnutrition focus on decreasing acute malnutrition levels; specific actions should be informed through a response analysis based on the information provided by analyses of contributing factors to acute malnutrition as well as delivery related issues, such as government and agencies' capacity, funding, insecurity in the area, etc.

Annex 5 Summary table – estimates of food-insecure people in 2018-2019

Country	Total population of reference Number (millions)	Sources	Highest number of food-insecure people in 2018				
			Percentage of population analysed out of total population of reference %	Population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)		Population in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)	
				Number (millions)	% of total population analysed	Number (millions)	% of total population analysed
Afghanistan	34.7	IPC analysis September 2018, covering Nov 2018-Feb 2019	65%	10.6	47%	6.8	30%
Bangladesh (Cox's Bazaar refugee and host populations)		OCHA Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (Mid-Term Review), October 2018		1.3	87%	N/A	N/A
Burkina Faso	20.8	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	97%	1.0	5%	2.7	13%
Burundi	11.2	IPC analysis August 2018, covering Oct-Dec 2018	98%	1.7	16%	N/A	N/A
Cabo Verde	0.6	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	99%	0.02	4%	0.1	20%
Cameroon (7 regions)*	24.8	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	64%	0.5	3%	2.9	18%
Central African Republic	4.7	IPC analysis September 2018, covering August 2018	95%	1.9	43%	1.8	41%
Chad	15.4	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	90%	1.0	7%	2.9	21%
Colombia (Venezuelan refugees)	1.1	WFP EFSA, covering Dec 2017-Jan 2018	100%	0.3	30%	0.3	30%
Cote d'Ivoire	24.8	CH analysis November 2018, covering Oct-Dec 2018	80%	0.04	0%	3.0	15%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	84.9	IPC analysis June 2018, covering Aug 2018-June 2019	66%	13.1	23%	27.4	49%
Djibouti (rural areas)	1.0	WFP EFSA May 2018, covering April 2018	16%	0.15	55%	0.1	40%
Ecuador (Venezuelan migrants)	0.1	WFP EFSA, covering Jan-Feb 2018	20%	0.02	23%	0.1	60%
El Salvador (Dry Corridor)	6.4	IPC analysis November 2018, covering Nov 2018-March 2019	22%	0.2	16%	0.4	28%
eSwatini	1.4	IPC analysis November 2018, covering Dec 2018-March 2019	79%	0.2	23%	0.3	28%
Ethiopia	96.5	OCHA Ethiopia Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, February 2019	100%	8.1	8%	N/A	N/A
Gambia	2.2	CH analysis November 2018, covering Oct-Dec 2018	83%	0.1	6%	0.4	21%
Guatemala (Dry Corridor)	17.2	IPC analysis March 2019, covering Nov 2018-Feb 2019	34%	0.8	14%	1.4	23%
Guinea	10.0	CH analysis November 2018, covering Oct-Dec 2018	100%	0.1	1%	0.9	9%
Guinea-Bissau	1.9	CH analysis November 2018, covering Oct-Dec 2018	65%	0.01	1%	0.1	11%
Haiti	11.1	IPC analysis December 2018, covering Oct 2018-Feb 2019	63%	2.3	32%	2.4	35%
Honduras (Dry Corridor)	9.4	IPC Analysis Nov/Dec 2018, Covering Dec 2018-Feb 2019	30%	0.5	19%	0.8	28%
Iraq	37.0	OCHA Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, November 2018	100%	2.5	7%	N/A	N/A
Jordan (Syrian refugees)	0.7	WFP CFSVA, Avril 2018	100%	0.1	14%	0.4	66%
Kenya	46.3	FEWS NET internal unpublished figures as of 25 January 2019 covering January-March 2018	100%	2.6	6%	N/A	N/A
Lebanon (Syrian refugees)	1.5	WFP EFSA, covering April-May 2018	100%	0.5	34%	0.9	57%
Lesotho	2.3	IPC analysis November 2018, covering December 2018-February 2019	64%	0.3	19%	0.5	33%
Liberia	4.9	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	87%	0.04	1%	0.6	15%

% of population analysed on total population of reference %	Sources	Latest update in 2018				Estimates for 2019 peak needs		
		Population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)		Population in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)		Anticipated peak period	Population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above	Source
		Number (millions)	% of total population analysed	Number (millions)	% of total population analysed			
	No further update					Jan-April 2019	10.63	IPC
	No further update							No forecast
100%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.3	1%	3.3	16%	June-August 2019	0.68	CH
	No further update					Mar-Apr 2019	No forecast	FEWS NET
99%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.01	2%	0.1	14%	June-August 2019	0.01	CH
	No further update					Feb-Sep 2019	1.0 – 2.99	FEWS NET
	No further update					Apr-Aug 2019	No forecast	FEWS NET
93%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.2	1%	1.7	1%	June-August 2019	0.52	CH
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update					June-August 2019	0.05	CH
	No further update					Varies in each area/region	13.14	IPC
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update					Feb-July 2019	0.31	IPC
	No further update					Jan-March 2019	0.25	IPC
	No further update					June-Aug 2019	No forecast	FEWS NET
	No further update					June-August 2019	0.19	CH
	No further update					March-June 2019	1.09	IPC
	No further update					June-August 2019	0.18	CH
	No further update					June-August 2019	0.01	CH
	No further update					March-June 2019	2.63	IPC
	No further update					March - June 2019	0.56	IPC
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update					Aug-Oct 2019	1.0 – 2.99	FEWS NET
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update					Jan - March 2019	0.27	IPC
90%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.02	0%	0.4	8%	June-August 2019	0.04	CH

Annex 5 Summary table – estimates of food-insecure people in 2018-2019 contd...

Country	Total population of reference	Sources	Highest number of food-insecure people in 2018				
			Percentage of population analysed out of total population of reference	Population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)		Population in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)	
				%	Number (millions)	% of total population analysed	Number (millions)
Libya	6.6	OCHA Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, October 2018	100%	0.3	5%	N/A	N/A
Madagascar (southern and southeastern)*	24.3	IPC analysis October 2017, covering November 2017-March 2018	12%	1.5	51%	0.7	22%
Malawi	19.3	IPC analysis August 2018, covering October 2018-March 2019	79%	3.3	22%	5.0	33%
Mali	19.4	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	97%	0.9	5%	3.4	18%
Mauritania	4.5	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	88%	0.5	14%	1.0	24%
Mozambique	30.5	IPC analysis October 2018, covering September-December 2018	94%	1.8	6%	7.8	27%
Myanmar (selected areas)	53.8	OCHA Myanmar Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, December 2018	14%	0.8	11%	N/A	N/A
Nicaragua	6.0	FEWS NET internal unpublished figures as of 25 January 2019 covering June-July 2018	100%	0.02	0%	N/A	N/A
Niger	22.1	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	94%	0.8	4%	5.0	24%
Nigeria (16 states and Federal Capital Territory)	195.9	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	50%	5.3	5%	22.7	23%
Pakistan (Sindh drought-affected areas)	207.8	WFP EFSA, covering October 2018	1%	2.0	87%	0.2	11%
Palestine (occupied territories of)	5.0	OCHA Palestine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, December 2018	100%	1.7	34%	0.8	17%
Peru (Venezuelan migrants)		WFP EFSA, covering June 2018	55%	0.04	14%	0.2	82%
Senegal	16.2	CH analysis March 2018, covering June-August 2018	77%	0.8	6%	3.2	26%
Sierra Leone	7.7	CH analysis November 2018, covering Oct-Dec 2018	86%	0.1	2%	1.5	23%
Somalia	13.9	IPC analysis January 2018, covering Feb-May 2018	89%	2.7	22%	2.7	22%
South Sudan	11.0	IPC analysis September 2018, covering September 2018	93%	6.1	59%	3.2	31%
Sudan	43.9	IPC analysis May 2018, covering May-July 2018	100%	6.2	14%	13.7	31%
Syrian Arab Republic	20.0	OCHA Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, March 2019	100%	6.5	33%	2.5	13%
Turkey (Syrian refugees)	3.6	WFP ESFA, covering April-Aug 2018	60%	0.2	11%	1.3	61%
Uganda	40.0	FEWS NET internal unpublished figures as of 25 January 2019 covering Sept-Dec 2018	100%	1.1	3%	N/A	N/A
Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and IDP)	42.0	OCHA Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, December 2018	15%	1.1	18%	N/A	N/A
Yemen	29.9	IPC analysis December 2018, covering Dec 2018-Jan 2019	100%	15.9	53%	8.9	30%
Zambia	17.6	IPC July analysis covering Oct 18-Mar 19	39%	1.2	17%	2.0	28%
Zimbabwe	13.9	ZIMVAC 2018, covering Oct-Dec 2018	67%	1.9	20%	N/A	N/A

* Due to differences in areas covered between analyses, the 2018 and 2019 peak numbers are not directly comparable. The situation in southern African countries (eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) is expected to deteriorate in late 2019.

% of population analysed on total population of reference	Sources	Latest update in 2018				Estimates for 2019 peak needs		
		Population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)		Population in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)		Anticipated peak period	Population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above	Source
		Number (millions)	% of total population analysed	Number (millions)	% of total population analysed			
	No further update					No forecast		
19%	October 2018 analysis covering November 2018 - March 2019	1.3	28%	1.3	29%	Jan - March 2019	1.30	IPC
	No further update					Jan - March 2019	3.31	IPC
100%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.2	1%	2.3	12%	June-August 2019	0.42	CH
90%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.2	6%	0.9	23%	June-August 2019	0.58	Ch
	No further update					Jan - March 2019	2.03	IPC
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update					Jun-Aug 2019	0 - 0.09	FEWS NET
94%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.6	3%	3.9	19%	June-August 2019	1.22	CH
53%	CH November analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	2.5	2%	14.9	14%	June-August 2019	4.51	CH
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update						No forecast	
81%	CH Nov analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	0.1	1%	1.9	14%	June-August 2019	0.38	CH
	No further update					June-August 2019	0.15	CH
89%	Aug 2018 analysis covering August - December 2018	1.6	13%	3.1	25%	Feb-June 2019	1.56	IPC
96%	September 2018 analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	4.4	43%	4.3	42%	May-July 2019	6.87	IPC
100%	October 2018 analysis covering Oct-Dec 2018	5.7	13%	13.7	31%	Aug-Sep 2019	5.0 - 9.99	FEWS NET
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update					Apr-Jun 2019	1.0 - 2.99	FEWS NET
	No further update						No forecast	
	No further update					Jul-Sep 2019	15+	FEWS NET
	No further update					Jan-March 2019	1.17	IPC
	No further update					Feb-May 2019	2.88	IPC

The estimates peak numbers for Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia remained unchanged between 2018 and 2019 as the same analysis was used to assess the peak numbers of both years. The estimate for Somalia covering Feb-June 2019 was produced excluding the mitigating effects of humanitarian food assistance.

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